Demography and Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

Edited by:
PÉTER TÁLAS
ALEX ETL

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Demography and Migration
in Central and Eastern Europe
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DEMOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Edited by Péter Tálas – Alex Etl
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Introduction

This volume aims to summarise the demographic and migration processes of nine Central and Eastern European countries (including Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine) from the collapse of the bipolar world order until 2018. The book is part of the ten volumes series, which was edited and coordinated by the Budapest based Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies and the National University of Public Service, within the PADOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” project funding framework in an overarching research project “Strategic Analyses for Supporting Governmental Decision-making in the Field of Foreign and Security Policy”. These ten volumes analysed comparatively the different security policy processes of Central and Eastern European countries concerning the fields of security perception; economic integration and interdependence; defence policy role in NATO and EU; foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making; regional cooperation; relations with the United States; relations with Russia; relations with Germany; relations with China as well as demography and migration that is introduced by this book.

There is a general consensus among security policy experts that demographic processes, trends and characteristics decisively influence the strategic position and the security of a state. Central and Eastern European countries belong to a region, where demographic prospects are less and less favourable, while there are several demographic macro processes that have influenced them similarly (but not to the same degree) during the past 28 years. With regards to fertility, these are the trends in the decline in the ratio of women in childbearing age; the decline in the absolute number of abortions; and the advancing of maternal age. With regards to relationships, the most influential macro trends include the declining number of marriages; the increasing number of divorces and the increase of children born out of wedlock. Finally, each of the analysed countries had to experience the general ageing of their societies with a declining ratio of the youth and a significant increase of the average life expectancy. In parallel to the introduction of these most influential demographic processes, the chapters in this volume also aim to answer whether these processes affect the security as well as the security perceptions of the given societies; whether the societies and the political elites interpret them as security issues; and whether these countries prepared the proper plans and strategies to solve or at least to mitigate their problems?

International migration became a global phenomenon for the second half of the 20th century and it also started to gain attention on the field of security studies in this period. The security studies literature analysed migration from two main aspects. Firstly, with regards to the security of the state, it emphasises that national sovereignty might be
challenged due to the loss of control over migration processes. Secondly, the framework of human security, and the security of the individual has become more and more influential on the field, especially owing to the increasing number of refugees. The 2015 migrant and refugee crisis in the European Union led to the emergence of a strong and divisive migration discourse that clearly characterised the phenomenon as a security issue. This was extremely visible concerning the question of immigration which has become openly criticised and significantly restricted in most of the analysed countries. However, this volume also reveals, that besides immigration, the phenomena of emigration, brain drain and skill drain are also heavily affecting the analysed countries. For this reason, our goal was also to answer, whether these countries and their political elites are prepared to handle these issues?

At the end we decided to analyse the two, seemingly different issues of demography and migration together, because of the convincing arguments that the complex demographic problems of the region can only be mitigated in the future through a comprehensive demographic policy that encourages childbirth, supports health preservation and builds on an effective migration policy as well.

We suggest this book for security policy experts, demographers and students who are interested in Central and Eastern Europe and we do hope that this work will serve as a useful tool for further comparative research on the demographic and migration processes of the region.
Trends in Demography and Migration in Austria

1. Population and demographic trends since 1990

Austria, a central European country with 8.8 million inhabitants in 2018, is one of the neighbours of Hungary. The two countries had a shared history during the monarchy, when the Austrian–Hungarian Empire was the second most populous nation and a major power in Europe.

1.1. Population dynamics

During the period of 1990–2018, the Austrian population increased by 15% (Statistics Austria 2017b; 2018b) and according to the main scenario of the latest projections, it will further rise towards 9.7 million by 2050, corresponding to an increase of 10% compared to 2018 (Statistics Austria 2017a).¹

![Population development and projections for Austria 1975–2080, selected scenarios](source)

The regional variation is high; the capital city Vienna is expected to grow by 23%.

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¹ Source: Statistics Austria 2013; 2017a
In the future, the country’s growth will be accompanied by ageing, with the mean age significantly increasing from 42.4 (2016) to 46.3 years (2050). The share of the over-65 age group is projected to increase (from 19% in 2016 to 27% in 2050), the potential labour force (men and women 20–64 years) will decrease (from 62% to 54%), whereas the proportion of the population below age 20 is expected to remain stable (20% and 19%) (Statistics Austria 2017a).

Apart from the main scenario described above, different forecasts for varying levels of immigration exist (Figure 1): Without further immigration, the Austrian population is expected to decrease to 6.6 million by 2080. Low levels of immigration during the coming decades are assumed to lead to a decrease to 8.5 million, whereas high levels of immigration might bring about a stock of 11.5 million inhabitants.

1.2. Ethnic homogeneity

Migration is an important aspect for the Austrian society. In general, different indicators are used for measuring immigration, like nationality, country of birth or parents’ country of birth. Whereas nationality might change due to naturalisation, the country of birth remains the same and is crucial for determining immigration. In 2018, roughly two in ten persons living in Austria were born abroad: 9% in EU member states and 10% in third countries (Table 1). The largest groups were born in Germany (3%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2%), Turkey (2%), Serbia (2%), Romania (1%), Hungary (1%), and Poland (1%). When zooming in on the 1.7 million inhabitants born abroad, we find that the majority (57%) come from these seven countries. Due to the inflow of forced migrants in recent years, Afghans (1%) and Syrians (1%) became non-negligible groups by 2018.

Table 1
Austrian population 2018 and 2003 by country of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,822,267</td>
<td>8,100,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7,125,144</td>
<td>6,962,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>1,697,123</td>
<td>1,137,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU and EFTA-countries</td>
<td>778,487</td>
<td>470,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>227,790</td>
<td>142,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>113,267</td>
<td>41,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>75,069</td>
<td>42,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>75,787</td>
<td>31,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU and EFTA-countries</td>
<td>286,574</td>
<td>212,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third countries</td>
<td>918,636</td>
<td>666,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (including Turkey)</td>
<td>586,229</td>
<td>446,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>166,353</td>
<td>138,098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Between 1990 and 2017, about half a million persons with foreign nationality received Austrian nationality (Statistics Austria 2018d).

3 The category “foreign country of birth” also includes individuals born abroad with native Austrian parents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>141,291</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>122,604</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>160,313</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>135,153</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European third countries</td>
<td>117,266</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51,043</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>230,257</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>74,902</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>44,356</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>46,963</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>138,938</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>69,792</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>54,932</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29,190</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America, Oceania, unknown</td>
<td>47,218</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115,801</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers refer to the population on January the 1st of the corresponding year.

Source: Statistics Austria 2018c

Fifteen years earlier, in 2003, the share of persons born abroad amounted to 14% and was thus 5 percentage points lower (Table 1). Also at that time, Germany, Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia were the leading countries of origin, and even almost equal in size (11–13%, respectively). Slightly more than 5,000 persons were born in Afghanistan or Syria, their number increased to almost 92,000 in 2018.

If both parents were born abroad, the official classification by Statistics Austria distinguishes between first and second generation immigrants. Whereas the first generation includes foreign-born individuals, the second generation immigrants are born in Austria. According to the Austrian Microcensus, slightly less than half a million persons living in the country can be classified as second generation immigrants (Statistics Austria 2018a).

1.3. Hungarians in Austria

Between 2003 and 2018, the number of inhabitants born in Hungary increased from 31,195 to 75,787, and thus more than doubled in this time span. In the past, a large number of Hungarians was seeking asylum due to the political situation in the mid-1950s (about 230,000 in 1956 and 1957). For most of them, Austria was a country of transit, as evidenced by Austrian censuses: In 1951, 6,000 persons had Hungarian nationality and their number decreased to 5,000 in 1961 (Statistics Austria 2013). Hungarian nationals further decreased to 2,500 in 1981, but quadrupled in the following decade to 10,600 in 1991. After a modest increase up to the turn of the millennium (12,700 in 2001), the number of immigrants with Hungarian nationality amounted to 77,113 in 2018 (Statistics Austria 2013; 2018a).4

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4 Hungary became an EU Member State in May 2004. A calculation of growth rates of persons born in Hungary and living in Austria reveals that between 2004 and 2011 the increase was rather modest (annually between 1% and 4%), but was substantially higher between 2012 and 2016, when annual growth rates ranged from 9% to 14%.
2. Demographic challenges: Public debate and policy impact

Low fertility, rapid ageing, as well as the size and composition of migration flows constitute the demographic challenges Austria is witnessing. While low fertility rates are rarely discussed, ageing is highly relevant in the public debate at least since the late 1990s and early 2000s. During the last years, however, migration issues – already a prominent topic since the early 1990s – dominated the public discourse and political elections on several administrative levels.

2.1. Fertility

For several decades, fertility rates were below societal reproduction level. The total fertility rate was 1.53 in 2016 (Statistics Austria 2018e). Fertility behaviour varies substantially by country of birth and among foreign-born women. The growing Turkish minority stands out for its high fertility level: Among Turkish immigrant women born between 1955 and 1960, the mean number of children amounted to 3.07, compared to 1.74 among women born in Austria and 1.64 of women born in the EU15 (Fürnkranz-Prskawetz et al. 2012). Austria is characterised by general family support and in the last decades policies fostering work-family reconciliation were established, in particular by investing in childcare facilities for (preschool) children (Blum et al. 2014).

2.2. Ageing

The average age of the Austrian population was 36.1 years on January 1, 1970 and 38.0 years in 1989. Until January 2017, it raised to 42.5 years. While about 24.5 people in the over-65 age group were dependent on 100 people aged 20 to 64 in 1989/1990, this figure increased to 29.9 in 2016 (Statistics Austria 2018b). Low fertility rates result in an ageing population challenging the public systems providing retirement pensions, health care and elderly care. From 1993 onwards until 2014, the pension system has been reformed several times. Already the reform of 1993 followed the aim of “financial sustainability” (Mairhuber 2003). In particular, reforms between 2000 and 2004 tried to abolish forms of early retirement and to reduce pension levels. Nevertheless, further reforms seem to be unavoidable and debates continue (Christl–Kucsera 2015).

2.3. Migration

Immigration debates in Austria usually focus on the arrival of asylum seekers (and differences in terms of language, religion and culture) on the one hand and on the need for skilled labour on the other. In addition to the so-called “Blue Card”, introduced in 2009 and following the EC Council Directive for entry and residence of third-country nationals, the “Red-White-Red-Card” was established on the national level in 2011, to foster
immigration of highly qualified workers and skilled workers in shortage occupations.\(^5\)

In the realm of academia, two issues are worth mentioning. Potential threats of “brain drain” as well as potential gains by “brain circulation” are considered. Both refer to the “Germanization of Austrian universities”. On the one hand, laws guaranteeing “open access” to higher education lead to a significant number of students from abroad (especially from Germany) who are entering Austria for educational reasons and are leaving the country immediately after the completion of their studies. On the other hand, professorships are often appointed to foreign applicants (especially from Germany) while many talented Austrian researchers are leaving the country.

In the course of the last 25 years, the number of foreign students increased substantially (Figure 2). Whereas in 1990, about 17,000 foreign students were registered at Austrian universities, their number amounted to 25,000 in 1995 (the year of Austrian EU accession), and was as high as 75,700 in 2017. The share of foreign students increased from 9\% in 1990 to 27\% in 2017. Conditions of access to university education introduced after EU membership have been qualified as discriminating by the European Court of Justice in July 2005 (Case C-147/03). As a consequence, the number of students from Germany quadrupled between 2004 and 2014 (ÖIF 2014).\(^6\)

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\(^5\) For details see Migration.gv.at (2018).

\(^6\) In contrast to Austria, local admission restrictions for particular degree programs are often based on final grades of university entrance qualifications in Germany.
Due to the increasing number of German students at Austrian universities, several countermeasures were introduced (e.g. limited number of new students, quotas reserved for students with Austrian school leaving certificates), which were debated by the EU Commission. In 2017, the Commission decided not to lodge a claim against the quota in medical studies, as Austria was able to demonstrate its necessity, arguing that the provision of health care in the future could get problematic without a quota. Shares of German graduates in medical sciences had significantly increased during the last years (from 5 to 18% between 2009 and 2014). Less than 8% of German graduates in medicine stay in Austria as compared to more than 90% of graduates with Austrian school certificates (Leidenmüller 2016). The quota for dental medicine studies, however, had to be abolished.

The free movement of workers and services, two of the fundamental freedoms of the EC, ensure that citizens of EU member states are allowed to participate in the Austrian labour market without migrating to the country. Although Austrian families are often dependent on workers and services from abroad (e.g. in elderly home care, Austria is profiting from the so-called “care drain” (cf. Bahna 2015), many are afraid of wage dumping by cheaper workers from Eastern neighbours and resulting increases in unemployment among native Austrians. As a temporary solution, transitional arrangements were introduced: Citizens living in the eight enlargement states of 2004 were not granted employment rights in Austria and services in protected economic sectors were forbidden until May 2011 (e.g. gardening, cleaning, construction work). For citizens of Bulgaria and Romania, restrictions were maintained until the end of 2013. A recent study showed that the arrival of additional foreign job seekers since 2011 raised unemployment first but should lead to higher employment levels in the long run (Schiman 2018). Whether the restrictions for Croatian citizens will be prolonged until 2020 is a present matter of debate (Kopf 2018).

3. Migration trends, public perception and policy reactions

3.1. Past migration trends

Since the Second World War, diverse waves of immigration have had a strong impact on Austria. Most importantly, the dominant view on immigration has mainly been influenced by the “classic” labour migrants of the 1960s and 1970s, when workers recruited from abroad compensated shortage in manpower in many European countries (e.g. in Belgium, France or Germany). As Austrian companies had problems to recruit workers from Italy and Spain, labour recruitment agreements were established with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966) (Bauer 2008; Gächter 2008). Although these so-called “guest workers” were expected to return to their home countries, many of them stayed in Austria. In particular workers from Yugoslavia (the largest group) and Turkey shaped the image Austrians held of an immigrant for decades.

In the past, Austria received high numbers of asylum seekers, due to its geographical location, the historical legacy of the Habsburg Empire and the political turmoil in the neighbouring countries (Halilovich 2013; Fassmann–Stacher 2003) (Figure 3). For a long time, Austria understood itself as a traditional “asylum country” and a “gateway to the West” (Bauer 2008; Böse et al. 2001). About 230,000 Hungarians in 1956–1957
Trends in Demography and Migration in Austria

(as mentioned above), 160,000 Czechoslovakians in 1968, almost 140,000 Poles in 1981–1982, and about 250,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union between 1973 and 1989 found refuge in Austria. For many of them, Austria was an intermediate stop on their journey to other Western countries. Nevertheless, the knowledge about the national imagination of being an asylum country is important to understand the later developments in Austria.

During the last 25 years, the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989), the war in Yugoslavia (1991–1995), Austria’s accession to the EU (1995), and the EU eastward enlargements (2004, 2007, 2013) induced immigration to Austria (HINTERMANN 2000; VERWIEBE et al. 2015). Inflows are particularly relevant for Vienna: The city’s population – stagnating from the 1950s to the 1980s – started to increase substantially in the 1990s (City of Vienna 2014), due to refugees from Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkish immigrants’ families, and inflows from EU member states following EU accession. Since then, Germans, Romanians and Poles constitute the largest groups to come to Vienna (MA23 2016), commonly better educated than both the labour migrants of the 1960s and 1970s and the native Austrian population (FASSMANN et al. 2014).

3.2. Public perception of migration and civil society action

The general perception of immigration to Austria varies in accordance with the respective period of migration and broader societal developments. Until the 1973 oil crisis, migrants were associated with economic growth and around 1990 with issues of human rights,
allowing for positive images of the arriving immigrants and the host society alike. In times of economic downturns, however, competition and prejudices about foreigners come to the fore (Gold 2013).

Within the short period of 1989–1993, the number of foreign citizens in Austria almost doubled (Bauer 2008). In the course of the fall of the Soviet Union, almost 90,000 people sought for asylum (Figure 3). Reasons were manifold (e.g. the regime change in Romania in 1989–1990, wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Chechnya). “Supported by the yellow press in Austria and politically exploited in the course of a federal elections campaign, a highly emotional anti-asylum seeker-discourse emerged, introducing notions of ‘abuse of asylum’ and rising sensitive issues in connection with the dispersal of asylum seekers in Austria” (Böse et al. 2001, 7). The populist Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs − FPÖ) used this tailwind to start a petition called “Austria First” (“Österreich zuerst”) in 1992–1993, aiming at the creation of legal measures that permanently secure the right to a homeland for all Austrian citizens and that ensure a restrained immigration policy to Austria (Austrian Parliament 1993). Exactly 416,531 citizens (7%) signed this petition between January 25 and February 1, 1993 (BMI 2018b). Other parties and large parts of the civil society reacted. Most notably, the NGO “SOS Mitmensch” (“SOS Fellow Human Being”) was founded in December 1992 (SOS Mitmensch 2018). Supported by several political, religious and civil organisations, it arranged a “sea of lights” in Vienna on January 23, 1993, an event against xenophobia, where approximately 250,000 to 300,000 people participated.

Another noteworthy initiative is “Nachbar in Not” (“Neighbour in Need”), founded in 1992 by the Austrian public service broadcasting company (ORF) together with a number of well-known NGOs. For ten years, money was collected to support the victims of the Yugoslav wars and reconstruction in the successor states of Yugoslavia. This initiative – since 2003 a foundation – provides on-site assistance and seems to be compatible with both the Austrian tradition of support for people in need, as well as the latent scepticism against having “too many” foreigners in the country.

The next peaks in asylum applications in the late 1990s and early 2000s were related to the wars in Kosovo, Chechnya, and Afghanistan (Figure 3). The issue of “crime and security” gained relevance in public and political debates in these years (Gold 2013) leading to two consecutive right-wing governments (2000–2003 and 2003–2007). At this rather unfavourable societal climate for asylum seekers, the retired educator Ute Bock established the “Ute Bock Verein” (“Ute Bock Society”) to support accommodation and integration of asylum seekers and refugees.

In late 2015, when large numbers of asylum seekers arrived in Austria, and further more crossed the country on their way to Germany and the Nordic countries, voluntary organisations and initiatives were crucial. They provided shelter and support to increasing inflows of asylum seekers “in a context where limited resources and unclear policies kept governmental actors and established NGOs from providing adequate administration and services” (De Jong–Ataç 2017, 28). A “welcome culture” dominated the country until

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7 This organisation is observing the implementation of human rights until today.
8 Smaller demonstrations were also organised in other Austrian cities.
9 In the course of the last 25 years, it extended and changed its focus several times. Currently, campaigns focus on famine in Africa or Yemen and on refugee aid in Syria.
the turn of the year 2015–2016, characterised by a large involvement of the civil society. For example, about 100,000 people joined a demonstration and the concert *Voices for Refugees* in Vienna on October 3, 2015 (Volkshilfe 2015).

In Austria, particularly the print media is often perceived to transport prejudices and everyday racism while reports in radio and TV programs are usually more nuanced and less discriminating (ECRI 2012; Verwiebe et al. 2015). When contempt against refugees was expressed – far and foremost by populist politicians — it was mostly expressed as costs for welfare states and the threat that Islam was posing to the social and religious cohesion of the receiving societies. Across Europe, nationalists made political gains and Austria was no exception. In the public debate, the religion of both migrants and refugees is a growing issue. It increased even more as the country had both presidential elections in 2016 and parliamentary elections in 2017, in which religion became one of the recurrent themes (Buber-Ennser et al. 2018). The coalition of the social-democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) and the conservative people’s party (Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) which was in power since 2007 lost the legislative elections, with a coalition of the people’s party (ÖVP) and the far right-wing party (FPÖ) being in power since fall 2017.

### 3.3. Attitudes towards migration

Data of three rounds of the *European Social Survey* in Austria provide evidence on changes in general attitudes on migration. We selected the questions whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live, whether the country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants and whether immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy. To cover long-term trends, we compare findings for 2002 with current ones. To assess the impact of the 2015 “refugee crisis”, we compare results for 2014 with findings for 2016. In addition, we compare Vienna to the rest of Austria. With a population size of nearly 1.9 million, Vienna is the only metropolis of the country and attitudes on migration are much more positive than in the rest of Austria (Verwiebe et al. 2015; Friesl et al. 2010). The analysis is restricted to natives (i.e. those *not* having two foreign-born parents).

Table 2 reveals a significant long-term trend of decreasing positive attitudes on migration between 2002 and 2016. This trend is most strongly pronounced with regard to the cultural impact of migration. Attitudes towards migration seem to be predominantly negatively shaped nowadays: In 2016, the average score in culturally and economically related attitudes dropped below the mid of the 10-point scale. Between 2014 and 2016 – the time before and after the new refugee migration – attitudes on migration did not change remarkably (except some declining positive views on the cultural consequences of migration on the country). In other words, not much impact of the “refugee crisis” on the individual attitudes on migration can be observed. The negative trend in the culturally related attitudes on migration is much more severe in Vienna than in the rest of Austria (mean difference: –0.79 vs. –0.34). Still as expected, within Vienna, all observed attitudes on migration are significantly more positive than in the rest of Austria.
Table 2
General attitudes of natives towards migrants in Austria 2002 to 2016 (means)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2016 (ref.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Immigrants make the country worse or better place to live?”</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = worse place to live, 10 = better place to live)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Total</td>
<td>4.65*** (***)</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>5.32*</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Austria</td>
<td>4.50*** (***)</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (weighted)</td>
<td>1,906</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2016 (ref.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“The country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants?”</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = cultural life undermined, 10 = cultural life enriched)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Total</td>
<td>5.72*** (***)</td>
<td>4.77**</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>6.47***</td>
<td>6.07**</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Austria</td>
<td>5.54*** (***)</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (weighted)</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2016 (ref.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy?”</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = bad for the economy, 10 = good for the economy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Total</td>
<td>5.52*** (***)</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>6.45*** (***)</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Austria</td>
<td>5.31*** (***)</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (weighted)</td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Statistical differences of means to the year 2016 were tested by using Games–Howell and Tukey HSD post hoc tests. Statistical differences of means between 2002 and 2014 are shown in the column of 2002 in parentheses. Statistical differences of means between Vienna and the Rest of Austria (not shown) were tested by using independent t-tests proving significant differences in every respect (all p < .001). *p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001)

Source: European Social Survey (Austria): Round 1 2002, Round 7 2014, Round 8 2016; own calculations

Just recently, a study using Eurobarometer data (ENNser-JeDenastik – GAHN 2018) revealed interesting developments and patterns in attitudes towards different immigration groups in Austria. First, although attitudes towards immigration from third countries went negative in late 2015, they improved again later. Today, they are on comparable levels as in 2014. Second, immigration from EU member states is perceived more positively than immigration from third countries. Third, immigration from EU member states is seen even more positive in 2018 than in 2014.

3.4. Policy reactions

In the last decades, immigration laws were more and more restricting immigration. The Settlement and Residence Act from 1993 is an important landmark. It dealt with allowances to stay in the country permanently by defining criteria to get an immigrant visa (GÜNGÖR–RIEPL 2008; VERwieBE et al. 2015) and amended employment allowances for non-Austrians, a frequently debated issue (GÄCHTER 2008) (Figure 4).
for foreign employees (10% of the potential labour force, later reduced to 8 and 7%), in 1992–1993 yearly ceilings for different immigrant groups and in 1996 quotas for “key workers” were introduced (BAUER 2008; HORVATH 2014). During the 1990s, the main political aim was to restrict the increase in the total stock of immigrants, but at the same time, integration of immigrants slowly gained relevance. Knowledge of German language was defined as a main indicator of successful integration which in turn became a relevant criterion for naturalisation (GÜNGÖR–RIEPL 2008).

From 1987 to 2000, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) were in power, followed by a coalition between the conservative ÖVP and the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) (2000–2007) that further restricted immigration laws. Two reform packages of laws relating to foreigners in 2002 and 2005–2006 included far-reaching amendments. Most importantly, immigrants wanting to receive a settlement permit had to commit to learn the German language and visit a language course. In addition, labour market driven immigration was almost entirely restricted to the category of “key workers” (GÜNGÖR–RIEPL 2008; VERWIEBE et al. 2015). Nevertheless, numbers of employed people with foreign citizenship increased substantially in those years, because of more and more EU citizens working in Austria and an expansion of seasonal allowances for foreigners (BAUER 2008). A further reform package was implemented in 2011. Most notably, the government – at that time again formed by SPÖ and ÖVP – introduced the “Red-White-Red-Card” to attract highly skilled labour (see Section 2).

In line with the general immigration law, Austrian asylum policy became more restrictive from the early 1990s onwards. Nevertheless, there is at least one important exception: For refugees from Bosnia who did not get the official status of a conventional
refugee, a special temporary residency permit has been created (Böse et al. 2001; Kodydek 2011). Although it was initially planned to be a short-term measure for the specific emergency situation in 1992, this instrument was used for hardship cases until 1998 and again for Syrians in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, large immigrant inflows triggered restrictive reactions all over Europe. Policies soon turned towards border management, reforms of asylum procedures, and security issues (Carrera et al. 2015; Göbl et al. 2016), also in Austria. Notably, the government introduced a maximum ceiling for asylum procedures per year in 2016, the Anti-Face-Covering Act introduced a ban on the full-body veil in public spaces in October 2017, and the Integration Act 2018 established a new integration agreement including compulsory civic orientation courses (e.g. teaching democratic values).

4. Present migration issues

4.1. Cross-border commuting

Since 2011, cross-border commuting is strongly affecting the Austrian labour market. This chapter describes East–West commuting within the Central European Region (Centrope) that encompasses eight regions of Austria, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia (Figure 5). Cross-border commuting in this area is relatively undemanding due to short distances and a well-developed highway and train infrastructure. For instance, commuting between Bratislava and Vienna takes less than one hour (cf. Verwiebe et al. 2017, 253).

Figure 5
The Central European Region (Centrope)
Source: Centrope Agency 2012
According to the Austrian employment service (AMS), in total 58,173 citizens from Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary have been dependently employed in the Austrian labour market within Centrope in 2014. Exactly 27,912 persons, corresponding to 72% of all commuters of the Eastern European neighbouring countries in Austria, commuted into the north-eastern border area of Austria (Figure 5). During the last years, the relevance of cross-border commuting in comparison to traditional labour migration rose: While the share of cross-border commuters among the foreign labour force from Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary was 39% in 2007, it rose in the year of the opening of the Austrian labour market (2011) to 44% and reached 48% in 2014. Most of the East–West cross-border commuters in Centrope are Hungarians (19,639 or 70%) (cf. Haindorfer 2019, 35).

East–West cross-border commuting is an important mean to improve individual standards of living (cf. Haindorfer et al. 2016, 51). Data from the TRANSLAB-Survey among cross-border commuters from Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary demonstrates that the subjectively anticipated higher income in Austria is the most important motive for cross-border commuting. It is mentioned by nearly 96% of commuters to Austria. In addition, 88% state that the protection of their living standard and 84% that the existence of better income opportunities for people with same qualifications are very important. In contrast to the financial motives, job-related motives seem to be of minor relevance: Only 46% rated the improvement of occupational qualifications as an important commuting motive. At least, 76% mentioned better working conditions in Austria (Haindorfer 2019, 166).

Figure 6
Dependently employed migrants and commuters of Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary on the Austrian labour market of the Central European Region 2004–2014 (yearly averages)

Source: AMS monitoring of employment careers 2015; own calculations
Closely related to this topic are discussions about the provision of welfare benefits in Austria. For instance, the present right-wing government is planning to change the national legislation regarding family allowance: For parents working in Austria with minor children residing in the country of origin, family allowances shall be adapted to the living costs in the country of residence. This would result in lower transfers for parents with children in Hungary or other CEE countries. However, the implementation of this policy is unlikely as it is violating EC law (Leidenmühler 2018).

4.2. The 2015 refugee inflow

The vast majority of the persons seeking refuge in Europe aimed to apply for asylum in Germany, but a substantial number also came to Austria. In total, 88,340 individuals applied for asylum in Austria in 2015 (BMI 2017), corresponding to about 1% of the Austrian population and almost 7% of all asylum applicants in the EU in 2015, and making it the 4th biggest receiver of asylum seekers in that year (Eurostat 2016). Despite this large inflow in 2015, the historic peak has been already reached in 1956 with more than 170,000 (mainly Hungarians) asylum seekers (Figure 3).

During 2015–2017, about 156,000 asylum applications were filed, half of them from Syrians (26%) and Afghans (26%) (BMI 2016; 2017; 2018). In that period, roughly 77,000 individuals were officially granted asylum. A substantial number of asylum applications is still pending and will lead to a certain time lag in peaks of asylum applications and granted asylum status.

Analyses of previous forced migration flows to Austria, such as Prettenthaler et al. (2017), find a clear positive impact on the host society’s resource allocation, welfare and revenue. For the current cohort of refugees and asylum seekers, similar effects were reported for Austria’s most immediately relevant neighbour Germany, including employment prospects in an overall dynamic labour market (OECD 2017), and the contributions of refugees to the German national budget (Bonin 2016) on the one hand. On the other hand, official levels predict long-term-unemployment of refugees in Germany (Chazan 2017).

While the recent arrivals from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan differ from previous refugee flows to Europe in terms of cultural, socio-economic and religious background, Rengs et al. (2017) suggest a similar picture. In fact, the educational level of displaced persons arriving in Austria in 2015 turned out to be high compared with the average level in their country of origin (Buber-Ennser et al. 2016), and these findings on educational attainment of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan forced migrants are corroborated by further recently collected data in Austria and Germany (Buber-Ennser et al. 2018). The results on educational attainment of forced migrants seem to confirm an “educated refugee effect”, comparable with the healthy immigrant effect (Domnich et al. 2012).

Regarding refugees, a major challenge for the future is their successful integration into the Austrian society. Most importantly, it is argued that access to education and the labour market has to be improved (Eurofound 2016; Riederer–Verwiebe 2015). This is important for at least two reasons: First, only then the potential of immigrants can be fully used to the benefit of the host society, otherwise it could lead to the so-called “brain waste”. Second, the risk of an establishment of parallel societies should be minimised as
economic integration generally also fosters social integration (Riederer 2017). Integration into the labour market is successful only when it does not merely strive for quick results, but aims to make use of existing qualifications and also offers comprehensive provisions for qualifications (Rosenberger–König 2012; UNHCR 2013a; Rengs et al. 2017).

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TRENDS IN DEMOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION IN AUSTRIA


Trends in Demography and Migration in Croatia

1. Introduction

The primary objective of this study is to outline the demographic and migration trends in Croatia, the country which in 2011 covered 0.54% of Europe, with 0.61% of the population of the continent, and only 0.06% of the world’s population. On a global scale, this makes Croatia the 128th most populous country in the world. Out of the 45 European countries, in 2011 Croatia ranked 25th in size, and 28th in population size. The country’s average population density is 75.71 people per km², which ranks 126th in the world. Croatia is slightly more densely populated than Europe as a whole, with 68.6 people per km².

In the Republic of Croatia political and economic transformations of the last 25–28 years have had a decisive impact on the demographic development of the population. The demographic picture of the Republic of Croatia has been characterised by: continuous natural depopulation (higher number of deaths than births), low birth rates, demographic ageing, imbalance in the population age structure, population concentration in the large cities, the spatial polarisation of the population, deepening of regional demographic differences, as well as higher rates of mortality, intensive external migration and increasing emigration. As a result, the country is suffering a deep demographic crisis.

2. Demographic trends

Croatia is facing considerable demographic changes, similarly to the European Union member states (Koudela 2011). Like many other countries in Europe, Croatia is experiencing a decline in its natural population and population ageing. Although the population of Croatia doubled in the last 150 years, nowadays one of the biggest problem is the continuous decline of the population. The first census of the total population of Croatia following modern principles of data collection was conducted in 1857. Since than there have been 15 surveys, the latest one took place between 1 and 28 April 2011, and the population of the country was 4,290,612. The 1961 census resumed the practice of the decennial one (Mrđen 1998).

From the first census on, the population of Croatia has been increasing apart from the two world wars, although in the second half of the 20th century the process was slowed by the decrease in natural change, accompanied by emigration for “temporary work” abroad. In the period 1971–1981 the population growth rate was +4% and in the last inter-census period (1981–1991) it was +3.5%, which was the lowest population growth rate in the entire period from the mid-19th century. The number of the population has risen until
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, reaching its peak in 1991 with 4.78 million people. Since then Croatia’s population has been declining, now reaching the same size as over 50 years ago. Since the eruption of the war in 1991, when the number of deaths was higher than the number of births, the natural population growth became negative and remained so more or less since that year. Positive natural population changes were recorded only between 1995 and 1997. It means that the natural decline became the constant element on the social agenda of the country. This has happened despite the fact that infant mortality has been reduced as a result of the developing Croatian health care system (Klemenčić et al. 2013).

The population density of 75.71 inhabitants per km$^2$ is quite under the EU 27 average, which amounts to about 115 inhabitants per km$^2$. Therefore, compared to other EU countries, Croatia is loosely populated.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Annual growth rate</th>
<th>Population density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>2,181,499</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>2,398,292</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2,506,228</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2,854,558</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3,161,456</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3,460,584</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3,443,375</td>
<td>−0.05%</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,785,455</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3,779,958</td>
<td>−0.01%</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3,936,022</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,159,696</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,426,221</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4,601,469</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4,784,265</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4,437,460</td>
<td>−0.63%</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4,290,612</td>
<td>−0.08%</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2017a

Not only the natural decline but also each of the demographic indicators reflect the gradual decline of the Croatian population from independence to today. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the crude birth rates of the Croatian population were very high (about 40% per year). The total fertility rate [measured by the number of live-born children per woman in her reproductive age (15–49) was the highest in 1890 (6.04)]. Women born at the turn of the century (1899–1903) delivered an average of 3.3 live-born children, while those born in the period 1942–1946, less than two children (1.96). Croatia was the first European country to experience the fall of total fertility under the replacement level in 1968. The average number of live-born children per woman was the lowest in 1992 (1.44) as the consequence of the war in Croatia. The decline in fertility results from a considerable decrease of share of the women who delivered three, four or more children; their percentage
fell to 20% in 1991 (Mrđen 1998). The number of women with one or two live-born children increased since then and now the country’s fertility rate is just 1.5 children per woman, which is below the “replacement level”, one of the lowest in the world. The crude birth rate is lower than the mortality rate.

The reduced birth rate is not a new phenomenon, it started after World War II as a result of several factors, such as the war losses of men, political and economic emigration, de-ruralisation and forced post-war industrialisation (Čipin et al. 2016). Nowadays, the decline originates in many negative social circumstances, e.g. the modern way of life, a reflection of several internal and external influences and events. Among the most cited reasons for low fertility in Croatia one can find the large number of selective abortions, people getting married at a relatively late age, increasing number of single people, fewer marriages, higher number of divorces, extended education, unemployment and job insecurity for young people under the age of 30, a lack of adequate income to leave the parental home and form one’s own family, an increasing number of (mostly inadequately paid) jobs that require work in the so-called atypical working hours (Magaš 2015; Čipin–Ilieva 2017).

Besides these negative demographic trends, the Republic of Croatia has to face the approaching retirement of the so-called “baby boom generation” and its effects on the pension system. Such troubling trends will bring about changes in the population structure, that are population ageing, a reduced or inadequate labour supply, imbalance in the inflow and outflow of pensioners, increased need for health and social protection, etc. The long period of depopulation has resulted in many negative consequences, such as the reduction of the core population producing new generations, the reduction of the young and active working population, and increasing percentage of the older population. Croatia – following all the demographic trends of the European Union – is facing the problem of significant population ageing. This is accompanied with the greatly reduced mortality rates, therefore, a longer life expectancy, which was 77.2 according to the 2011 Census. Life expectancy at birth has been increasing but the comparison with the EU countries shows that Croatia is at the middle bottom of the scale, so the life expectancy is by 2.4 years below the EU average. This difference is higher for men (3.6) than for women (2.5). Life expectancy has risen to 80 for women and 73 for men, leading to the more rapid ageing of the population. Over the last fifty years, the average age of the population has increased by almost ten years, (from 30.7 years to 41.7) according to the last census the ratio between young (0–19 years of age), mature (20–59), and old (60+) population groups has become increasingly unfavourable. The percentage of young and mature populations is decreasing, while the percentage of old population groups is constantly increasing resulting in problems in age structure.

Almost one quarter of the population in 2011 was over 60 years old (24.1%), while fifty years ago, it was just 11.9%. In addition, the percentage of young people dropped to 20.9 while in the 1960s, it was 34.2%. This is also shown by the ageing index, which is the percentage of the population aged 60 and over in the population aged 0–19. The index exceeding 40% indicates that the population of Croatia entered the ageing process (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011b). The process of population ageing in Croatia will continue unless a dramatic increase occurs in birth rates – which is, under the existing circumstances, practically impossible – or an immigration of a population in the fertile age range happens. The ageing of the population is expected to continue, according to some
demographic projections by the year of 2031, the share of the elderly will reach between 20% and 25% of Croatia’s total population (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2007).

If this trend continues in the future and no affirmative measures are implemented, today’s youth will have to deal with the problem of supporting an ever-increasing number of non-active and retired population (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Raboteg-Šarić 2015).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Average age</th>
<th>Ageing index</th>
<th>Age structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2014

There have been a lot of changes in the structure of Croatian families during the last 40–50 years. On the one hand, the share of families without children in the total number of families increased from 24.8% in 1971 to 28.6% in 2011, on the other hand, the share of couples with children decreased from 63.8% to 54.3% during the same period. However, the proportion of father-only families has not substantially changed (2.1% in 1971 and 2.7% in 2011) while mother-only families increased from 9.3% in 1971 to 14.4% in 2011 (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Raboteg-Šarić 2015).

3. The ethnic structure

The Republic of Croatia has a relatively homogeneous population profile but there is also a considerable number of national communities and minorities who live in the country. According to the census 1991, 78.10% of the population were Croats, and their number increased to 89.63 after the war and continued rising to 90.42% by 2011. In 1991 the proportion of other national communities and minorities was 15.89%, among them the most prominent ones were the Serbs with 12.2% of the whole population. Serbs originally moved into the territory of Croatia as border guards during the period of the Habsburg area (Gulyás 2012). They settled in the area of the former Military Border (Lika, Banova, Kordun, parts of northern Dalmatia and Slavonia). The Serb population decreased sharply from 12.2% in the 1991 census to 4.4 in 2001, and 4.36 in 2011 mainly as a direct result of the war. Not only the percentage of Serbs have decreased in Croatia since 1991, but also the number of other minorities – with the exception of Roma, Albanians and Bosnians – and pre-1991 war minority population has fallen from 22% to under 8%. The most drastic decrease is seen among the indigenous national minorities (Serbs, Czechs,
Hungarians, Italians and Slovenians) due to various reasons: natural decline, assimilation and emigration (Rácz 2014).

There are 22 national minorities in recent Croatia, among them the most prominent and populous are the Serbs. There are less than 1% Bosniaks (0.5% in 2001, 0.7% in 2011), Italians (0.42%), Albanians (0.41%), Roma (0.40%), Hungarians (0.33%), Slovenians (0.25%), Czechs (0.22%), and others (Slovaks, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Germans, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Turks, Russians, Poles, Jews, etc.) (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2017a; Magaš 2015).

When Croatia achieved international recognition as an independent state in 1992, all non-dominant ethnic communities received official recognition of their minority status, regardless of whether they had formally enjoyed such a status. However, in the first years of the post war transitional period, minority rights protection did not work. Only after 2000 were important steps made towards the implementation of minority rights – the most important ones are the Constitutional Act on Human Rights and Freedoms and on the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities (2000) and the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities in December 2002. Since then the status of national minorities, particularly the Serb minority, has improved significantly in comparison to the negative treatment in the 1990s (Mesić–Bagić 2016).

According to the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities: ‘A national minority shall be a group of Croatian citizens whose members have been traditionally settled in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and who have ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious characteristics which are different than those of other citizens and who are guided by the wish for the preservation of those characteristics’ (Constitutional Law 2002). The Act grants national minorities the right to use their own language and script, the right to education in their own languages and script, the right to use their own insignia and emblems, the right to cultural autonomy, to practise their own religion, to access public media, the right to self-organisation, and to be represented in representative bodies at national and local levels, and in administrative and judicial bodies (Constitutional Law 2002; Minority Rights Group International 2003).

One of the novelties of the Constitutional Law is the establishment of the Council for National Minorities. Its first elections were held in May 2003. With these elections and the formation of the council sui generis, in addition with the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Croatia entered a new era of the protection of minority rights (Tatalović 2006).

In Croatia, several groups are hit hard by social exclusion and poverty such as the disabled, the mentally impaired, the homeless, the unemployed, the retired and the Roma. Social exclusion and poverty are much more widespread among the Roma than in other social groups. It is estimated that 76% of the Roma and 20% of other population live in absolute poverty. That is why the government adopted the National Roma Inclusion Strategy from 2013 to 2020 in 2012 (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2012).

The Croatians outside the Republic of Croatia include the Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian minorities and Croatian emigrants (diapora). The Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina are as an equal, sovereign and constituent people with Bosniaks and Serbs. Croatia has one of largest diaspora communities among the states of comparable size and population. According to the data of the State Office for Croats Abroad, approximately
3 million Croats and their descendants live abroad. Autochthonous Croatian minorities are located in 12 European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Italy, Kosovo, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Serbia) and their number is about 350,000 (State Office for Croats Abroad 2018).

In Croatia, as in some other countries, the religious and ethnic composition of the population match almost completely. Although there is no “official religion”, according to the 2011 census (Census 2011), the population of Croatia is predominantly Roman-Catholic (86.28%). The second largest religious group is Orthodox Christians (4.44%), (mostly Serbs, some Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Bulgarians). Other significant religious groups are Muslims (1.47%) and Protestants (0.34%). Only 2.2% of the population did not declare their religion, 3.8% are atheists, 0.8% are agnostics or sceptics, while 0.3% have no declared religious beliefs (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a).

4. Regional heterogeneity

Croatia has today a two-tier system of sub-national government. Municipalities, towns and cities represent the local level of government, while counties [županija] referred to as regional self-government units. The municipality is a unit of local self-government, consisting of the territories of several inhabited places representing a natural, economic and social entity, and which is connected by the common interests of its inhabitants (SUMPOR 2004). The capital city of Zagreb, having double, local and regional status, so in total, there are 21 units of regional self-government. According to the Census 2011, Croatia consists of 556 local self-governments and 21 regional self-governments, and they are further subdivided into 6,756 settlements [naselje] (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Alibegović 2012).

More than 60% (276) of the municipalities are too small with a population between 1,000 and 3,000 people and they have too little capacity and financial resources for good governance and efficient management. They have difficulties in using their resources to achieve further development, their finances, staff and organisation are not capable to provide local public services. According to the Census 2011, there are 38 municipalities having a population under 1,000, and in 36.7% of them live just 2,000 inhabitants or less, while 7 have more than 10,000 inhabitants and could become cities according to law. The average population of the municipalities is 2,958, including 10 settlements and 86 km² territory. In spite of the huge difference, they all have the same responsibilities and functions (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a).

The number of the towns has increased significantly – from 68 in 1992 to 127 in 2011 – and there are huge differences among them. The population size of cities varies widely. According to the Census 2011, only four cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants, on the other hand there are 18 that have less than 5,000 and 60 cities having a population below 10,000. The share of inhabitants living in urban areas has increased from 54.3% to 70% during the period of 1992–2011, although many of these cities are too small. Most cities (their number is 58) are medium sized from 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, for one third of the urban population. Many of these urban settlements are not capable either of financing their expenditure or of providing the basic services (Državni zavod za statistiku...
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Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Maleković 2011). That is the reason why they do depend on direct transfers from the national budget and national authorities, as well as the law level of decentralisation (Konjhodžić 2009).

Croatia is characterised by a significant population concentration in several regional and macro-regional centres and economic activities are mainly centralised in these urban areas and in the surroundings. Croatia misses the bigger cities, and the country’s urban development is based on four growth poles: Zagreb, Split, Rijeka and Osijek. According to the Census 2011, only these four cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants: Zagreb has 790,017 inhabitants, Split 178,102, Rijeka 128,624 and Osijek 108,048, and 40% of the whole urban population, one third of the total population lives in these centres (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a; Lőrinczné 2013).

A trend of rural-urban division has continued in the country, which is characterised by a growing concentration of population in Zagreb and a few other macro regional and regional centres (Zadar, Varaždin, Slavonski Brod, Pula, Karlovac and Dubrovnik) and narrow coastal areas, while other regions are being depopulated. It leads us to the problem of huge inner migration from underdeveloped regions (Slavonia, hills, island and rural areas) towards the Western and Adriatic territories and urban settlements.

The results of the latest population census show that the first five counties in terms of population (Zagreb city, Split-Dalmatia, Zagreb, Osijek-Baranja, Primorje-Gorski kotar) encompass half of the total population, while other sixteen cover the other half. The highest population density is registered in Zagreb (1,232.48 inhabitants/km²), which amount is almost 8 times higher than the county in the second place (Međimurje 156.11 inhabitants/km²) – and 16 times higher than the Croatian average (75.71 inhabitants/km²) (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a).

Not to take into account Zagreb, the ratio of population density of the least populated county (Lika-Senj) to the most populated county (Međimurje) is very high: 1:16.4. Besides the differences generated by the number of inhabitants, there are other differences among the regions generated by the geographic position and by land areas they cover. The average size of the counties is 2,700 km², but there are huge differences among the regional self-government units. The most extreme example is Lika-Senj County (5,353km²) which has a territory twice bigger as the average, but the lowest demographic index (9.51 inhabitants/km²). Lika-Senj County covers a land more than seven folded bigger than the smallest county, Međimurje (729 km²) with its 156.11 inhabitants/km². These differences of the fragmented system of territorial division makes more unequal regional units. Significant regional discrepancies are also noticed in the economic and social development of the counties which are usually defined in terms of unemployment rate and GDP/capita in a region, and are aggravated by structural changes, which have social and economic consequences (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011a).

The natural population decline is also visible at the county level. Only three counties have a positive balance: Split, Dubrovnik and Međimurje županija. The natural loss was highest in the ring around the capital city region (Krapina, Koprivnica, Bjelovar, Sisak and Karlovac) and the mountains (Rác 2014).

Initially three NUTS 2 (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, NUTS 2 is the second level which refers to the statistical regions) level regions were introduced in 2006, which was changed in 2013 to only two regions: Continental Croatia encompassing
13 counties and the city of Zagreb, and Adriatic Croatia encompassing 7 coastal counties. Both regions have huge regional disparities. Disparities may not be considerable at the NUTS 2 level; however, significant differences can be noticed at the individual county (NUTS 3) level caused by diverse factors such as their location, demography, population density, economy, transport connectivity to other regions or countries, local conditions, natural resources and different traditions (National Strategic Reference Framework 2013).

According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, the percentage of people at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion was about 29% and the share of severely materially deprived people was 13.7% in 2015. The poverty in Croatia is also characterised by great territorial differences. While in the continental part of the country one in five people are poor, in the coastal region only one in eight people is considered to be poor. The poverty rate on the one hand is the lowest – around 9.8% – in the urban areas of the northwestern and western parts of the country. On the other hand, the poverty rate is very high in the eastern parts of the country. In three out of five counties in Slavonia, the poverty rate exceeds 30%. Regarding the poverty by age, the highest poverty rate was in the over-65 age group, reaching 26.3% in 2015 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

The regional inequality is presented in the existence of the categories of special concern, such as war-torn areas, hilly and mountainous areas and islands, where almost 50% (280) of the total of 556 local self-government units exist. The Areas of Special State Concern territories encompass 180 local self-government units (municipalities and towns), amounting to 15.3% of Croatia’s total population. The population of hilly and mountainous areas counts for 4.8% of the total population, while 131,000 inhabitants live on islands which make up 2.9% of Croatia’s total population. According to existing criteria, altogether 23% of the total population of Croatia falls under the category of areas receiving assistance covering 64.3% of the surface of the country (Lőrinczné 2015).

5. Forecasts and decision-makers’ reactions

On the basis of longstanding changes in the past and the present situation in normal circumstances, (that is, not in wars and heavier economic and social crises) the Central Bureau of Statistics made the population projections of the Republic of Croatia until 2061 when the Croatian population is estimated at 3,554,000. It means that the population could drop by more than 700,000 (16%) in the next four decades. In addition, according to the UN’s world population forecast, the population of the country is expected to be only 2,615,000 by the end of the century (UN 2017). The median age in 2061 would be 49.7 years for both sexes, 47.1 for males and 52.0 for females, which is a substantial increase from the 41.7 median age in 2011. At the same time the share of people ageing 65 or more would increase by around 70% and would account for 29.4% of the total population (17.3% in 2011). Meanwhile the number of young (0–14) would fall from 15.3 to 13.5 in the same period (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2011c; European Training Foundation 2012; Sveučilište u Zagrebu Ekonomski fakultet Katedra za demografiju 2014).

In Croatia, the Ministry of Demographics, Family, Youth and Social Policy performs administrative and professional tasks related to the social welfare institutions, the care and protection of people and families, youth, persons with disabilities, victims of trafficking,
refugees and asylum seekers. The ministry added the name “demography” to its official title in 2016 due to extremely poor long-term demographic trends in Croatia to deal with. Since then the ministry has implemented several social programs that extended social assistance and direct compensation to support the social empowerment of young people, families and children.

Concerning the young people, the Croatian government founded the Youth Council with the goal to supervise and develop national youth policies. In addition, the Youth Advisory Boards Act was issued to form the institution to enhance the participation of young people in public affairs of their interest, active engagement of young people in public life and their informed participation at the local level in Croatia. Despite the legal provision, only 52% of cities, 15% of municipalities and 90% of counties formed youth advisory boards until the end of 2016 (Hrvatski Sabor 2014). In 2007, the law on higher education student unions and other students organisations was adopted, which protects the students’ interests, participation in the decision-making process within university bodies and represents students in higher education structures (Hrvatski Sabor 2007).

In October 2014, the government of the Republic of Croatia adopted the third youth strategy entitled National Youth Program for the Period of 2014–2017 with the aim to make better the activities and responsibilities of state administration bodies and public institutions in order to improve the quality of the youths’ lives for the purpose of their optimal social integration. The Strategy refers to those persons between the ages of 15 and 30 who represent 18.6% of the total population in Croatia (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2014).

In 2017, the Croatian government formed a Council for Demographic Revitalisation which is headed by the Prime Minister and its task is to give proposals and recommendations on the demographic policy and monitor the implementation of demographic policy measures from the government’s 2016–2020 programme. The Council’s activities are directed at creating conditions for a demographic revival of Croatia.

The government recognised the demographic problems and put the family and its support into the centre of social policy in its National Reform Programme for 2018. In order to halt the negative demographic tendencies and achieve their priority goal of empowering the family to raise children several measures were introduced. The most important ones are creating a more favourable environment and financial conditions for families with new-born children, increasing of parental benefits, implementing the socially-motivated housing construction and from the 1st of July 2017, new amendments to the Law of Maternity and Parental Benefits Act was introduced (Vlade Republike Hrvatske 2018).

Demographic renewal and revitalisation of the Croatian society is one of the aims of the country’s National Security Strategy. Due to complexity and interdependence of multiple factors that affect demographic trends, efficient population policy is implemented in the field of social, health, economic, housing, educational, legal, financial, tax and other policies aimed to create conditions for demographic renewal. The population policy focuses on the protection and rights of the children, reinforcing families and family values, with particular emphasis on harmonisation of the work and family life and increasing level of the standard of living of the young families (National Security Strategy 2017).
6. Migration

Traditionally, Croatia has been a country of immigration and it represents a complex and multidimensional space of migration activity from the 19\textsuperscript{th} century onwards. The country was/is affected by both cross-border movements as well as internal mobility. Mass migration started in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century as a result of wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy and until the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, it is estimated that 400,000 people left the country. Before the First World War, due to economic reasons an estimated 350,000 to 450,000 people left Croatia mainly for overseas destinations (Kranjec–Župarić-Iljić 2014). During the interwar period this destination was replaced by European countries such as Germany, Belgium and France. It was followed by forced migration during the Second World War. Migration under the socialist Yugoslavia could be divided into two distinctive periods. The first one lasted from 1946 until 1963–1964 and it was characterised by the increase of illegal emigrants because of political and economic purposes. The second period was marked by state-tolerated migration when a large number of legal labour migrants, who worked on a temporary basis went abroad. The most attractive destinations were Western European countries, especially Germany (Mlinarić 2009; Nejašmić 1991; Mlinarić et al. 2015).

In general terms one can distinguish three major periods in the migration process since the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Mežnarić–Stubbs 2012). The first was the conflict period of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war between 1991 and 1995, resulted in both emigration from but also massive immigration flows into Croatia, causing large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, displacement and exile of more than three million people. This period was mainly characterised by forced, primarily ethnic-based movements of the population which occurred in two major flows. During the first one ethnic Croats and other non-Serb ethnic groups were expelled from areas in Croatia with the help of the Yugoslav army. The second one was, in connection with the Croatian liberation operations Flash and Storm, resulting in the exodus of the Serb population.

In the second post-conflict period (1996−2000) the emigration pattern normalised, although the entire South-Eastern region was affected by significant population movements, as the partial return of refugees to their former residence. The normalisation of migration flows after 2000 coincided with the relative normalisation of life in Croatia. Programmes were introduced to facilitate the return of the Serbian population to war-affected territories (Župarić-Iljić 2012).

Today the increasing emigration of highly skilled labour together with the ageing population are the biggest problems of the country. In addition, the majority of emigrants are from the prime working age. According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, the largest number of persons emigrated abroad in 2016 were aged 20–39 (46.7%). Almost half of the emigrants had completed secondary education and around 8% higher education. Especially high was the number of healthcare professionals who left the country: according to estimations, 525 medical doctors emigrated between 2013 and 2016 (Župarić-Iljić 2016; European Commission 2017).

Croatia is placed among the top thirty countries in the world with the most significant problem of brain-drain. The difficult economic conditions and high level of unemployment (especially among the youth) produce an increasing number of mobile labourers. It is true
that some positive impacts of emigration are visible such as remittances, return after acquiring additional knowledge and skills, possibilities of creating business networks. The Croatian diaspora is channelling more than 1.1 billion € annually to Croatia, which is more than the total of the entire annual FDI amount (Knezović–Grošinić 2017).

From 1996 right until 2008, Croatia recorded a positive net migration (which means that the number of persons arriving was greater than the number of departing ones), which has been steadily dropping since 1998. From 2009 up until now this trend changed, and Croatia has a negative net migration. It has a strong connection with the beginning of the global crisis that, among other countries, hit Croatia, resulting in increased moving out of the country and raising the negative net migration rate even further. This trend became bigger after Croatia’s accession to the European Union on 1 July 2013 (Župarić-Iljić 2016).

![Graph showing net migration of the population of the Republic of Croatia with foreign countries (2008–2016)](image)

**Figure 1**

*Net migration of the population of the Republic of Croatia with foreign countries (2008–2016)*

*Source: Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2017b*

According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, the net migration rose from 1,472 in 2009 to 22,451 in 2016 when a total of 36,436 persons emigrated, but levels of emigration from Croatia are higher than official statistics suggest, perhaps double or even triple. In 2016, there were 55.3% of Croatian citizens and 44.7% of foreigners who immigrated into the Republic of Croatia. Out of the total number of immigrants, there were 1,921 persons (31.1%) who arrived from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The other countries from where immigrants also came were Serbia (557 persons), Slovenia (467), Germany (462), Italy (300), Ukraine (206), Macedonia (173), the Russian Federation (139), Austria (134). Traditional destinations such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Italy have still remained the most frequent destinations for Croats given that some 68% of all emigrants moved to these countries in
2016. Regarding to sex, out of the total number of immigrants, there were more men who immigrated than women (60.0%) and out of the total number of emigrants the number of men was also bigger (54.1%) (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2017b).

Croatia has to face not only international migration but also internal one. In 2016, there were 74,752 persons who changed their place of residence within the Republic of Croatia. The largest positive total net migration of population in 2016 was recorded in the City of Zagreb (2,706 persons), while the largest negative total net migration in the County of Osijek-Baranja (–3,952 persons) and the County of Vukovar-Sirmium (–3,526 persons) (Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2017b).

Until 2013, when Croatia entered the EU, most immigrants came from the countries of former Yugoslavia (the only exception was Slovenia), and almost half of the immigrants arrived from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two third of them were Croatian citizens by possessing dual citizenship. Since 2013, the number of immigrants arriving from the European Union has been steadily increasing (Kranjec–Župarić-Iljić 2014).

The first official policy document, *Migration Policy of the Republic of Croatia 2007–2008* was adopted in 2007, which was followed by the *Migration Policy of the Republic of Croatia for the Period 2013–2015*, as well as the *Action Plan on the removal of obstacles to the exercise of particular rights in the area of the integration of foreigners 2013–2015*. Newcomers to Croatia face barely halfway favourable policies for their integration, but compared with other countries in the region, Croatia has gone furthermost in its legislation and institutional infrastructure, as well as in the development of the asylum system; however, the country’s real capacities in the face of a crisis have never been properly tested (Government of the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Internal Affairs 2013; Gregurović – Župarić-Iljić 2014).

It is a fact that Croatia has never been a destination country. Even during the immigrant crisis (15 September 2015 − 8 March 2016), when 650,000 people passed through Croatia, there were only 22 of them who wanted to stay and seek asylum in Croatia. So, obviously the country was only a transit destination. Since the second half of 2016, the refugee crisis halted as a result of the closure of the Balkan Route. In order to normalise the situation, a number of bilateral agreements and protocols have been signed. One of the most important is that Croatia and Serbia signed the agreement which came into force in early November 2015, which helped the authorities to control the movement of immigrants, reduced the income of traffickers, and facilitated the development of capacities for temporary accommodation during the winter season (Knezović–Grošinić 2017).

Croatia is willing to participate in the EU’s proposal to relocate and resettle refugees according to a consent to accept the EU quota system, hosting and accommodating 1,617 refugees (1.87% of the total EU amount) (Lőrinczné 2016).

The survey held by the Croatian Employers Association covering the period from Croatia’s accession to the EU to February 2018, with 661 respondents who have emigrated to 26 countries shows that political reasons are the main motive – poorly organised and run state, incompetent politicians, incompetent politicians and political parties (8%), decline of the state, society and nation (7.6%), corruption and crime (7.3%) – why workers are emigrating, followed by social and personal reasons. Low salaries were cited only by 5.2% of the respondents. Emigrants for Croatia are satisfied with their new place and only one in ten thinks about returning to Croatia in the next ten years (Hina 2018).
7. Conclusion

The demographic losses in the 1990s sped up and strengthened the overall process of natural depopulation, as well as the regional polarisation in the structure of settlement. Due to the reciprocal effect of a number of destabilising determinants in the movement and development of population, after the millennium, Croatia found itself on the threshold of a severe demographic crisis. The almost 30-year long depopulation has resulted in many negative consequences, such as the reduction of the core population producing new generations, the decreasing of the active working population and the increasing of the older population. Later, increased economic and social burdens are placed on the State Budget in the areas of pension insurance, social and health care of the elderly. Population changes are determined by reproduction and migration. The number of deaths has persistently exceeded the number of live births since 1998, which phenomenon has caused the drastic drop in the birth figures and has resulted in an ageing population and natural population decline (Rácz 2014).

The scope of the recent emigration flow that Croatia has to face is ever more significant. It is expected that, in combination with extremely negative demographic trends, it will have repercussions for the labour market disturbances. It may destabilise the economic, healthcare, social, pension and education systems in the long run. Emigration, together with a natural decrease of population, has aggravated further depopulation and ageing in Croatia. Although demographic trends have been a cause of political concern, there have been few policy initiatives. The Government of Croatia could do more to solve the demographic problems of the country.

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Libor Frank

Trends in Demography and Migration in the Czech Republic

1. Introduction

On 31 December 2017, the total population of the Czech Republic was 10,610,055 inhabitants (ČSÚ 2018). This number gives the country the 87th place among 206 countries in the global comparison (Prospects 2017) and the 13th position out of the 48 countries in Europe (Worldometers 2018). Still, in comparison and in absolute terms, the Czech Republic is one of the countries with a relatively small population. It is currently experiencing a very dynamic demographic development and, in particular, the increases since the early 1990s have and will have a significant impact on the structure and key characteristics of the population.

2. The historical context of demographic trends in the Czech Republic

In the course of the 20th century, the development of the population of the Czech Republic was marked by several major events that had a significant impact on the long-term and stable demographic continuity. Similarly to other Central European countries, the development of the population was affected by the two world wars. As a result of the First World War 300,000 men from the Czech lands died. This, the subsequent epidemic of the Spanish flu and 550,000 “unborn” children have led to a distinct break in the age structure of the population and to a temporary deformation of its gender composition. War population losses were over 900,000 people who would otherwise contribute to the population (Kučera 1996, 334).

The Second World War and its aftermath also significantly influenced the population development of the country, both in terms of the quantitative population growth or decline, and the ethnic composition of the population. The population losses during the war were caused by repressions against the population (e.g. 3,229 persons were executed); deportations and almost complete extermination of Jewish (77,000) and Roma people (5,000); or deaths in combat, in prisons, concentration camps and forced labour in Germany (50,000) (Kučera 1996, 333). On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically a population increase is also evident in the period of occupation, due to several factors. Family and children were the only intimate sphere, where it was possible to fulfil oneself without being confronted with the totalitarian environment of the occupation. As free functioning in the political, public, but also economic life was impossible, the family became the only and relatively trouble-free refuge. Another,

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1 For the purposes of this paper, the traditional term “Czech lands” refers to the territories of the present Czech Republic, consisting of the historic lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.
also paradoxical factor was the improvement of the conditions of living for some parts of the population. The introduction and expansion of social care and higher wages, in particular, for those employed in the war industry, facilitated the establishment of families. Furthermore, having a child was a “protection” from forced labour in Germany. It can be seen as a paradox that during this period of occupation, such difficult for the Czech nation, the numbers of women with children as well as the numbers of children in a family increased (Kučera 1996, 334). During the war years, the number of population in the territory of the Czech lands grew by more than 200,000 people, but mainly in the (German populated) border areas (Kučera 1994). In quantitative and qualitative terms, the Nazi occupation had much less serious consequences on the development of the Czech population compared to the consequences of the First World War.

The fundamental impact on the demographic history occurred in the subsequent post-war events, especially with the expulsion of the German population. In pre-war Czechoslovakia, the Czech lands had 10,674,240 inhabitants (according to the census in 1930), out of which 7,304,442 obtained Czech nationality and 3,149,820 German nationality (Sčítání lidu 2016). People of the Czech and German nationalities formed 98% of the population, the other minorities were negligible (Sčítání lidu 2017). As a result of the war and, in particular, the expulsion of the German population, especially in 1945–1946, the number of Germans dropped to a fraction of their original number. According to the population census in 1950, only 159,938 people obtained German nationality. As a result of ethnic cleansing during the occupation and in the post-war period, the Czech lands became an ethnically homogeneous territory with a complete domination of the Czech nation, or Czech-speaking population.

After a short period of relative freedom and reconstruction of the state, another dramatic political change emerged in 1948 – the establishment of a communist government that lasted until the end of 1989. The new political regime tried to promote pro-natalist measures, but in the first two decades of the regime, their practical implementation was often only declarative. There was, however, a significant shift more than twenty years later, after the country was attacked and occupied by the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, and the promising attempt at political and economic liberalisation was terminated by a brutal military intervention in August 1968. This was the second period of occupation in the modern Czech history and the restoration of conservative neo-Stalinist political course had also specific demographic consequences, including the forced exodus of many people, as well as an increase in the birth rate among the deprived population. Similarly to the period after the Communist coup in 1948 (25,000), a large number of inhabitants (70,000) went into exile in 1968–1969. During the period of the Communist Government between 1948–1989, over 200,000 inhabitants left the country (Tomek 2000). It is interesting to note that in the years that followed the stressful Soviet occupation, similar demographic behaviour could be observed among the Czech society as in the time of the Nazi occupation.

The period of the first half of the 1970s can be even described as a baby boom (due to the generation of the so-called Husák’s children). This was the result of several factors: an external pressure, when the neo-Stalinist political regime, set up after the invasion in

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2 Gustáv Husák was the General Secretary (the head) of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1969–1978. In 1975–1989 he was the President of Czechoslovakia. He is viewed as a symbol of close collaboration with the USSR and the leading representative of the so-called normalisation system, established after the occupation in 1968.
1968, again started to control and restrict significantly the political, public and economic life of the society and family became the only intimate refuge outside the direct political supervision. There was also an actual and extensive support for the families and other pro-natalist policies implemented by the state, facilitating the establishment of families (advantageous loans for the newly married, longer maternity leave, increased building of flats and more accessible housing for couples with children, etc.), social and health care for children (establishment of nurseries, expansion of the network of educational, social and healthcare facilities for children, etc.). The main impetus for these measures was the necessity of political calming after August 1968 − therefore, the communist regime supported the fulfilling of citizens outside the political sphere, i.e. within the family. In addition, it pursued long-term economic and security interests (increase in labour force and conscription potential for covering the future needs of the armed forces).

In the course of the 20th century, the Czech society underwent many turbulent changes that had an absolutely crucial, revolutionary and probably permanent effect on the nature, age and gender structure as well as ethnic composition of the population of the Czech lands. In particular, the consequences of the two world wars changed and directly determined the demographic behaviour of the society. The year 1989, which brought the end of the long period of Communist government, marked not only the end of one political regime and the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, but it is also a symbolic milestone separating different types of demographic behaviours of the population.

3. General demographic trends after 1989

3.1. Changes in fertility rate

The fall of the Communist regime in November 1989 brought a downright change in political, economic and social conditions, the influence of which was fundamentally reflected in the demographic development of the country. During the 1990s, there was a definite start of the demographic trend that is strongly correlated with the demographic development in Western European states. The new situation was most visible in the birth rate, which not only dropped heavily in comparison with the last two decades of the Communist period, but it has remained at a very low level in the long term as well.

This process had several different reasons: family and children have ceased to be the single meaningful and intimate fulfilment in life − as there appeared a range of alternative possibilities outside the family. People were free to participate in public and political life, to run businesses, travel and study − all of which contributed to the postponing of the starting of the family, especially among younger generations. At the same time, material and social conditions for the establishment and taking care of a family have become worse, while a functional family has ceased to be the priority for the state or for the society. A large family with many children, typical at the beginning of the 20th century, became absolutely rare at the end of the same century, and a family with one or with maximum two children has become the standard. The beginning of the century and to a large extent its entire first half were characterised by a high fertility rate (the sum of 4.0 children per woman in 1910–1911), high proportion of children under the age of 15 in the age structure (34%) and,
the opposite, low proportion of people over 60 (6%) (Kučera 1996, 314). The second half of the century is marked by a gradual shift toward the intensive type of reproduction, which is characterised by a particularly low fertility rate, longer life expectancy and decreasing share and number of children in the population structure.

The downward trend of the fertility rate can be traced already in the 1980s (the Czech population reached the minimal necessary fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman for the last time in 1980, in the course of the next ten years, fertility rate was at the average value of 1.94) (Indicators 2018). There was a sharp decline in the period after 1989 – the lowest fertility rate was recorded in 1999, when it reached the value of only 1.13 (Český statistický úřad 2017). Since the beginning of the last decade of the last century, the fertility rate has been slightly growing, but it is still far below the values required for at least sustaining the population level – in 2016, it reached the maximum value 1.67. The number of live births in 2016 amounted to 112,663 children (57,837 boys and 54,826 girls) (Zdravotnická ročenka 2017).

A certain “population reserve” is the number of unborn children, in particular, the number of so-called induced abortions (artificial abortions). The aggregate abortion rate, indicating the average number of abortions per woman, provided that the age-specific abortion rates are maintained at the level of the respective year, was 0.51 abortion per woman in 2016. The number of abortions in the Czech Republic is in decline – in 2016, a total of 35.9 thousand abortions were reported (4.0 thousand less than ten years ago), of which 20.4 thousand were artificial abortions (4.9 thousand less than in 2006). This means approximately 32 abortions per one hundred live births. In 1990, 126,055 pregnancies ended with abortion, of which 111,268 were induced abortions (Počet interrupcí 2017).

The share of induced abortions was historically the lowest – 56.8% in 2016; while this number was 63.4% ten years ago. Meanwhile, the amount of spontaneous abortions has increased over the years. In 2016, they accounted for 39.6% of the total number of abortions (and for 33.3% in 2006). In the last four years, their absolute number increased (up to 14,200). The average age of women during abortion has increased over the past ten years by 0.5 year, to 30.5 years in 2016 (Český statistický úřad 2017).

### 3.2. Transformation of family behaviour

Low fertility rate, insufficient number of live births and growing numbers of spontaneous abortions are also the result of a profound change in the family behaviour. Preferring other priorities to family values, together with the economic and social pressures, led to the postponement of the time of starting the family. The average age of women at the time of the birth of the first child has increased. While at the beginning of the 1990s, the average age of a woman giving birth was less than 25, it is now at the age of 30. The increase of the average age of women giving birth slowed down after 2008; in 2016, the average age of women giving birth stagnated at the value of the previous year (30.0), the same applies to the average age of primiparas (28.2) (Český statistický úřad 2017). The high age of primiparas also biologically limits the possibility of giving birth to more children.

The traditional approach to marriage and formal family ties have also transformed fundamentally. As a result of this, the share of persons with single status grows at
the expense of married couples. Persons living in marriage still represent the largest number, however, their share within the population has dropped below 50% and continues to decrease. The number of new marriages decreased significantly in the 1990s (before, over 90% men and women entered into marriage) and the declining trend prevailed also in the first decade of the new century. In 2016, the first marriage before the age of 50 was concluded by 56.2% of men and 64.3% of women, with the average age of 32.2 and 29.9, respectively. Among the divorced, 40.7% of men and 38.7% of women entered into another marriage. The minimum absolute number of concluded marriages (43.5 thousand) and historically the minimum marriage rate (51.4% among men and 59.0% among women entering into the first marriage) was reached in 2013. According to the latest results (as of 31.12.2016), 48.5% of men and 45.9% of women over 15 were married, while ten years ago these numbers were 53.8% and 50.4%. People living in marriage become a major group at an increasingly higher age. In 2016, this age was as high as 37 among men, compared to 31 ten years ago, and 33 among women, unlike 28 in 2006 (Český statistický úřad 2017). This situation is the result of both, more frequent preference for a free partner coexistence or separate living (singles), but also a high divorce rate.

The decline of the traditional family model, based on authority or church approved and permanent tie between a man and a woman, can be demonstrated very clearly on the divorce rate. While in the first half of the 20th century, less than 5% of marriages ended in divorce (Kučera 1996, 314), currently, the number of divorces is almost tenfold. Since 2001, the divorce rate was at 45–50% of marriages. Marriages often end in divorce after 3 to 6 years of living together. Owing to the lower divorce rate of shorter duration marriages and its increase among marriages lasting 20 years and longer, the average length of marriage at the time of divorce increased from 12.0 to 13.1 between 2006 and 2016 (Český statistický úřad 2017). Therefore, a large part of children grew up and grow up in single-parent families and assume this model of co-existence as normal and easier to follow in an adult age. Despite the state’s pro-natalist policies and professed support for families, raising a child in a dominating intensive model of reproduction is rather demanding for economic and social reasons. Especially in single-parent families, where the other partner does not participate, there is a danger of social and economic isolation of the parent who takes care of the child (in particular, in case of the so-called single mothers).

3.3. Changes in mortality rate

The gradual improvement of the economic and social conditions, as well as the extensive and long-term access to high quality healthcare have resulted in the gradual increase of life expectancy, as well as the decrease in mortality in all demographic cohorts. Life expectancy was gradually growing already during the 20th century – from about 40 (among men) and 45 (among women) at the beginning of the 20th century up to 74 (among men) or 81 (among women) in 1989 (Lustigová 2006).

In comparison with Western European countries, however, the pace of reducing mortality was slower and the average life expectancy remained shorter. After 1989, there is a further growth to the current 76.2 years among men and 82.1 among women. In the same year, 107.8 thousand deceased persons were registered in the Czech Republic. The longer life
was boosted mostly by the lower mortality rate among the over-75 age group and also among men in the 50–64 age group. Infant mortality rate grew in 2016 by three tenths per mille to 2.8‰, but it still remains one of the lowest in the world (Český statistický úřad 2017).

The most frequent cause of death in the Czech Republic are long-term diseases of the circulatory system; in 2016, they were the cause of death in 40.6% of deceased men and 48.0% of deceased women. The second most frequent cause of death are neoplasms, in the same year causing 28.0% of male and 23.5% of female deaths. There is a remarkable difference between the representation of death with external causes (accidents, suicide, poisoning, etc.) among men and women: among men, they are currently the fourth most frequent cause of death with 6.7% (Český statistický úřad 2017), next to the respiratory system diseases (7.3%), whereas among women they occupy the sixth position with 3.5%, following the respiratory system diseases (5.9%), endocrine, nutrition and metabolism disorders (4.8%), the category including also diabetes mellitus, and diseases of the digestive system (3.7%).

3.4. Demographic ageing

The dramatic changes in the fertility rate, mortality rate and the prolonged life expectancy have led to the ageing of the population. Following Malta and Finland, the Czech Republic is the third among EU member states with the largest population share of people in the over-65 age group (Eurostat 2017). Still in 1989, this age cohort represented approximately 12.5% of the population of the Czech Republic, while currently, it is almost 19% of the population. The age cohort 65+ will reach the largest share around 2059, when their number will reach 34% within the total population (Struktura 2017). The average age of the Czech population is constantly increasing – in 1989, the average age of men and women were 34.4 and 37.8. In 2016, the average age was already significantly higher – 40.6 among men and 43.4 among women (Český statistický úřad 2017).

Thus, there is not only the ageing of the population and the quantitative increase in the number of people in retirement age (65+), but in addition to the above, extending life expectancy. These lead to a longer period, when the oldest population cohorts are dependent on the state pension system. The growing dependence of people in elderly age on the ever-shrinking number of economically active people is not only a serious intergenerational conflict, but also the onset of a fatal economic and social disbalance.

3.5. Changes in the educational structure

Among the Czech society, there is a long-term and traditional respect for education and full literacy has been a matter of course in the Czech lands since the rule of Maria Theresa. However, in the course of the last few decades, there has been a significant change in the attitude to education and the constant expansion of the range of educational activities. Education is no longer considered to be a single and relatively short-term matter of children and adolescents, but today, it is clearly outweighed by the trend of lifelong learning – almost
half of the population continue their education after leaving compulsory schooling (Český
statistický úřad 2018).

Also, higher levels of education are becoming accessible to a still greater proportion of
the population. While secondary and, in particular, university education was understood as
selective, or exclusive and prestigious in the first half of the 20th century, since the middle
of the century, the numbers of graduates from secondary schools and universities were
gradually growing. In 1950, 83% of the population had only basic education, 9.8% had
vocational secondary education, 5.1% had A-level secondary education, and less than 1% held
university degrees. In the 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of secondary and tertiary
educated population grew significantly, and the trend was also prominent after 1989, with
the boom of education of all types, especially at universities. The reform of the education
sector that transformed state universities to public and private schools and expanding
the range of new subjects meant a huge impetus for the increased numbers of graduates. In
1991, the proportion of people with basic education accounted for 33.1% of the population,
secondary education with vocational certificate 35.4%, secondary education with A-level
exam 22.9%, and university graduates 7.2% of the population. In 2016, the number of
people with basic education had the share of only 9% of the population, 35% of people had
vocational secondary education, 33% were A-level graduates, and 23% were university
degree holders. There is a more prominent trend in the growing numbers of higher levels
of education, apparent when examining the younger age cohorts, where the shift is more
evident – in the age group of 25–34, both men and women with only basic education account
to only 6%, with 32% men and 19% women with vocational secondary education, 37% A-level educated men and women alike, with university educated men accounting for 24%
and women for 38% in this age group (České noviny 2017).

Currently, 68 university-level institutions operate in the Czech Republic (2 state, 42
private and 26 public), with approximately 350,000 students. Each year, there are more than
82,000 graduates from the universities. Compared with the beginning of this century, it is
a threefold increase. There is also more intensive integration of secondary education finished
with A-levels and university education – 9 out of 10 A-level holders apply for university
studies and 7 out of 10 complete that (Hronová 2016). The increase in the proportion of
graduates in the higher levels of education has been confronted with the lower numbers
of students in recent years. There is a demographic decline, with less pupils and students
coming to school than in previous years. In 2017, approximately 118,000 first year pupils
entered basic schools, which is approximately 9% less than in the previous year (České
noviny 2017). In 2016, 99,610 students started secondary schools (with a total of 424,849
secondary school students), whereas ten years ago there were 140,564 new students
(Vojtěch–Chamoutová 2018). In the same year, there were 82,021 university applicants,
about 90,000 less than in 2010, the year with the highest record of students admitted
to universities. The demographic curve is clearly reflected in the forward movement of
the younger and less numerous age cohorts through the educational system, in particular,
the secondary and tertiary education.

3 Nowadays there are only two state universities in the Czech Republic: The Police Academy and the University
of Defence in Brno.
3.6. The ethnic structure

In terms of ethnic stratification of the population, the Czech Republic is an extraordinarily homogeneous state. According to the most recent census from 2011, the Czech, Moravian or Silesian ethnicity was reported by almost 95% of the population. The Czech Republic is a true nation state, without major compact minorities on its territory; also, the Czech minorities abroad are entirely marginal. Put simply, the international border of the Czech Republic defines the area on the planet where the Czechs live. In addition to them, there are about 5% of foreigners in the country – today, more than half a million people (Báčová 2018). The foreigners are represented mainly by Ukrainians (120,000), Slovaks (113,000), Vietnamese (57,000), Russians (35,000), Germans (21,000) and Poles (20,000).

The census in 1991 was the first that allowed the reporting of the Moravian and Silesian nationalities. In previous censuses, the Moravian nationality was not recorded separately. The Moravians reached the highest proportion of the total population exactly in 1991 (13.2%), which was caused to some extent by the mediatisation of Moravian national issues. In the census of 2001, their share decreased to 3.7%, in 2011 it raised back to 5%. The highest representation of Moravians was in the South Moravian and Zlín regions. Almost one third of people with Moravian nationality (31.4%) lived in the districts of Brno-město, Brno-venkov and Hodonín. Silesians, just like the Moravians, could first report their nationality in 1991. They also had the highest proportion of the total population in 1991 (0.4%), while the censuses in 2001 and 2011 recorded their share equally at 0.1% of the population. The vast majority of Silesians lived in the Moravian–Silesian region. 60% of the Silesians lived in the Opava and Karviná districts. A high proportion of people reporting these two nationalities in 1991 (together 13.6%) decreased during the next census in 2001 to 3.8% and their share has slightly increased to 5.1% in 2011. Reporting nationality in the 2001 and 2011 censuses was voluntary. While the share of unidentified responses in 2001 was only 1.7%, in 2011, one quarter of respondents (25.3%) did not answer this question. This affects the shares of the other nationalities and thus reduces the comparability of results with the previous censuses (Krausová 2014).

In 2011, the Roma nationality was reported by five thousand people, amounting to less than 0.1% of the population. In comparison with 2001, the number decreased by 50%, but there was a higher number in the category combining the Czech and Roma nationalities, which was reported by almost 7 thousand more people than in 2001; (in 2011 it had 0.1% share within the population). However, the experts view these data to be underestimated.

The national structure of the population of the Czech Republic is influenced also by foreigners who were included in the total population. Compared to the previous censuses, the census in 2011 included all who had a regular residence on the territory of the Czech Republic or who fulfilled or intended to fulfil the conditions of actually living in the country for at least one year.

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4 People reporting Czech, Moravian or Silesian ethnicity speak an identical language and there are no ethnic, cultural, religious or other differences among them. The decision to report the Moravian or Silesian ethnicity could be the result of patriotism – in the past, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were administratively divided and underwent a partly different historical development. In everyday and political life of the country the specified partitioning does not play any role.
The largest traditional national minority were the Slovaks in the post-war period. This is the result of the historical development, because Slovakia (whose residents have Slovak nationality as the dominant one) was part of the joint Czechoslovak state between 1918–1939 and between 1945–1992. After the separation in 1993, the number of people living in the Czech Republic and reporting Slovak nationality temporarily and substantially dropped, but in the past 15 years, a rapid and continuous growth in the number of Slovaks living in the Czech Republic can be traced.

The Polish national minority was the second largest until 2001. It is also traditional on the territory of the Czech Republic. The biggest concentration of Poles was in the Moravian–Silesian region, which corresponds to the historical Těšín territory, inhabited by the Poles already since the 13th century, and it is also an industrial area offering jobs. However, the number of Poles has been decreasing and since 2011 they are the third largest ethnic minority behind the Ukrainians and Slovaks.

The German national minority is also historically linked to the territory of the Czech Republic. Until the post-war expulsion, 30% of the population was German. Afterwards, their share dropped dramatically and this trend continued further. The reduction in the number of persons with German nationality occurred because of their adverse age structure, but probably also due to the assimilation of the younger age groups. They had the highest representation in the area in the north-west, near the border with Germany (Karlovy Vary and Ústí nad Labem regions), which formed an important part of Sudety.

The Ukrainian national minority recorded a significant increase after 1989. It is closely connected with the development of labour migration of the Ukrainians. As compared to 1991, when their number was around 8 thousand, in the census of 2011, their number was more than six times higher, and the share of 0.1% in 1991 rose to 0.5% of the population in 2011. The highest concentration of Ukrainians was in Prague and the Central Bohemian region.

The Vietnamese national minority recorded a similar increase to the Ukrainian minority after 1989 and it is also associated with labour migration. Although the Vietnamese were on the territory of the Czech Republic since the 1970s, they started to report the Vietnamese nationality increasingly since the census in 2001. Their share within the total population in 2001 was 0.2%, and it rose to 0.3% in 2011. The highest concentration of the Vietnamese was in Prague, followed by the Ústí nad Labem and Karlovy Vary regions.

The Russian national minority has been steadily increasing since 1989. In 1991 and 2001, the Russians had the share of 0.1% of the population (but their total number increased from 5,000 to 12,000); in 2011, their share reached 0.2% with almost 18 thousand people. The history of Russians in the Czech Republic is also long: the first wave of migrants came already in the 1920s and 1930s, but their number decreased significantly after 1945. The second wave of migrants came after 1989. The reasons for migration were mostly political-economic. The highest concentration of Russians was in Prague (KRAUSOVÁ 2014).

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5 More detail in the section on legal migration into the Czech Republic.
4. Population outlooks, forecasts and state reaction

The development of the population of the Czech Republic has been fundamentally affected by the already mentioned trends, of which the process of population ageing is undoubtedly the most important. Despite the currently and momentarily favourable development owing to the generation of the so-called Husák’s children from the baby boom of the 1970s having their own children, the return to a strong trend of depopulation can be expected in a short time. According to forecasts, the Czech Republic could expect a real population decline in the coming years, even despite the slight but continuous growth in immigration.

According to the forecasts, the total number of the population will decrease to 9.8 million by 2050, whereas the number of elderly people will double compared to the current situation. The number of people in the over-65 age group is estimated to reach almost 3.2 million, which would represent nearly one third of all people living in the Czech Republic. At the same time, by 2050, the number of people over 85 will grow more than three times to 0.6 million, which will represent approximately 6% of the population (Struktura 2017). The most significant decrease in population is expected to take place between 2050–2080. By the end of the century, the number of the population is expected to drop to 9.083 or even as little as 6.095 million people, with more than 1/3 of the population in the over-65 age group and only approximately 13% of the population younger than 15. Opposing trends in the size of the junior and senior components of population result in a higher ageing index, which describes the relation between the two groups. Thus, the ageing index will continue to grow significantly in the future. It will culminate in 2063, when the ratio of 100 children per 277 elderly people is expected. The situation of the elderly outnumbering the children 2.5 times should last for the entire second half of the century (Štyglerová et al.[s. a.]).

The dynamics and potential severity of the ageing, as well as its social, economic and security aspects, attracted the attention of the political domain already at the end of the last century. The response included the gradual adoption of some pro-natalist measures and implementation of measures in young families support, as well as starting a public and political debate about the problem of the ageing or immigration. However, it is a fact that there was no real and substantial transformation in this area.

The key strategic document at the state level in this area is the Concept of Family Policy, adopted by the government in 2017, which builds on earlier similar documents of previous governments. Its implementation manages, to a certain extent, to improve conditions, in particular, for young families with children, but also to prepare measures to manage the care of the coming and growing demographic cohort of elderly people. There have been significant legislative changes, extending the competences of municipalities and non-state subjects, which become more involved in the system. At the same time, there is an increase in funds from the state budget for the development of institutions of social and health care or education as well as direct or indirect financial and social support for population groups in need. Measures have been implemented in the area of pre-school care (allowing for the introduction of the so-called child groups as alternatives to kindergartens – 4,000 new places, guarantee of places in kindergartens for children older than 2 years, compulsory kindergarten attendance for the last year of the pre-school age, etc.). Financial support for families has increased (higher childcare tax relief – approximately €570 per year for
the first child, €720 per year for the second child and €900 per year for the third and each additional child), introduction and financing of paternity leave after birth, higher birth allowance (€480 for the first child, €370 for the second child), introduction of the so-called kindergarten allowance (tax relief for a child in a pre-school facility), faster reception of the parental allowance − a parent is entitled to €8,200 to be paid progressively for up to 4 years of available maternity leave period. If she decides for a shorter period of maternity leave, e.g. because of an early return to work, she can receive up to €1,360 per month. There is also direct financial support for low-income families and those who are at risk of income poverty due to the birth of a child − currently, contributions for 547,000 children are paid, with the amount between €30 to 281 per child each month. There were also changes in the areas of health insurance and social security, which now includes a wide range of care for children and the elderly, as well as extended direct financial support for families and persons taking care of the elderly (long-term care allowance − the highest labour protection comparable to maternity leave) (Koncepce rodinné politiky 2017).

The areas which are still considered to be a priority also include modifications on the labour market to allow for coordination of family and working life (preference of part-time work, flexible working time, etc.) and support for housing for low income groups of the population (first flats, social housing). Despite the apparent progress, there is still a lot of room for improvement in these areas, requiring a huge amount of investment and political will.

The fear of high financial costs and strong political sensitivity are also reasons why despite the clear need, the major steps toward a radical reform of the pension system have not been adopted. The present continuous system is unsustainable in the long term, but its modification, which would reduce the pension burden from the national budget and at the same time required people to save individually or otherwise contribute to their retirement benefits, is extremely unpopular. In 2013, the government adopted a reform that consisted in the introduction of the so-called three pillars of the pension scheme, or three parallel sources of retirement pension. The state budget, i.e. the funds of the current pension account remained as the first source. The newly established second source consisted in a selected commercial pension fund, where the citizens deposited part of their wages. Participation in this scheme was voluntary, but once someone opted so, it would become a permanent commitment. The fund managed the deposits and appreciated their value. The pension from the second pillar was based primarily on the merit. The third pillar represented investments and savings of the citizen, especially in commercial and voluntary supplementary pension schemes. Voluntary saving schemes are financially supported in the Czech Republic − whether by a state contribution or reducing the tax base by the amount paid to the supplementary pension scheme. However, this reform became politically unpopular, as, according to the critics, it introduced income inequalities among the future pensioners, and the new government, coming to office in 2014, abolished the scheme at the end of 2015. Only the first and third pillars remained, with the pension system based on a continuous funding from the state budget practically unchanged. Approximately 60% of the economically active people maintain reserves for their pension in estimate, but the total number of participants of pension schemes have decreased significantly (from 5,078,835 in 2013 to 3,690,476 in 2017); at the same time, the amount of regular deposit is insufficient (Ekonomika ČNB 2018).
5. Migration trends: Perceptions and responses

In the first third of the 20th century, Czech people left the country especially for economic reasons, in other decades the reasons were mainly political. The second world war brought massive ethnic cleansing and movements of the population that took place in the territory of the Czech lands. The result is almost a monolithic ethnic structure of the Czech Republic, which was and still is to a considerable extent a true nation state not only in the political sense, but also in ethnic terms. For most of the second half of the 20th century, the Czech society lacked opportunities of normal contact and communication even with the closest neighbours due to the nature of the ruling communist regime. Also, the failure or practical absence of policies dealing with the integration of the Roma people, coming to the Czech Republic in the second half of the century, helped to develop prejudices against other ethnicities. It can be said that several generations grew up without the possibility of intense direct contact and unmediated experience with foreigners or other nationalities. The absence of this experience may also contribute to the sensitive perception on the subject of modern migration, which is very intensively viewed by the Czech public and some political groups and it has been turned into a security issue.

5.1. Legal migration

Only after 1989, when the opening of the borders brought unprecedented opportunities for free travelling, studying and working abroad, there was a confrontation with foreign nations, ethnicities and cultures. Also, the Czech Republic opened to foreigners who increasingly visit the country not only as tourists, but still more often in order to work, study or pursue the prospects of a long-term stay or permanent residence. The number of foreigners with permitted residence has increased from 35,198 in 1990 (Vývoj počtu cizinců a jejich zastoupení podle státních občanství 2010) to as many as 535,970 in 2018 (Cizinci s povoleným pobytem 2018).

In terms of legal migration, those coming from Ukraine and Slovakia hold dominant positions. The formers are motivated predominantly economically (even though the number of students is also growing) – these migrants come to the Czech Republic, in particular, in search of employment. They are employed, usually in low skilled jobs in construction, agriculture, selected services, but sometime they also perform jobs of medium qualified sectors, e.g. in health care. The number of immigrants from Ukraine currently amounts to more than 120,000 people (36,570 with temporary residence permit, 83,861 with permanent residence) (Cizinci s povoleným pobytem 2018). This number is likely far from being final because of the lack of labour force in the labour market in the Czech Republic and growing demand for workers from abroad, as well as the enormous interest of Ukrainians in working in the Czech Republic – the number of their applications for employee cards is increasing. Since 2016, the quota provided by the Czech Government for the acceptance of applications of Ukrainians increased from 170 to 1,000 per month. In addition, based on the pressure of the Czech businesses, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Ukraine Project, which enables Czech employers to look for their future workers directly in Ukraine. They then have the opportunity to obtain permit in an accelerated procedure. In the last two years,
there were a total of 10,104 applicants within the project. Originally, the intention was to bring 3,800 Ukrainians to the Czech Republic each year.

The second place in terms of the number of immigrants is occupied by the Slovaks, who come to the Czech Republic both for working and studying. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, many Slovaks returned to Slovakia and their number in the country dropped, but since the beginning of the last decade, a continuous and very strong flow of immigrants from the Slovak Republic has been recorded. The current number of Slovaks in the Czech Republic amounts to 113,000 persons (64,855 with a temporary stay and 48,322 permanent residents). A large proportion of them are university students and the age and educational structure differs significantly from the immigrants from Ukraine or other countries. From the Slovak perspective, the situation can be even described as a brain drain.

In total, there are 43,622 foreign students at Czech universities (14% of all students), about half of them being citizens of the Slovak Republic. This means more than 22,500 students (cf. only 3,700 students in 2000). The best students of the Slovak schools go to the Czech Republic − 70% of the secondary school leaving elite continue their studies at universities in the Czech Republic (elite = best 10% among the secondary school students). After finishing their university studies, half of the Slovak students remain in the Czech Republic where they get their first job opportunities and establish families. The situation is similar for the doctoral level: 34% of the Slovak candidates want to stay in the Czech Republic, others plan to go elsewhere into the world, only 6% want to return to Slovakia. The reasons for the attractiveness of the Czech education system for young Slovaks, in particular, include the language proximity, the higher quality of education and the fact that the system is free (99.5% of Slovaks do not pay for the study) (Fischer–Lipovská 2015).

The expenses of the Czech state for one Slovak student amount to €2,680–3,160 per year (cost of study, accommodation and food, etc.), on the other hand, the yearly benefit for the Czech Republic from one Slovak student is between €3,240–8,800, in sum, more than €24,000,000 each year (Hroňová 2015). The migration of the Slovak elites has a significantly positive demographic and economic impact on the Czech Republic, which gains highly skilled and young people. Today, the Slovaks in the Czech Republic are younger and more educated in average than the majority of the Czech society. Slovaks constitute also the most dynamically growing ethnic minority – their number has increased from around 20,000 to more than 110,000 in just 15 years.

5.2. Illegal migration

In terms of illegal migration (and, in particular, in comparison with the countries of Western Europe), the Czech Republic is not seen as an attractive destination country. Even the migrant and refugee crisis in 2015–2016 did not hit the Czech Republic to a major extent; since it was not and is not an important transit country (Chovanec 2016), despite being the neighbour of the main European destination country – the Federal Republic of Germany. Foreigners residing illegally on the territory of the Czech Republic can be divided into three categories. The first group consists of the so-called migrants in transit who move through the Czech territory, primarily towards Germany. The number of persons in this category is declining. In 2017, the Alien Police arrested 172 migrants in transit in total,
whereas in 2016 this number was 511 and at the time of the peak of the crisis in 2015, they were as many as 2,294. This category includes mainly citizens from Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.

The second group of foreigners with illegal status are those who typically entered the Czech territory legally but exceeded the permitted period of residence, thus, their stay has become illegal. There were 4,316 of such persons found in 2017. Most frequently the illegal residences were detected among the nationals of Ukraine (34%), Russia (7%) and Vietnam (7%). Most of these foreigners were discovered in the capital (40%), at international airports (20%) and in the territories of the Ústí nad Labem (8%) and South Moravian (7%) regions.

The third category of illegal migrants consists of the foreigners detected when illegally crossing the external Schengen borders (at international airports). In 2017, there were 250 of them. This category is dominated by the nationals of Albania. The total number of illegal migrants in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2017 was 4,738 in total, the sum of the above mentioned categories. Compared to the previous year, there is a slight decrease in this number by almost 10% (or 523 persons).

The area in which a significant increase was identified in 2017, is the illegal employment, or illegal work performed by the foreigners. This trend had a strong impact on the number of decisions on the administrative expulsion. This was issued in 2017 by the authorities for 5,119 persons, and in 3,111 (60%) cases the reason was illegal employment. This is a 100% increase compared to 2016. The largest groups of foreigners in this respect are the citizens of Ukraine (84%) and Moldova (15%) and it can be expected that this trend will continue, owing to the introduction of a visa-free regime for the citizens of Ukraine (in June 2017) (Rendlová 2018).

5.3. Asylum seekers

The Czech Republic is a stable, secure and economically attractive country and may provide temporary protection or political asylum also to those persons who appeared illegally in its territory. However, the numbers of asylum seekers are generally very low (28 asylum applications per one million inhabitants, while the European average is 702 applications) (ČT24 2017). The key condition for granting an asylum is a proof of the reasons for providing the protection and the information of asylum applicants subsequently investigated in the country of origin of the applicant. This is the reason for a relatively long process of the asylum procedure and also a very low success rate from the perspective of the applicants. In the last ten years (2007–2017), asylum was granted to only 1,134 persons (Azyl udělen podle let [2007–2017] 2018).

During the 1990s, many asylum seekers, especially citizens of the former Yugoslavia, applied for asylum and received most often the so-called temporary refuge, allowing them to remain for the duration of the conflict. Afterwards, most of the refugees returned to their home country (for example, 903 people returned to Kosovo out of the total of 1,034 with a temporary refuge in the Czech Republic). Higher numbers of applicants from other countries appeared in 1998, 1999 and 2000, when more than 4,000 persons from Afghanistan applied for asylum in the Czech Republic; and in total 57 applicants were
The most significant number of applicants from a single geographical location appeared between 2003 and 2004, when 15,856 persons from the Caucasus asked for protection. Asylum was granted only in 1–2% of the cases (Migrace v číslech 2018).

The annual numbers of applications for international protection in the Czech Republic are generally low – maximum between 1,000 and 2,000 applications per year. The exception was the period at the turn of the millennium, and quite extraordinary was the year 2001, when there were 18,094 applications for asylum. This number was further decreasing and since 2007, it is around 1,500 applications per year. Even in 2015, when Europe was facing the migrant and refugee crisis, this problem did not appear in the number and composition of asylum seekers in the Czech Republic – there were a total of 1,525 applications, with the most prominently represented nationals of Ukraine (694), Syria (134), Cuba (128), Vietnam (81), Armenia (44), Russia (43), China (40) and Iraq (38) (ČR 2016).

The most recent figures from 2017 do not represent a radical change. There were 1,450 asylum applications in total (out of which 308 repeated), most of them, again, from Ukraine (435), Armenia (129), Georgia (129), Azerbaijan (127), Vietnam (82), Cuba (68) and Russia (57). Generally, it is possible to say that in the long term the group of asylum applicants includes the largest numbers of those originating from the countries of the former Soviet Union (in particular, Ukraine), as well as Vietnam and Cuba. The numbers of applicants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or from African countries are relatively low (Rendlová 2018).

Despite these numbers, the Czech Republic recognises the growing numbers of international migrants and the fact that migration becomes an important pan-European social, economic, cultural and security challenge. The highest-level strategic document of the Czech Republic, the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, adopted by the government in 2015, pays significant attention to migration and its negative aspects (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky 2015). The concerns include both the possibility of massive and uncontrolled migration into Europe including the Czech Republic and the possibility of insufficient integration of the coming foreigners. The same concerns are accentuated by the adopted National Security Audit from 2016 (Audit národní bezpečnosti 2016). The increasing economic and security importance of migration was reflected by the government by adopting the new Strategy on Migration Policy of the Czech Republic in July 2015. The strategy sets out seven principles, sorted in order of priority, that represent fundamental subjects in the area of migration – security as an all-embracing element, integration of foreigners, illegal migration and return policy, international protection (asylum), external dimension of migration, legal migration, free movement of persons within the European Union and the Schengen area, as well as coordinating the common policies of the European Union. The principles are further elaborated in the text following up on the set targets, which the government seeks to achieve in the area of migration at the national and European level (Strategie migrační politiky České republiky 2015).

5.4. The securitisation of migration

The increasing numbers of foreigners arouse emotions within the Czech public. The majority of respondents in public opinion polls declare negative attitudes towards foreigners and 58% of the respondents consider foreigners as a problem for the Czech Republic. There are concerns of
increased crime rates, spreading of diseases, newcomers abusing the social system, increased competition in the labour market, etc. (SAV 2018). The attitudes are even more negative towards the refugees (asylum seekers). The majority of respondents (69%) hold the opinion that the Czech Republic should not receive refugees at all, a quarter (25%) of them approve their temporary admission until they are able to return to their country of origin, and only 2% of the respondents believe that the Czech Republic should accept refugees and allow them to settle in the country (CVVM 2018).

The refugees are not perceived as people in distress, rather, as a security threat, in particular those coming from Muslim countries and Africa. There are apparent concerns of deterioration in the security situation and the dominant issue is associating the refugee problem with Islamic extremism and terrorism. Public opinion polls report only a low percentage of respondents with unclear opinion on immigration – this indicates that the issue attracts strong public interest, with a relatively stable (and predominantly negative) position. It is characterised by a rigid refusal of any immigrant, regardless of their origin and the cause of their departure (a mostly negative attitude also applies to migrants from Ukraine, even if there is a slightly more tolerance towards this group). It can be assumed that migration is securitised, i.e. interpreted as a security threat by the media (Neumann 2015), certain political forces, the president of the country, or other persons who have sufficient authority and possibilities to influence public opinion (Tkaczyk–Macek 2015). Based on empirical data from public opinion polls, it seems that the negative interpretation of migration is accepted by a significant majority of the Czech society, which feels threatened by immigration and requires strong, fast, simple and forceful or restrictive measures by the state or anyone who answers these concerns with their political offer. It is no coincidence that the parliamentary elections in October 2017 represented a major success of the anti-immigration Freedom and Direct Democracy party with 10.64% of votes and the winning of 22 seats (out of 200). This was the first time in the modern history of the Czech Republic when a primarily anti-immigration party entered into the Parliament, recording such a dramatic electoral success. The subject of migration was also strongly present even in the direct presidential election in early 2018, when especially in the second round, the incumbent and subsequent tight winner Miloš Zeman (51.36% of votes) was referring to his challenger Jiří Drahoš (48.63%) as the one who welcomes migrants.

6. Conclusion

The Czech Republic is undergoing a dramatic demographic change that will have long-term and major implications for the social, economic and security dimensions. In the course of the 20th century, the population gradually abandoned the extensive type of reproductive behaviour and this trend was definitively strengthened after the establishment of qualitatively different conditions after 1989. The result is a situation, in which the Czech society is ageing and faces the frightening prospect of depopulation. At the same time, it fluctuates between the fears of migration pressures and the need to secure sufficient available and skilled workforce for the current and future labour market. And as there is still insufficient political will to prepare for the consequences of the deep demographic changes on time in the coming decades, we can expect distortion of social cohesion and solidarity among generations, the collapse of the social system in its current form, the impoverishment of the state and
society, increasing pressure on the redistribution of limited resources of the state in favour of social agendas, and lack of personnel for the operation of the state, including the armed and security forces.

References


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Demographic and Migration Trends in Hungary

1. Introduction

The present chapter reviews Hungary’s demographic characteristics and problems, as well as the way the country’s political leaders have reflected on these problems in the past. In the past 28 years since the 1990 regime change, Hungary’s population has decreased by 604,000 to 9.77 million in January 2018. The decline of the country’s population since 1980 has continued, and while the rate of the decline has decreased somewhat between 1980 and 1990, it has become a growing trend again (KSH 2018). Between 1980 and 1990 the population fell by 334,000, between 1990 and 2000 by 153,000, between 2001 and 2010 by 186,000 and between 2011 and 2018 by 215,000. Among the world’s 206 countries, Hungary is the 98th by population size and in Europe it is the 15th of the 48 European countries. Besides the decline in numbers, the ageing of the population has also continued in the past 28 years: while in 1990 13% of the population fell in the over 65 age group, this proportion rose to 18.7% by 2017. Meanwhile, the proportion of children under 15 was the lowest ever at 14.5% since Hungary’s first census in 1870 (E-Volution 2017; Obádovics 2018, 272).

2. General demographic trends after 1990: Reasons of population decline

2.1. Changes in fertility

The demographic trends of a country – the rise and fall – are determined primarily by the number and age indicators of women of childbearing age, and their willingness to have children. In Hungary, the decline in the number of women of childbearing age was more or less in line with the overall fall in the general population (their ratio was 24.4–25%); however, between 2001 and 2016 their number fell by almost 278,000 and their ratio dropped to 23.1% (KSH 2016, 2). After 2000, the age distribution among women of childbearing age has begun showing increasingly unfavourable trends. The number of women of childbearing age under 40 – who account for 97% of live births – showed a fluctuating rise in every age group, but their numbers fell since 2000–2001 in every age group and the younger the age group, the more severe the fall was (KSH 2016, 2–3). Very few children were born in 2017; only 91,577, which was 102,000 less than the last major peak in 1975. In terms of live births, the past 28 years can be divided into four distinct stages: between 1991 and 1999 the number
of live births fell from 127,000 to 94,600; between 2000 and 2008 it practically stagnated at 97,000–100,000, falling to 88,000 by 2011 from which point onward it has stagnated at 88,500–93,000 (KSH 2018). In the first decade of the examined period (1991–1999), the Hungarian total fertility rate (TFR) dropped from 1.88 to 1.28 and then stagnated for the subsequent decade (2000–2010) and after the low point of 1.23 in 2011 it slowly began to recover to 1.5 by 2017 (KSH 2018). While in the previous decades the number of births and the total fertility rate essentially moved in tandem, since 2012 − when the fall in the number of women of childbearing age under 40 began to decrease further − the two indicators diverged. TFR was more favourable than the number of births, given that a decreasing number of potential mothers were willing to have equal number of or slightly more children than before. Due to the decreasing number of women of childbearing age, the total fertility rate may still continue to show a spectacular rise despite the fewer births in total (KAPITÁNY–SPÉDER 2018, 49). The decline in the number of births between 1990 and 2010 was unequivocally the result of women postponing motherhood to a later age (the childbearing age has increased from 23 years in 1990 to 28.2 years in 2010). However, the postponement process ended in 2010 and from that point the age of having first-born children remained steady or even dropped a little in 2017 (to 28.6 years) (KAPITÁNY–SPÉDER 2018, 48–49). With relation to postponement, we must draw the readers’ attention to two facts. Firstly, the average age of motherhood varied significantly depending on educational levels: among women with eight completed elementary school grades, the age of motherhood barely changed, but it has risen by almost five years among women with secondary or higher education (Statisztikai Tükör 2014, 2). Secondly, the adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp) that filters out the tempo effect has dropped from 1.8 in 2005 to under 1.4 in 2010 and stagnated since then. This shows a decreased willingness to have children (KAPITÁNY–SPÉDER 2018, 47). In this respect there was a change between 2015 and 2017 only among women with tertiary education whose fertility showed an increase (FARKAS 2017a).

2.2. Changes in intimate relationships

An important factor in birth numbers is the ratio of children born in marriages or in unwed relationships. In Hungary the number of marriages continued to decline as part of a trend which began in 1975, falling from 66,400 in 1990 to 35,500 in 2010, followed by a moderate growth between 2010 and 2014 and a surge since 2016 to 51,800. Hungary registered 50,600 marriages in 2017. The number of divorces practically stagnated around 23,000–25,000 between 1990 and 2011 and has fallen since then. 2017 was the first in 50 years when it dropped below 19,000 (KSH 2018). In parallel with the declining popularity of marriages, there was an increase in the number of unwed couples in the 1990s and a rise in the number of singles after 2010 (from 20.3% in 1990 to 35.1% in 2018) (Statisztikai Tükör 2018, 8). This latter fact is of importance in the Hungarian society, which has traditional values because experts agree that the willingness to have children is mostly set back by the absence of a happy and steady relationship. Hungarian youth still have the desire to have children, but out of the planned 1.7 children only 1.4 are born (FÁBOS 2017). Showing a continuous growth between 1990 and 2000, the number of extra-marital birth rose from 13% to 29%. At the turn of the millennium, this trend stopped for a while but then resumed rapidly and by 2015 it
reached its peak of almost 48%. In 2016 and 2017 – due to the dynamic rise in the number of marriages – both the number and ratio of extra-marital children has fallen. In 2017, 55% of children were born in marriages and 45% out of wedlock (Statisztikai Tükör 2018, 4).

2.3. Changes in mortality rate

The examined period is contradictory with regard to mortality indicators. While life expectancy of the Hungarian population undoubtedly rose – from 65.2 years to 72.3 for men and from 73.9 to 79.2 for women –, Hungary still remains one of the European societies with the worst life expectancy rates. Although it is ahead of several regional countries (Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Ukraine), in terms of life expectancy the gap has not been decreased neither to countries with low-mortality rate nor to the European Union average. We must also point out that the mortality rate crisis accompanying the regime change reached its bottom in 1993 (when men’s life expectancy hit 64.5 years and only recovered to the 1990-level in 1995), meaning that life expectancy growth was more dynamic than the European average (Bálint–Kovács 2015, 75). Mortality rate by 100,000 citizens showed a staggering downward trend since 1994 but still remains one and a half times higher than in the developed EU countries. Since 2000 the annual number of deaths hovered around 130,000 (marginal years: 2003 – 135,823; 2014 – 126,308) while the annual natural population loss around 37,000 (marginal years: 2003 – 41,176; 2008 – 30,878) (KSH 2018). Besides the decline in mortality, the number of healthy years lost – an indicator of lower living standards – is also significantly worse in Hungary compared to other EU member states. Moreover, the country’s handicap in the number of deaths due to certain circulatory diseases and cancer has even grown worse (Egészségjelentés 2016, 7–8).

2.4. Demographic ageing

Due to changes in fertility and mortality indicators – similarly to other European societies – the Hungarian society is also ageing. At the time of the regime change (1990) the average age was 36.1 years and it rose to 39.4 years by 2008 and 41.9 years by 2016 (Piac és Profit 2018). Between 1990 and 2017 the ratio of the over 65 age group rose from 13% to 18.7% and is forecasted to rise to 29% by 2070 (E-Volution 2017). One of the most severe problems of seniors in Hungary is the deterioration of their health, with those having only primary studies are the most affected. Within this demographic group only 11–12% rate their health as good, while this ratio among those with tertiary studies is 43% for men and 26% for women (Monostori 2015, 115–116).

2.5. Changes in the population’s educational structure

Given that both life expectancy and health quality are related to educational levels, we must also examine this question. In the last 100 years the post-1990 period brought the biggest change in this field. While in 1990 those with primary studies accounted for 57.5% of
the population, this ratio dropped to 26.5% by 2016. Over the same period, the percentage of those with vocational training rose from 15% to 20.9%, those with secondary studies from 19.9% to 33.4% and those with higher education from 9.7% to 21.8% (Szémann 2017). In 2016, 1 million 750 thousand people had vocational qualification, 2 million 700 thousand had high-school graduation, and 1 million 716 thousand completed university education (Mikrocenzus 2016/4, 5–6). Women made the biggest strides in terms of education, as their number and percentage both among those with secondary studies and higher education is above than those for men. It is also true, however, that educational levels show significant regional disparities: while in the capital, Budapest, 76.4% have at least secondary studies and 40.7% have higher education, the same ratios are 61.4% and 27.2% in other cities and 37.8% and 11.8% in rural areas (Mikrocenzus 2016/2, 17–18).

2.6. The ethnic composition of the Hungarian population

Hungary has 13 nationality groups recognised by the law (the 1993 ethnic law recognised 12 nationalities and one ethnic minority, but since 2011 the law also defines Roma as a nationality), whose numbers are based on self-declarations. Between the 2001 and 2011 census their number officially rose from 205,720 to 315,583 while their ratio within the total population rose from 2.02% to 3.17%. (KSH 2014, 15). The real number and proportion of nationalities, however – primarily due to the Roma population – is significantly higher. A recent research pegs the number of Roma in Hungary at 886,000 and their ratio at 8.8% (Pénzes et al. 2018, 3). According to experts, these numbers also seem to be validated by the fact that during the 2011 census over 1.4 million people did not wish to declare their nationality (KSH 2014, 166). From a demographic perspective, only the Roma are standing out from the general population, as they tend to have decreasing, yet still high fertility rate and extended reproduction rates, higher mortality and lower life expectancy. Latter trends can be explained by the lower levels of education and employment, worse health and social conditions and the fact that they are often regionally segregated (Statisztikai Tükör 2015, 1–9).

2.7. Regional demographic specifics

If we consider the seven Hungarian regions, it can be stated that there is a continuous population decrease in the countryside of Hungary – with the exception of Western Transdanubia – and it is only the Central Region where the population is growing. In Hungary – as in other countries – there are significant differences in the development level of the regions: the most affluent region – which includes the capital – is only matched by Western and Central Transdanubia, while the other four regions have a significant economic handicap. This also determines the destinations of domestic migration: young and middle-aged adults seeking education or jobs typically migrate towards more developed regions with higher wages, more job opportunities and better infrastructure. But from a demographic perspective not only the more developed regions have an advantage, but the poorest ones (Northern Hungary) as well, where birth rates are relatively high. Negative demographic
trends have their biggest influence on regions where the number of seniors is relatively high, the number of children is low and the migration balance is also negative (Southern Transdanubia, Southern Great Plain) (Rigó 2017a). Since the direction of internal migration is largely determined by the level of economic development, the most affluent central region is the clear beneficiary of migration trends. Besides this, Western Transdanubia bordering Austria and Slovakia is the only other region where both domestic and international migration increase population numbers. The migration balance of Central Transdanubia is neutral but the other regions’ populations are declining (Rigó 2017b). Domestic immigration does not only affect rural areas but most Hungarian cities as well. Between 2005 and 2016 Budapest and only the six largest county towns of the total of 24 (Győr, Sopron, Szeged, Hódmezővásárhely, Debrecen and Kecskemét) could increase their population.

3. Demographic perspectives, forecasts, reactions of decision-makers

The latest official population projection for Hungary was conducted in 2018. It had three scenarios (base, high and low) and all three forecasted a decreasing population until 2070. According to the base scenario operating with a 1.65 fertility rate concludes that at the end of the forecasted period, the population will be at 7.75 million; the low scenario, supposing a fertility rate of 1.45 forecasts a population of 6 million but even the high projection with a 1.75 fertility rate and significant immigration expects only 9.07 million (Obádovics 2018, 284). The United Nations’ 2017 forecast until 2100 is somewhat more optimistic regarding the rate of the population decline with a prognosis of 9.23 million by 2030, 8.27 million by 2050 and 6.38 by 2100 (WPP 2017, 25). The single most important factor in the population decrease will be the decline in the number of women of childbearing age, but even they will be able to sustain around 90,000 births per year level – which will somewhat slow down the fall in population – only if they have more children. In terms of life expectancy at birth, all three variants expect an improvement by 2060 (the values for men are between 81.4 and 85.5 years, while it puts women between 85.5 and 90.3 years of expected lifespan). The projection also assumes a parallel drop in mortality to around 125,000–100,000 per year. The ratio of over-65s in the population will rise from 1.67 million (in 2011) to 2.27 million by 2070 (Obádovics 2018, 284–290). The surplus of women over the same horizon will drop from ca. 500,000 (in 2011) to around 100,000 (Obádovics 2018, 271).

Because the number of live births in Hungary began to drop significantly since 1974 and the same trend is valid regarding population numbers since 1981, the subsequent governments after the regime change have been well aware of the country’s demographic challenges. The post-1990 measures intended to improve the demographic situation were primarily aimed at increasing birth rates, paying much less attention to the two other areas of demographic policy: increasing life expectancy (primarily through reducing mortality rates among the young and middle-aged) and migration policy (including emigration and return migration policies). This policy that spun across multiple governments was not only supported by the public opinion that values the structure of family, but also by the experts, in the hope that the relatively large generation that reached fertile age in the mid-1990s (the so-called Ratkó-grandchildren) combined with family support initiatives will be able to
stabilise the country’s population in the short and medium terms (Kapitány–Spéder 2017, 184). Accordingly, in the period covered in this article, the generous (compared to other European systems) Hungarian family support system offered financial incentives to those with young children and those nurturing their children at home. The main elements of this system – based on the age of the children – are the following: the one-off maternity grant, the pregnancy and maternity benefit (TGYÁS) for children under the age of 3, the maternity benefit (CSED) that replaces the previous one, the childcare benefit (GYED), the childcare allowance (GYES) and the child rearing benefit (GYET), of which the latter three are provided to families with three or more children until the child reaches the age of eight. A 24-week maternity leave and a three-year childcare leave is also available after each child. The most important regular support for children until the age of 18 is the family allowance (with two components: the upbringing allowance and the schooling allowance) and the family tax rebate, which up until 2011 was only available to large families (i.e. with more than three children), but has since been extended to include all families with even one child. The family support system also gained new elements in the form of subsidised housing loan, the non-refundable housing support (the so-called “szocpol”), the regular child protection benefit and the regular child protection allowance for the socially disadvantaged and the one-off life start support. The fundamental structure of the support system established in 1990 has essentially remained unchanged; experts say that the different governments only changed the relative weight of each element. While leftist governments regarded these elements as parts of social policy, conservative governments primarily used them as tools of demographic policy thus prioritising them. Or, to put it more critically: experts criticised the former for neglecting demographic issues and the latter for ignoring issues such as child poverty (Ónody-Molnár 2017).

However, by the 2010s, it has become evident what the experts already foresaw after the turn of the millennium: the size of the population did not stabilise. Subsequently, when the “Ratkó-grandchildren” grew out of fertile age, the fertile group has been reduced to an extent that for the upcoming decades sectoral policies of encouraging childbearing would be insufficient to stabilise the population size of the country on their own (Kapitány–Spéder 2017, 184). The negative demographic turn was also reinforced by the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, which – after the 1989–1993 transformation crisis and the 1993–1994 Hungarian economic imbalance crisis – was the third one to hit the Hungarian society in a mere two decades. This coincided with Hungary’s accession to the European Union, which triggered an emigration wave that resulted in an estimated 7–8% of the demographically fertile people leaving the country (Kapitány 2014, 2). Faced with all of the above, the conservative government that came to power in 2010 – after having also ruled between 1998–2002 – has included the improvement of the demographic situation among its political priorities and at the beginning of its third consecutive cycle in 2018 it announced a “governance with a demographic emphasis” with the goal of increasing the fertility to 2.1 by 2030. It is also important to mention that while this regime has implemented a series of positive family policy measures – extending the family tax rebate to families with just one child in 2011, extending GYED to higher education students, a continuous granting of GYES after children born within a short time span and allowing mothers to have jobs and still receive GYED and introducing the family housing discount (CSOK) in 2016 – it did all of the above while using the traditional family support toolset and primarily stimulated childbearing among the middle class with
a traditional family model. Experts warn that such measures could increase the fertility rate to 1.6 at best or in a more optimistic view to 1.7 and any further increase would require much more radical demographic policy intervention (Serdült 2018).

According to experts, there are several reasons why the measures intended to improve the Hungarian demographic situation have proven ineffective or of very little effect in the past decades. We have already mentioned one of the most important reasons: in the past decades, Hungarian governments started from the wrong premise that they will be able to put Hungary on a sustainable demographic path by using a single factor, a family policy that encourages childbearing (Kapitány–Spéder 2017, 184). It is important to mention that they did this with the support of the vast majority of domestic experts. We have also mentioned before that successive governments have approached demographic issues based on their political-ideological leanings. They either saw the solution in social policies, or they separated social policy from the decrease in population, or they restricted family policy support to certain social strata. This latter was particularly true for conservative governments, which primarily encouraged childbearing in the upper middle classes (Horváth 2017). Another frequent criticism is that the Hungarian family support system is insufficiently differentiated, too focused on financial support, bureaucratic, neglects measures intended to reconcile child rearing and work (such as nurseries, day care, part-time work, teleworking, etc.), and that in the past few decades no government could formulate a comprehensive demographic policy concept and strategy (Szilas 2015c). Even the Fidesz Government – the one with the best track record in this respect – failed to remedy these problems. While even critics of this government acknowledge their (partial) successes in a family policy that encourages childbearing, they are rightfully criticised for implementing very few effective measures in the two other important fields of demographic policy: the increase of life expectancy and migration policy.

4. Migration trends – political reactions

The stance and behaviour adopted by the current government since 2015 with regard to migration policy – primarily the strong refusal to solve demographic problems through migration from outside the Hungarian cultural sphere – seem to suggest that migration is not only a perception, but an actual problem for the country and its society. Despite the obvious difficulties and debates regarding the statistical approach to migration, data from the period under scrutiny only confirm the fears voiced by the government in the area of emigration. We must immediately put forward that with regard to migration, we will only focus on migrant groups which are relevant to the Hungarian society from a demographic perspective.

4.1. Immigration

 Compared to the traditional host Western European countries, the number and proportion of immigrants in Hungary is modest – though data from some other Central and Eastern European countries are even lower (Gödri 2018, 237; Bleha–Sprocha 2018; Todor 2018). According to 2017 data from the KSH, 96% of the Hungarian population are Hungarian
citizens born in Hungary, thus immigration by citizenship or country of birth only affects a small fraction of the population. In 2017, the rate of foreign citizens in Hungary was 1.6% (151,000 people), and of people with foreign birthplace was 5.2% (508,000 people) in the society according to Eurostat data. The rate of foreigners from neighbouring countries among people with foreign birthplace was 72% and 28% among the people with foreign citizenship (GÖDRI 2018, 250). Hungary was affected by the largest wave of immigration around the years of the regime change (the peak was 1990, when over 37,000 people came to Hungary), and from then until 2003 immigration has stabilised at a rate of under 20,000 people per year (marginal values: 1994 – 12,758; 2001 – 20,308). In the years following the 2004 accession to the European Union, the number of immigrants began to rise again except for a 2008 peak of 35,547 people due to the introduction of the permanent residency card in 2007. Later it has stabilised around between 20 and 25 thousand and showed a modest growth since 2011. In 2017, there was another peak of 35,400 immigrants to Hungary. The rise was due to the massive growth in arrivals from the Ukraine, Asia and Serbia. In the examined period, the overwhelming majority of migrants came from Europe and within that, between 1990 and 2007 more than two thirds from four neighbouring countries with ethnic Hungarian minorities (Romania, Ukraine, Serbia and Slovakia), of which for a long time Romania was the largest source. After this, the proportion of immigrants from these countries fell to under 45% until 2011 and following the introduction of simplified naturalisation in 2011 it dropped to under 35% (GÖDRI 2015, 190; KSH 2018). Between 1990 and 2009, the ratio of those arriving from outside Europe was only 16%, rising thereafter from 19% to 32%, primarily on account of arrival from Asia. The number of the latter rose by 20,000 between 2000 and 2017. The ratio of African immigrants over the same period rose from 1% to 4%, but the actual numbers are very low: between 2000 and 2017, the number of African immigrants rose from 1,783 to 5,985 people (VASKÓR 2018).

Although between 1990 and 2018 one million people received Hungarian citizenship, 797,000 of them are people living abroad naturalised under the simplified naturalisation scheme. This means that from a demographic perspective, the number of the population only increased by the 203,000 people naturalised in Hungary between 1993 and 2017 and by those 61,000 naturalised abroad with a residence in Hungary; while the rest might only influence future immigration trends (GÖDRI 2015, 187; LENGYEL 2017; FARKAS 2017b; ÚJ MAGYAR ÁLLAMPOLGÁROK 2017, 5). In the examined period, immigrants were typically young (within the 20–39 age group), with senior people mostly immigrating from the European Union or as Hungarian citizens of neighbouring countries. 57% of the immigrants came to Budapest and its agglomeration, 10% to the Southern Great Plain and 9% to Western Transdanubia. Only 3% of them chose the disadvantaged region of Northern Hungary. Among those coming to Budapest, the majority were from Asia or Romania, while immigrants from the other neighbouring countries preferred the regions closest to them. This is even more so in case of those who became citizens under the simplified naturalisation scheme (GÖDRI 2015, 193).

### 4.2. Refugees

Between 1990 and 2017 Hungary registered 444,782 asylum-seekers (HALMOS–NÉMET 2014; KSH 2018). The actual number of refugees arriving to the country was certainly higher
than that, because for example only during the 2015 refugee/migrant crisis, the Hungarian police had to take action against almost 400,000 people at Hungary’s Schengen borders (Christián 2017, 151). The annual number of asylum-seekers during this period was mostly below 4,300, except for the first years of the Balkan war (1990–1992), between 2000 and 2002 and the period of the 2015 migration crisis (2014–2016). During the first period 88,000 asylum-seekers came to Hungary, between 6,400 and 9,600 in the second period and 294,000 during the third one. 76% percent of all refugees registered in Hungary arrived during these nine years. Refugees only applied for asylum in Hungary for formal reasons, almost all of them went on to Western Europe later, mostly to Germany (Juhász et al. 2017, 8). Experts say the reason for this is partly that since 1995 Hungarian authorities only granted asylum, protected status or settlement rights to 10,784 people, i.e. an annual average of 469 people or 3% of all asylum-applications were accepted (Halmos–Német 2014; KSH 2018). In the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of asylum-seekers came from the former Yugoslav territory (between 1990 and 1992 Hungarians, Croatians, Bosnians, and since 1999 Romas and Albanians). In the 2000s – because Hungary also officially accepts asylum-seekers from outside of Europe since 1998 – the majority of the refugees arrived from Asia (Afghans, Iraqis, Bangladeshis, and Syrians), although in 2008–2009 and since 2014 the Kosovars were temporarily the largest single group (Gödri 2015, 195). It is worth mentioning that the asylum-seekers’ acceptance rate is worsened by those asylum-seekers between 2013 and 2017 whose vast majority had left Hungary before the decision was made in their cases.

4.3. Emigration

Emigration is where Hungarian experts have the biggest disagreement regarding the actual numbers. Firstly because the statistical definition of emigration is ambiguous to this day and secondly because many emigrants do not report their leave to the Hungarian authorities. For these reasons, the Hungarian expert literature has estimates regarding emigration on a fairly wide scale from 120,000 to 637,000. It is likely though that the actual number is much closer to the upper estimate (Mikrocensus 2016/10, 10; Beke 2018). Emigration from Hungary began to grow significantly in the mid-2000s, after Germany and Austria opened their labour markets in 2011 to the workforce coming from the states that freshly joined the European Union (Gödri 2016, 7). Besides Great Britain, these are the two most popular destinations for Hungarian emigration (71% of Hungarians living abroad lives in Germany and Austria), the overwhelming majority of them (86%) lives in these countries due to employment reasons. Among the emigrants, the ratio of men (55%) is higher than their respective ratio among the total population, while the other over-represented groups are those of working age (90%), the younger generation (33–37%), skilled workmen (58%) or people with higher education (30%) (Blaskó–Gödri 2015, 61–62). In a regional breakdown, a higher percentage emigrated from Southern Transdanubia compared to the national average. The number of those with migration experience registered in 2016 shows that 41% of them returned to the country (Mikrocensus 2016/10, 11). Although since 2015 the rate of emigration has dropped and the number of returning citizens has increased (Statisztikai Tükör 2018, 11), the majority of polls shows a high − 0.5–1.2 million people – willingness to emigrate (Beke 2018; Publicus Intézet 2018). It is important to notice that there is not always
a real intention behind the high willingness to emigrate. Only about half of the people who plan to emigrate can be considered as serious planners (Gödri 2016, 26).

Although in a short period after 1989 Hungary was the recipient of three larger immigration waves (Hungarians from Transylvania, East Germans, refugees from the Balkans) and in the second half of the 1990s a professional debate about migration has begun, these debates have not resulted in a deliberate and strategically supported migration policy on behalf of the various governments (Tóth 2005, 320). The liberal migration policy of 1990–1993 was changed to adherence to two views between 1993 and 2010 that will be discussed below. On the one hand, adhering in principle to the nascent migration and refugee policy of the European Union. On the other hand, there was the consensual practice to make it as difficult as possible for foreign nationals of other than Hungarian ethnicity to enter the country, receive a residence permit, buy real estate, settle in the country or be naturalised (Nyíri 2016). This is amply demonstrated by a migration strategy draft compiled for the Gyurcsány government in January 2007 – which did not pass in parliament due to the opposition’s refusal. This strategy on the one hand regarded immigration as part of its demographic policy and foresaw that “the number of foreigners could rise tenfold and their ratio could rise above 10% in the first half of the century” (Előterjesztés 2007, 3). It is also important to note that the migration strategy adopted by the Orbán government in 2013 and which is formally still in effect, states that “for national economic and demographic reasons it is important to encourage a wider range and number of migrants’ arrival to the country who wish to enter with economic reasons, seeking work or bringing knowledge, but it is imperative that security considerations receive a high priority” (Migrációs Stratégia 2013, 31). While the 2007 draft was cautiously supportive of inviting and naturalising ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, the 2013 strategy was much more committed in this respect. Orbán’s migration strategy primarily counts on legal migrants from the EU and ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries. With respect to those arriving from elsewhere, a certain “regulated openness” is mentioned: it deems the reception of third-country migrants desirable – similar to other countries – who can contribute to the economy as investors, highly qualified professionals and those who could relieve skill shortages (Migrációs Stratégia 2013, 31).

As in many other European countries, the 2015 migration and refugee crisis brought the most significant change in the Hungarian government’s migration policy. On the one hand, since the inception of the migration wave, the government has put migration as one of its top political and communications issues, thereby removing it from the expert policy level. On the other hand, on verbal level it exhibits a rigid refusal of even harbouring those refugees who arrive from outside of the Hungarian, and broadly speaking European cultural sphere. At the same time, it is also true that the Fidesz government accepted almost exactly as many refugees between 2010 and 2017 as did the leftist governments between 2002 and 2009 (KSH 2018). On the other hand, it still makes immigration possible even for those coming from outside the European cultural sphere through special means (e.g. settlement bonds). According to experts, the biggest risk of this policy is that the strict anti-migration rhetoric of the government will turn the Hungarian society rigidly anti-immigrant for a long time. This is even more so given the fact that – as we have previously indicated – in previous years ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries are much less disposed to settle in Hungary.
5. Conclusion

According to most experts, the unfavourable demographic trends of the past almost three decades (decreasing population, ageing, emigration) could have only been handled, or could only be mitigated in the future through devising and implementing a complex and flexible demographic policy that encourages childbirth through family policy, supports health preservation and regards immigration an essential component. The consecutive Hungarian governments since 1990 were unable to devise such strategy and their demographic policies were largely restricted to the financial tools of family policy. The political and social opinion regarding migration has changed significantly as a result of the 2015 migration crisis and is thus highly doubtful whether in the coming years, the government will be able to elaborate and implement a strategy in line with experts’ recommendations. For the time being it seems that even the current government – one that is quite sensitive to demographic issues – is looking at increased birth rates as the only solution. But, in the words of demographer Balázs Kapitány: “The Hungarian society quite simply does not have the goal internalized that the government has set out for itself” (Serdült 2018).

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Cătălina Todor

The Demographic Country Profile of Romania after 1989
Challenges and Perspectives for Policy Makers

1. Introduction

Since the 1989 Revolution, Romania has been experiencing unprecedented dramatic demographic trends: population decline, population ageing and massive emigration (including brain drain).

To some extent, Romania’s situation subscribes to the regional context, Europe (with its inner regional differences) being perhaps the most affected continent in the key dimensions of the demographic transition:¹

Numerical dimension. Europe has three types of countries: with a low population growth (but still a population growth due to migration), with stagnating or slowly declining population and with a very acute population decline (mostly in the former Eastern Bloc countries). Romania is in the third category, with dynamics specific to the ex-Eastern Bloc countries, being marked by acute trends of population decline.

Age-structure dimension. All European countries will experience the phenomenon of demographic ageing. There are still some differences, but not that notable in terms of how fast populations are ageing: the average Eastern Europe is expected to age slower than the rest. But Romania will age faster compared to the East, and even though until 2040–2050 this process will be slower than the European average, following this period it is expected to accelerate, even surpassing the European average.

Migration dimension. This aspect applies to two opposite types of European countries: host countries which attract migration (the phenomenon started decades before the refugee and migrant crisis in 2015, and culminates currently with this major challenge posed by it) and countries of origin (even though some of them have an acute population decline, at the same time, they experience significant emigration of the economically active population – situation characteristic mostly for the former Eastern Bloc countries). Unfortunately, before the refugee crisis, Romania was the 2nd origin and source country

¹ When speaking of “demographic transition”, different approaches on variables exist. Therefore, we relate to this in terms of the three theories which cover the main and topical demographic phenomena: 1st transition (the classic one) based on changes in birth rates and mortality rates (initiator: W. Thompson and F. Notestein; important contributions: Jean-Claude Chesnais); the 2nd transition based on fertility control (Dirk J. van de Kaa); this process brings into attention dynamics such as ageing (important theory: Malmberg Bo and Lena Sommestad discuss about the transition based on age structure dimension of population dynamics); the 3rd transition: based on migration dynamics (David Coleman). In 2012, John F. May: makes a synthesis of these three types of transitions.
for the European immigrants, even though being confronted with one of the most acute population declines worldwide.

To conclude, Romania follows the regional trends, but with its own particularities, being one of the most acute European demographic cases. Ionel Muntele remarks: “Even if the problem is, in general present at a European level, the situation in our country, according to the trends described, is much worse” (Muntele 2010, 85). He integrates this dynamic in the 7th category of demographic transitions out of 8 (the last two being the most acute ones), characterising Romania’s situation by: an abrupt completion of the demographic transition; a faulty adaptation to the post-transitional model and the risks related to the demographic challenges, such as short-term chronic population ageing, the pronounced decline in the labour force without an equilibration from the migration contribution; the risk of devitalising as a result of massive emigration (Muntele 2010, 76).

This research aims to draw an accurate demographic profile of Romania and to analyse the answer of the Romanian state to these significant long-term challenges.

2. Population and demographic trends since 1989

2.1. Causes of acute developments

In Romania’s case, the current demographic profile was shaped by a complex combination of economic and cultural changes (Sobotka 2003) and challenges occurred immediately after the 1989 Revolution, common to the ex-socialist Eastern countries.

The economic challenges were: the uncertainty of the population due to hyperinflation, unemployment, risk of poverty, dramatic decrease of living standards and governments’ low capacity of guaranteeing basic social security; the new characteristics of jobs (much more flexible, but much more insecure); the new opportunities to increase standards of living abroad (Sobotka 2003, 691–715; Strzelecki 2003, 15; Neyer et al. 2013, 4–6).

The cultural and identity transformation meant important changes in lifestyles by prolonging education duration (extending the higher education among youth population, in order to increase the chances of having a well-paid job), by a delayed contraceptive and sexual revolution, by postponing marriage, by a new culture of choice and opportunities (transitioning to a consumer society associated with the importance of free time, increased individualism and avoiding long term commitments; focusing on the satisfaction obtained from new goods as a substitute for the lifestyle centred on children) (Sobotka 2003, 691–715; Strzelecki 2003, 15; Neyer et al. 2013, 4–6).

In addition, an abrupt shift happened from the previous pro-natalist policies, specific to the communist regime, and their replacement with social and family policies greatly influenced by economic evolutions (job insecurity, but also the emergence of new opportunities arose from opening towards Western Europe), abandoning the centralised housing distribution system, the liberalisation of contraception and abortion, people’s movement and cultural globalisation, all this facilitating the change of values among young people (Sobotka 2003, 691–715).

Tomáš Sobotka states that all these have begun to compete with the decision to bring children to the world. He argues that the effects produced by crisis-related factors (the first
category of causes) can be reversed if an economic and social recovery is produced. But the effects of cultural and identity changes are irreversible and have a long-lasting effect. Therefore, the situation is acute in the former Eastern Block region (Romania inclusively) and is expected to have long term implications, probably irreversible ones (Sobotka 2003, 691–715).

Romania shifted, as Vladimir Trebici and Ion Ghinoiu remarked even since the mid-1980s, from a natalist (pro-birth) family planning to anti-natalist one (Trebici–Ghinoiu 1986, 17–18). The country underwent profound socio-economic changes after the 1989 Revolution, associated with the period of transition from a socialistic country to democracy, from a centralised economy to a market economy. Therefore, along with European trends that affected the traditional family (postponing marriage, the growth of the education period duration, increasing individualisation, increasing women’s autonomy and the advocacy for family planning, etc.), it went to particular developments emerged from the transition to democracy, that came with a series of socio-economic and cultural challenges. If we take into consideration that after the 1990s Romania suffered both types of causes mentioned by Tomáš Sobotka, one can assert that it is highly likely for the demographic transformations to be irreversible with a great societal long term impact.

2.2. Demographic decline in Romania from 1989 to 2100

Before 1989, Romania’s demography was overall characterised, by positive developments: the population of the territory increasing more than 3.5 times in the last century. But 1990 represents a historical turning point. Starting with the 1990s, Romania’s population experienced a considerable and constant population decline. By 2018, the demographic decline in Romania has been going on constantly for 29 years.

Before 1989, Romania’s demography was overall characterised, by positive developments: the population of the territory increasing more than 3.5 times in the last century. But 1990 represents a historical turning point. Starting with the 1990s, Romania’s population experienced a considerable and constant population decline. By 2018, the demographic decline in Romania has been going on constantly for 29 years.

| Table 1 | Total population of Romania according to the censuses conducted after the 1989 Revolution |
| Date of the census | 7 January 1992 | 18 March 2002 | 20 October 2011 |
| Population | 22,810,035 | 21,680,974 | 20,121,641 |

Source: National Institute of Statistics 2018

Romania’s population declined with 14.89% between 1989–2016, from 23,151,564 in 1989 to 19,703,494 in 2016 (National Institute of Statistics 2018) (Figure 1). UN estimates show a slightly higher decline (15.37%), from 23,489,000 in 1990 to 19,877,000 in 2015 (UN-DESA 2017).

2016 is the last estimate that can be found in the Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2017. At the time of the research, it was the most actual Statistical Yearbook of Romania.
Thus, all reliable national and international sources of data show that Romania lost about 3.4 million inhabitants from the 1989 Revolution to the present days.

In terms of prognoses, Romania will be in the top 10 most acute cases globally of demographic decline by 2050 (UN-DESA 2017). Its dramatic population decrease can turn into depopulation, with varied risks associated in different areas of society (most of all in terms of social infrastructures: labour market, the education and health care systems, etc.). According to the Romanian National Institute of Statics, Romania will have 18,047,000 inhabitants by 2030, and 12,946,000 by 2060 in the medium variant predictions that include the external migration component. This means a decrease of 35.7% by 2060. The optimist scenario shows a decrease of 30.6% and the pessimist one a decrease of 40.7% by 2060. Without the component of external migration, the medium variant shows a population of 18,121,000 inhabitants by 2030 and 13,232,000 by 2060 (a decrease of 34.2% by 2060). The optimist variant represents a decrease of 29.1% and the pessimist one a decrease of 39.4% by 2060. (INSSE 2017). One can conclude that external migration contributes to the long-term decline to a little extent, with less than 1.5%, for the rest being responsible mostly the levels of fertility and births rates. UN estimates the decrease will continue by 2100, in the medium variant with 17.50% by 2050 and with 39.21% by 2100 (UN-DESA 2018).<sup>3</sup> In the pessimist variant, Romania’s population will drop even below 8 million in 2100 (UN-DESA 2017).

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<sup>3</sup> Percentage calculation based on UN 2015, 2050, 2100 estimates: UN-DESA 2018.
Romania's total population evolution between 1985–2100: estimates and prognoses

Source: UN-DESA 2018

Romania's population projection according to UN's variants

Source: UN-DESA 2017
Prognoses show Romania’s population will decrease with another 3.5 million inhabitants, at least, by 2050 and with 7.7 million by 2100 (INSSE 2017). If the parameters remain medium, Romania is expected to lose around 40% of its population by 2100.

Three demographic coordinates compose the future prognosis: birth rates, mortality and migration. In Romania’s case, the main responsible factors for the present and future demographic decline remain the extremely low levels of births (below the generational replacement level) and the emigration of youth and economically active population (INSSE 2012a; Mediafax 2018). At this section we will only analyse birth related indicators, migration being approached in a distinct subchapter of this research.

The total fertility rate (TFR). The states with extreme low values (Eastern Europe, including Romania) will face the risk of severe demographic decline or even demographic depopulation (from this can emerge their inability to maintain a certain level of ethnic homogeneity, if the territory becomes or is already attractive for immigrants; this can bring complex societal challenges) (Figure 4).

Unfortunately, Romania’s TFR average for the period 1989–2016 is 1.4, taking in consideration that after 1995 the TFR was between 1.3–1.2 and only from 2014 started to slightly increase (Figure 5).
Vasile Ghețău⁴ asserts that it is highly improbable for the TFR to recover at replacement levels after a period of nearly 20 years of stabilisation at 1.3–1.4 values. In addition, given the current socio-economic conditions, a significant positive change is improbable. He develops a scenario: assuming absurdly that by 2013 TFR would have reached the 2.1 threshold, Romania would still have to deal with negative effects: the population decline would still have continued by 2075 (at this point reaching 17.7 million); it would have taken 65 years for the population of Romania to recover its age structure. If a TFR of 1.6–1.8 would be reached and maintained, the proportions and rhythm of demographic ageing and decline would ameliorate. For this to happen, Vasile Ghețău highlights the need of a different general living standard and adequate resources in order to design, adopt and apply a long-term and long-lasting population policy (GHEȚĂU 2012b, 61–64). We can observe from the current data, that this is not the case for now.

Life-births rates. The number of live-births is in 2016 smaller with about 50% than the number estimated for 1989 (Figure 6).

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⁴ Director of the “Vladimir Trebici” Center for Demographic Research, Romanian Academy.
Massive abortion rates. This component is very relevant because it can impact the population number both directly and indirectly — possible physical and psychological repercussions on women, affecting their future capacity of giving birth — (Ghețău 2012b, 6). From this perspective, Romania has one of the most acute situations globally: it has one of the biggest abortion rates worldwide — 21.3 (UN-DESA 2013) and is number one in Europe by the number of abortions (Tomescu et al. 2013, 79). Because of abortion, there are approximately 50% less births in Romania annually (Ghețău 2012b, 6). This is so even though in 2017 it experienced a smaller number of abortions compared with the figures of

Figure 6.

*The evolution of live-births situation in Romania between 1989–2016*

*Source:* National Institute of Statistics 2018
the 1990s (Figure 7). From 1989 until 2015, a number of 8,026,819 abortions were carried out, meaning more than 8 million unborn children (Pro Vita [s. a.]).

The number could be though much higher because data about abortions carried out in the private sector after 1989 are incomplete or inexistent in some cases. This grave situation is the expression of the 1990s shift in: 1. legislation – from prohibition before 1989 (Decree 770/1966) to abortion being permitted on request without no restriction (UN-DESA 2013); 2. socio-economic conditions.

2.3. Demographic ageing since 1989

For the first time in the history of Romania’s population, after the 1989 Revolution, along with the population decline, one can observe the emergence of a new demographic phenomenon: population ageing. In the long term, this is going to be one of the most acute situations regionally and globally.

Median age. Even though, in the long term, differences at global and regional levels tend to reduce, it can be observed that at least until 2050 they will accentuate. Until 2015, Romania was under the European average, but in the long run it will suffer an accelerated ageing, surpassing the European average median age. But regarding the Central East region, starting from the early 2000s, Romania exceeds this region’s average.
Table 2

Median age estimations and trends between 1989–2100
Romania’s position at global and regional level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2050</th>
<th>2075</th>
<th>2100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN-DESA 2018

According to UN data, in 1990 the median age in Romania was 32.6 and in 2015 this increased to 41.3 (a jump of 9 years in a period of only two and a half decades). Another 4 to 7 years are expected to be added in the next one to three decades: Romania’s median age will be around 45.4 years by 2030, around 48.0 by 2050 and around 48.6 by 2100 (UN-DESA 2018) (Figure 8).

Figure 8

Romania’s median age evolution: estimates and trends for 1985–2100
A comparative perspective with global, European and Eastern European values

Source: UN-DESA 2018

Age structure. After 1989, Romania’s age structure started to register changes (Figure 9–10), experiencing a decrease in the proportion of children and an increase in the elderly. In the long term, the proportion of children and working-age population is expected to decrease further and the proportion of the elderly to increase (Figure 10).
INSSE prognoses show (Figure 10) an increase of the elderly proportion with 15.2% in 2060 compared to 1992 (first census after the 1989 results).
The elderly population increased from 2.44 million in 1990 to 3.37 million in 2015 and it is expected to reach 4.57 million by 2050 according to UN data (UN-DESA 2018) (Figure 11).

---

\[ \text{The first figure does not include the migration component.} \]
Working-age population. From an economic perspective, if the number of the elderly is growing and the number of the working-age population is decreasing, this is the worst situation. According to UN estimates and prognoses, this population group started to decrease in the 1990s and it is expected to be halved by 2100: from 15,466,748 in 1990, to 13,433,330 in 2015, to 9,496,385 in 2050 and to 6,677,671 in 2100 (UN-DESA 2018) (Figure 12).
According to the INSSE the decrease of the working-age population is forecasted to be slightly higher (Table 3).

Table 3

Romania’s working-age population group estimates and trends between 2002 and 2060 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–64 years old resid. Pop.</td>
<td>+ext. migration</td>
<td>– ext. migration</td>
<td>+ext. migration</td>
<td>– ext. migration</td>
<td>+ext. migration</td>
<td>– ext. migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14,810.6</td>
<td>13,684.2</td>
<td>13,413.4</td>
<td>11,985.2</td>
<td>7,506.1</td>
<td>–5,907.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>13,684.3</td>
<td>13,684.3</td>
<td>12,099.1</td>
<td>12,131.6</td>
<td>7,921.9</td>
<td>8,116.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSSE 2017, 9–17

Old-age dependency ratio. This indicator offers a perspective on the socio-demographical pressure that ageing is expected to have on the future Romanian society. After 1989, a considerable increase of this indicator can be observed, a tendency to be continued for the next decades. On the horizon of 2060, INSSE estimates that it will almost double, reaching a value of 44 elderlies at 100 working-age population (Figure 13).

Source: INSSE 2012a; INSSE 2017; UN-DESA 2018
UN data shows Romania had a quite equilibrated ratio of 18.1 in the year 1990 and by 2015 it has experienced a growth with almost 10%. According to UN, by 2050 old-age dependency ratio will double, reaching 52.7 and by 2100 it is expected to be at 60.6 (UN-DESA 2018). These values make Romania one of the worst cases worldwide and regionally (Figure 14).

Figure 14

*Old-age dependency ratio: Romania in comparison with the global and regional dimensions*

*Source: UN-DESA 2018*
As one can observe, the social pressure of ageing is about to double and if trends confirm, Romania will have to adapt its social infrastructures in order to cope with this phenomenon.

2.4. Migration

In its modern history, Romania was an emigration country: emigration flows were significantly bigger than the immigration ones. Currently the situation remains the same; therefore, an important part of this chapter will focus on emigration.

2.4.1. Emigration from Romania after 1989

Internal and external events and processes that have happened after 1989 have led to boosting emigration at very high levels. Internally, the fall of the communist regime and the economic transition led to job insecurity. The restructuring of some economic sectors generated massive job losses – around 2 million between 1990–2000 (Bălteanu 2005, 260) and 3.4 million estimated in 2010 (Comenius Project 2010, 35–38). The labour market was not mature enough and ready to assimilate the majority of workers in need of reorientation and the employed population decreasing with 44% (Comenius Project 2010, 35–38). Externally, geopolitical changes (USSR collapse) facilitated Romania’s opening towards Western countries, after a period of harsh restriction for emigration. After the end of the Cold War, the migration flow from East towards West has become one of the most important routes of migration (Laumer 2009), including Romania’s case. The flow accelerated with Romania’s accession to the European Union (Georgescu 2006, 310). Furthermore, the desire to have access to better living conditions, a positive example from successful first wave emigrants encouraged others to follow this path.

After 1989, the phenomenon of emigration gained magnitude, but also a distinctive characteristic through different periods, forming four major emigration waves (Ulrich et al. 2011).

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Emigrant’s profile</th>
<th>Type of emigration</th>
<th>Main destination countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 1\textsuperscript{st} wave</td>
<td>1990–1995: political; political instability; the opening of the borders</td>
<td>ethnic emigration (Transylvanian Saxons and Swabians; flows oriented mainly towards Germany; highly qualified professionals</td>
<td>mostly permanent emigration</td>
<td>Germany, Canada, the USA, Turkey, Israel, Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2\textsuperscript{nd} wave</td>
<td>1996–2001: economic motivation; work migration</td>
<td>Romanian emigrants (90%), mostly men, married, previously employed in the industrial sector becoming unqualified workers in the host country</td>
<td>Temporary/circular migration</td>
<td>Germany, Canada, the USA, Turkey, Israel, Hungary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Demographic Country Profile of Romania after 1989…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 3rd wave</th>
<th>2002–2006</th>
<th>economic motivation; work migration</th>
<th>emigrants (men, women) with previous emigration experience, working in sectors such as: construction, agriculture, domestic activities</th>
<th>Temporary/circular migration</th>
<th>Italy, Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 4th wave</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
<td>economic migration; recognition of professional status</td>
<td>a new category emerges: highly qualified emigrants (“brain drain” phenomenon)</td>
<td>Long term oriented; risk of becoming permanent</td>
<td>Italy, Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ulrich et al. 2011; INSSE 2018

In terms of number, according to INSSE, 527,170 persons emigrated permanently between 1990–2016 and 1,850,066 people emigrated temporary, from Romania between 2008 (first year with estimates available on Tempo online) and 2016.

![Permanent emigration from Romania between 1990–2016](image)

**Figure 15**

*Number of permanent emigrants from Romania between 1990–2016*

Source: INSSE 2018

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6 Data from the Ulrich et al. report were combined with the analysis of indicators from INSSE’s platform Tempo online and with other literature sources.
After the first years of 1990, the permanent emigrants were in majority Romanians (Figure 17): 269,359 Romanians emigrated permanently between 1990 and 2010 (last year’s available data) (INSSE 2018).
The real data could be in reality much higher than the official estimates of INSSE. Specialists advance different figures: 2,213,000 emigrants between the 2002 and the 2011 censuses (Gețău 2012a, 12; 27–28); 3.4 million people between 2007 and 2017 (Mediafax 2018). As a matter of fact, Romanian emigrants form one of the largest groups of immigrants within the EU countries (Eurostat 2018). In 2017, Romania had the 16th largest diaspora worldwide (UN-DESA 2017).

In terms of destination, INSSE data for permanent migration are in accordance with the remarks within Table 5. The situation can be observed in Figure 18.

![Figure 18](image)

*Permanent emigrants by country of destination*

*The evolution of destination countries of Romanian emigrants after 1989*

*Source: INSEE 2018*

In the latest years, the main destinations were Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium (National Institute of Statistics 2017, 101).

Given the magnitude of the phenomenon two associate issues have arisen:

Negative implication of emigration experience on children having one or both parents abroad – depression, impairing school performance, psychological and behavioural effects etc., emerging from a long period of separation from the parents, or even from the divorce installed within the family – (Georgescu 2006; Toth et al. 2007; Toth et al. 2008; Ulrich et al. 2011; Bara-Talpaș 2011). Their healthy and harmonious evolution is very important, as they are the future human resource of Romania.

Brain drain phenomenon, manifested mostly after 2007. According to a recent study, the most affected fields of activity are: research (15,000 Romanian researchers are active abroad which can have a circulatory character; in the last 10 years 300,000 students had decided to study abroad, which can reduce significantly the base of future research generation in Romania), medical system (15,700 doctors work abroad, mostly in Germany, Great Britain, France; the deficit of specialist doctors is about 4,700; their migration tends to be permanent) and information technology (less data are known about this category; they emigrate especially to Great Britain, Ireland, Belgium, the USA and Canada) (Lăzărescu et al. 2017). The highly qualified personnel do not emigrate only because of low incomes,
other important reasons are: corruption at national level, lack of professional development opportunities, career advancement on professional merits, bureaucracy in public institutions and lack of modern infrastructure/equipment (LĂZĂRESCU et al. 2017). This phenomenon deprives Romania of a substantial human resource responsible for innovation, change and economic growth, this being at active age and specialised in key sectors for the development of any society.

Specialists believe significant flows of emigration will continue to exist at least for the next 10 to 15 years, given the socio-economic conditions in Romania, the development gap between the country and the Western European states and the emigration intention confirmed by recent researches in the field (GHEȚĂU 2012b).

2.4.2. Immigration in Romania after 1989

Romania does not have a modern history marked by major immigration flows. Since 1989, Romania has been most of all a country of transition for immigrants, in order for them to arrive into Western European countries.

In terms of stocks, in 2017 Romania’s immigrants (135,825) had as main origin countries: the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Hungary, the Russian Federation, Spain, Greece (UN-DESA 2017). Eurostat 2016 data show that the foreign born population in Romania had as major citizenship: Italian, Moldavian, Turkish, Chinese, French and a great proportion of other citizenships (Eurostat 2016). Other national source of data shows a number of 60,000 legal immigrants are coming from outside the European Union, the European Economic Area and the Swiss Confederation. The main countries are: the Republic of Moldova (9,500), Turkey (8,800), China (7,500), Syria (4,500), Israel (2,600), Iraq (2,300), the US (2,100) (LĂZĂRESCU 2016).

According to the INSSE, in 2016 the permanent immigrants were 0.14% of the estimated population of Romania. The Oxford University estimated that Romania had 0.75% foreign-born people as a share of the total population (Migration Observatory Oxford University Project 2018). This statistic may include much more than the permanent immigrants. Whatever the source of data and its complexity, immigrants are less than 1% of the total population, which is a very small group compared to the developed European countries.

After 1989, the number of permanent immigrants has increased gradually (Figure 19). The EU accession increased the attractivity of the country as a destination for East Eurasian and South Asian economic migrants (STOICOVICI 2012; CERVINSCHI 2011).

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7 This percentage is the result of a calculus that took into consideration: the 2016 estimated total population of Romania and the number of permanent immigrants in Romania for 2016 – INSSE.
The biggest group of permanent immigrants is formed by Moldavians (Figure 20), due to their special status for migrating in Romania (Stoleriu et al. 2001), profound cultural and identity ties that makes their adaptation a facile one.

**Figure 19**

*The evolution of permanent immigrants’ number in Romania after 1989*

*Source: INSSE 2018*

**Figure 20**

*Permanent immigrants in Romania by country of origin after 1989*

*Source: INSSE 2018*
Temporary immigrants exceeded 135,000, between 2008 and 2016 (Figure 21), and their number was each year at least four times higher than the number of the permanent ones.

As for the origin of the temporary migrants, Romania attracts mostly workforce of nationalities as Moldavians, Turks, Chinese, Frenchs, Germans, Italians, Greeks, Albanians, British, Russians, Serbians and Indians (Chindea et al. 2008; Alexe et al. 2011). But besides work (which is the motive of immigration for only 10%), other two important reasons are studies and family reunification (Lăzărescu 2016).
Even though Romania is not dealing yet with great flows of immigration, it has experienced illegal forms of it, which were included as priorities within national strategies of security and defence. In recent years, specialists observed an acceleration of the phenomenon, mainly after 2011 (Stoica 2011; Barna–Pişleag 2014). In 2017, 3,580 illegal persons were traced and 1,568 returning decisions were issued (General Inspectorate for Immigration 2018).

In terms of asylum applications, these had increased constantly since the first years of 2000 (Figure 25). The main countries of origin of the applicants are Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran (General Inspectorate for Immigration 2018).

2.4.3. The impact of the European migration crisis on Romania

Analysing the events and statistical data, we can assert that Romania, so far, has been less impacted by the migration crisis. It was not included in the routes of migration for these flows. The geographical conditions and the fact that our country is not part of the Schengen area did not encourage immigrants toward this direction (Sarcinschi 2017, 78).

According to the mandatory refugee quotas, Romania should have received 4,000 refugees by the end of 2017, but due to a much smaller number of transfer eligible, Romania received 710 persons (in majority Syrians) relocated from Greece and Italy (Mediafax 2017). The first ones came in March 2016 (Sarcinschi 2017, 98). In 2017, 172 individuals were transferred from Greece, other two from Italy and 43 from Turkey (General Inspectorate for Immigration 2018). For the moment, Romania is not a transit or a destination country for the current wave of immigration (Sarcinschi 2017, 109).

2.4.4. Immigration forecasts

In terms of predictions, it is rather difficult to assert for sure that Romania will gain attractiveness for immigrants, evolving from transit country into a destination one. But in 2010, a research pointed out that in the long term, Romania could shift from a transit country to a destination one, because of: 1. The demographic crisis Romania is facing; 2. The labour market imbalance; 3. The economic growth of Romania and its European Union membership; 4. The evolution of the migration rate in Romania from strong negative ones (−4.04%) in 1990 to values around 0 in reality; 5. Precedent cases based on a similar logic, such as Spain, Italy and the recent evolution in this direction of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland – from negative values of migration rates to positive ones (Negu et al. 2010). If this scenario will become reality, it is important to observe if it will have the potential to bring changes in the ethnic structure of the country, to what extend and of what origin.

3. Awareness and answers to major demographic challenges

In the latest years, one can observe the existence of awareness regarding the major demographic challenges. Academic specialists regard Romania’s demographic situation as
a “latent demographic crisis” (Ghețău 2007), “demographic implosion” (Muntele 2008) and even as “the most serious demographic crisis in its [Romania’s] contemporary history” (Surd et al. 2014, 809). In the latest years, national mass media has increased the approaches of demographic crisis related topics, using such terms as: “clock bomb”, “demographic crisis”, “disequilibrium” etc. The last two presidents of Romania (Traian Băsescu, Klaus Iohannis) spoke publicly about the demographic challenges (Frățilă 2013; Blada 2016). Even so, the decision-makers had a less comprehensive and uniform approach of the matter, showed by the content of the 14 governance programs after 1989 (available on the CDEP and Lege5 sites and the official site of the Romanian Government). None of these refer to a distinct demographic policy. Demographic issues were approached with little continuity (some aspects were mentioned in certain programs, some appeared in others) and not of an integrated manner from a program to another (not in a specific chapter, but rather disparately within other ones). We identified mentions about demographic decline, ageing, brain drain, illegal immigration, but not all together approached within the same program (the only exception being the 2005–2008 one), rather in different years and in various combinations.

At strategic level, demographic challenges started to be approached mostly after 2006. Since then all three national strategies of defence and security have mentioned these kinds of developments. In the current Strategy, The National Defence Strategy for the Period 2015–2019, demographic challenges are mentioned both within the risks (demographic decline, work force emigration) and vulnerabilities chapters (demographic decline, migration of the specialised work force). Furthermore, out of 7 directions of action, one specifically includes demography, being mentioned the need of taking coherent measures in order to ameliorate the deterioration of the demographic situation (Romanian Presidency 2015). Other demographic issues are addressed along the document: the illegal migration within the Euro–Atlantic dimension of the security chapter (in relation with the organised cross-border crime) and within the sub-chapter specific to the direction of action in the public order sector (securing the borders, countering illegal immigration) (Romanian Presidency 2015, 13, 16, 20).

After 1989, Romania’s answer to the major demographic transformations has been a predominately reactive one instead of a proactive one. The state took measures and developed strategies mostly after the effects had started to be visible. Some specialists named the situation in the field of demographic policies after 1989 as a non-intervention one (Mărginean 2010, 3). Furthermore, we did not identify any program document entitled Demographic Policy of Romania. Without an integrated strategic approach of the major demographic transformations, clear goals and significant results are difficult for a state to accomplish. Thus, the decision makers started to approach, even at the surface level, the demographic issues and some examples can be seen below.

3.1. The numerical dimension: The demographic decline

Even so, since 1990 there have been some legislative measures meant to attenuate the demographic sideslip and these focused mainly on maternity leaves (currently being of two years) and allowances (fluctuating over time, but currently being at 85% of the average net income earned in the last 12 months) (Simion 2014, 12; Lege5 2005, EuroAvocatura [s. a.]).
However, these measures were unsteady, being influenced by economic and political developments and without significant achievements (Simion 2014, 12), even though Vasile Ghețău highlighted that some of them had a certain result among employed women (Ghețău 2012). For visible results, specialists emphasised the need of a complex set of measures: mentality changes (restoring family with children status and prestige); financial assistance (child allowance, public spending for family assistance, tax deductions, etc.), health and education services (including a better access and quality of reproductive health service and family planning); support families in order to better blend the family and professional development (facilities for children: kindergartens, nearby nurseries with a prolonged program, flexible work program, parental leave and access to housing); reviving demographic research and creating a high-level institutional structure for managing such important issues (Ghețău 2007, viii, 86; Ghețău 2012b; INSSE 2012b).

3.2. The age-structure dimension: Population ageing

Given the possible long term socio-economic effects, it started to be addressed in strategic documents. In this respect The National Strategy for Promoting Active Ageing and Protection of the Elderly 2014–2020 has 3 main objectives: 1. To prolong the active life; 2. To promote the social participation and ageing with dignity; 3. To achieve a greater degree of independence and security for individuals with long-term care needs (Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly 2014, 5). Two transversal objects are also added: 1. Delaying the physical ageing and the occurrence of chronic diseases; 2. Preparing the medical system to cope with a growing elderly population. These two transversal objectives contribute to “achieving a longer, healthier life and in fulfilling all three general goals” (Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly 2014, 22). The strategy highlights the implementation of policies in active ageing must be based on a cross-sectorial and inter-sectorial systemic approach and an action oriented on multiple areas: health, education, labour market, transport system, agriculture, public finances (World Bank 2014, 19; Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly 2014, 29).

In terms of prolonging the active live, World Bank asserted that developments are significant, but the plans for continuing them in this area are not so ambitious (World Bank 2014, 12).

3.3. The migration dimension

3.3.1. Emigration

Due to its magnitude and how the labour market has been developing (at times going through difficulties), specialists asserted that it would not be desirable for the state to set its stopping as goal. Dumitru Sandu sees the encouragement of the circular migration as an alternative (and not transforming it into a definitive one) by reducing costs and increasing benefits in the origin and destination countries (Ulrich 2011, 57–58). Juravle emphasised that Romania did not prepare solutions for an effective migration policy and highlighted
the need of economic stimulants to support the return of emigrants in the origin country or
to support circular migration (Juravle 2013, 10). Currently, emigration is approached as
a risk factor within the National Strategy for Employment in the Labour Marker 2014–2020,
destabilising the labour market most of all after the EU accession, because of its magnitude
in a short period of time (Romanian Government 2014).

A special category of emigrants forms the brain drain phenomenon. For attenuate it,
along with increasing the wages, the improving working conditions (including modern
technical equipment) and recognition of professional status at society level need to be
addressed. Therefore, in the short and medium term, brain drain is quite hard to be
attenuated. For example, in case of medical personnel, a very important category for any
state and one prone to brain drain, the lack of stability and continuity in this sector after
1989, lead to systemic problems (the main being the financial issue) (Moise 2016). This
motivated massive emigration in this sector. In 2015 an ordinance was emitted, in order
to increase the salary level in the system to ameliorate the emigration of personnel (OUG
35/2015). In 2018 the Government approved a budget which had priorities as health care,
education and investments sectors (Romanian Government 2017).

Because this phenomenon will continue to be relevant at least for the next 10 years and
because of significant diaspora emerged after 1989, there had been created structures for
strengthening the connection with these communities and for maintaining the cultural ties
with them. As a matter of fact, the Ministry for Romanians Everywhere, the Inter-Ministerial
Group for Romanians Everywhere and the Council of the Romanians Everywhere are
responsible for The National Strategy for Romanians Everywhere for 2017–2020 (Ministry
for Romanians Everywhere 2017). This has 4 objectives: 1. To preserve, develop and affirm
the Romanian identity outside its borders (by: language, Romanian mass media abroad,
promoting the cultural and spiritual Romanian values); 2. To strengthen the associative
Romanian environment from abroad; 3. To support the integration and defence rights
of Romanians abroad (including their integration at the place of living, work or study,
increasing the capacity of capitalising the strategic potential of the Romanian community,
supporting the process of Romanians returning and reintegration); 4. To strengthen and
make more efficient the institutional framework in the field of Romanians Everywhere
(adapting the legislative framework, increasing institutional transparency, establishing an
efficient dialogue between the Romanians everywhere, the Romanian State and the host
countries).

3.3.2. Immigration

Even though Romania is not yet confronted with significant challenges due to immigration,
this subject has been approached by the Romanian state at strategic level, due to its
geostrategic position (a possible transit country for illegal migration). Therefore, the National
the period 2015–2018 were created. The last one has as its main goal the development
of the necessary mechanisms for the inter-institutional cooperation, in order to identify
the best solutions for managing both legal and illegal immigration (Romanian Government
2015). The main body responsible for implementing the policies of migration, asylum
and integrating foreigners, the General Inspectorate for Immigration, in its 2017 report mentioned the following as its strategic objective for 2017: assuring an adequate management in legal migration regulation, strengthening the coordinating role of the IGI in preventing and combating illegal residence, work and voluntary repatriation, forced return, assuring access to asylum procedure and improving the national system in this respect, modernising in order to better response to challenges and assuring a higher degree of absorption of EU funds and other sources of finance (General Inspectorate for Immigration 2018).

Regarding the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis, even though Romania is not yet confronted with the same challenges as some European countries are, it had reacted since the beginning of the crisis. The Romanian President expressed his solidarity with the EU states and in September 2015, he asserted that Romania could receive 1,785 refugees, underlining opting for voluntary refugee quotas in the European Council talks and rejecting the mandatory quota version (Neagu 2015). Two weeks later he changed his position and emphasised that Romania could shelter 4,837 refugees and was voting against the mandatory quotas along with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, being in favour of a balanced answer – between solidarity and responsibility (Neagu 2015). In 2016, the President affirmed that Romania’s position was not based on a refusal to receive immigrants, but on questioning the procedure. He emphasised the role of dialogue in identifying a solution and criticised bureaucratic approaches (ProTV 2016). In March 2016, Romania supported the agreement between the EU and Turkey regarding immigrants (Lazar 2016). On the other hand, regarding infrastructure efforts, by the end of 2020 Romania will be equipped with 36 camps for situations of need (accommodation, food). They are designed to meet national needs (cases of disasters) and the need brought by massive movements of migrants across borders (Brumar 2018). Therefore, even though Romania is not confronted with challenges of magnitude as are the Western European countries in terms of immigration, from this perspective it has started to be proactive, so far with a good result.

4. Conclusions

Romania’s demographic profile has specific characteristics in all three dimensions of demographic transition and is in line with the regional general trends of the former Eastern Bloc states, having also its own peculiarities as a distinctive case:

Numerical dimension: since 1989 Romania is facing a continuous population decline, as a result, it has already decreased with about 15% from 1989 until the present days. This will become even more acute in the coming decades; it will manifest even until the horizon of 2100, by that time losing almost 40% of its population, if the demographic parameters remain the same.

• Age-structure dimension: demographic ageing is an emerging and new phenomenon for our country, and until the 2060s the demographic pressure caused by the elderly will double as a result of this process.

• The dimension of migration: Romania is currently a country of emigration, although faced with an acute population decline. On the other hand, a relatively small number of people choose Romania as an immigration destination.
– Emigration. After 1989, emigration flows intensified both as a result of internal and external developments and then because of positive experiences of previous emigration waves. Romania became one of the main sources of EU immigrants. From 1989 until the present more than 2.5 million people emigrated circulatory or permanently, mostly Romanians. Besides the direct demographic impact in the total population number, two other particularly important aspects are to be noted: a) the negative impact of emigration towards the family (the children affected by the migration of one or both parents, their harmonious development is essential they being the country’s future human resource, vital especially under the current population decline); b) brain drain, especially after 2007, in key areas (medical, research, ICT, etc.), with possible negative implications (given its key role in economic development and innovation) and being expected to continue the next 10 years (given the existing development gap between Romania and the Western countries).

– Immigration. Romania has a small number of immigrants compared with the Western European countries; they account for less than 1% out of the total population, even if in recent years it can be observed a gradual increase in the number of immigrants and of those individuals seeking different forms of political and social protection (asylum seekers). This brings the challenge regarding illegal immigration. As a matter of fact, the following immigrant communities are much more significant than others: Moldovans, Turks, Chinese, Syrians, Iraqi, Italians and Americans. As far as the European refugees and migrant crisis are concerned, these did not affect Romania, not being on the routes used by migrants. However, as a sign of solidarity with the countries affected by these dynamics, Romania is hosting several hundred refugees since 2016. Overall, regarding immigration trends, it is difficult to anticipate whether Romania will shift from a transit country to a destination one, although there are specialists who consider this transformation as possible in the long term.

A second part of the paper focused on the analysis of how the state has perceived and responded to these dynamics. We can assert that, while academics and the media have apprised on significant demographic trends, political decision-makers have had less constant and comprehensive approaches to demographic issues and responses to the challenges in the field.

However, those significant developments for the demographic profile of the country are addressed at the strategic level within the documents of the national strategies: at a general level in the national security and defence ones and then specifically on different issues (the strategy in the field of active ageing, migration, Romanians everywhere etc.).

At the level of actual actions, we can assert that in most situations, after 1989, Romania had a reactive approach, coming up with measures after a phenomenon or its effects became visible, and the best example in this regard are those that concern demographic decline and brain drain. A higher degree of proactivity can be observed regarding demographic ageing and immigration. Taking into account the current socio-political and economic context and the demographic developments, as well as the measures taken to improve some of them, Romania’s demographic profile is not expected to improve in the near future.
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1. Introduction

The demographic features of Serbia do not differ significantly from the similar indicators of Western Europe (with the exception of migration). The aim of this chapter is to point out the most important tendencies regarding the demographic trends. This will include the perceptions of the decision-makers and the analysis of the national strategies with the intention to find a solution to the current situation. The last part of the study deals with the issue of migration, pointing out the consequences of the two Yugoslav Wars and the powerlessness of the government concerning the constant decrease of the population. At the moment, the population of Serbia is decreasing by 35,000 people per year, 10–15,000 of which is due to the extent of emigration. According to the tendencies, this trend may be slowed down to some extent, but it is expected to remain influential in the long run.

2. General trends after 1990: The background of the declining population

2.1. Changes in fertility

The rate of fertility in Serbia has seen a dramatic decrease.

Following the Second World War, on average 3.05 children were born for every woman, which was an outstanding result (Rašević 2004). The first major decrease was in 1995, when the rate of child birth declined, and at this point only 2.81 children were born for every woman. After the period of constant decline, the next milestone event took place during the First Yugoslav War, when, for obvious reasons, the number of children born was less than two for every woman. By 2016, this number further decreased to reach a mere 1.46 (Statista.com 2016). Between 2006 and 2016, the rate of fertility has stabilised around this number. Compared to that of what was seen in the 1980s, it can be said that the period of moderation set in around the start of the war, with the low point of 1.38 children in 2007. According to the 2011 census data, in case of those identifying themselves as Bosniaks, Romanians, Albanians or Muslims, this number reached an average of almost three children for every woman.

The natural decrease in the population of Serbia has been a problem since 1992, when the number of child births was lower than the number of deaths. By 2016, the number of
live births was two-thirds of the number of deaths. This is explained by the Yugoslav Wars, the high rate of emigration (to be discussed further on), and the increasing rate of poverty emerging in the 1990s. This decade did not provide the necessary conditions for raising children, and thus the number of couples taking this step also declined. During the time of the economic recovery of the 2000s, it was this decreased willingness to start a family that made it more difficult for a demographic growth to take place.

In recent years, less than 70,000 babies were born in Serbia annually, while the highest birth rate was around 150,000 children in the first half of the 1950s. The decrease in the fertility rate and the lower number of child births resulted in the significant population ageing, and so by 2018, Serbia has made it to the top ten of the countries with highest median age. One of the important transformational changes of fertility is the aforementioned late childbearing starting from the year 2000, which is also reflected in the increase of the average age of women having their first child. In 1950, this was 27 years, which by 2002 decreased to 25.3 (an all-time low), and increased again to 29.6 by 2017. In the urbanised areas, the average age of women having their first child is 30.4 years, while in the rural areas, it is 27.8 (Vajma.info 2017).

Infertility is also an emerging problem for the country, because it affects 10% of the population at the age of being able to bear children. According to official figures, the target number of birth rates is set at 2.1 in Europe, while in reality it is closer to that of 1.58. This rate is even worse in Serbia, where the number is 1.5 children for every family, and every third couple has no child at all.

2.2. Transformation of family behaviour

The average age of those getting married for the first time is currently 28.2 years among women and 31.2 years among men. Regional variations are seen for these figures as well, because in the South of the country the average age of getting married for the first time is 27.3 years among women while in the region of Belgrade it is 31.7. In the South of the country, the average age of getting married is 31.2 years among men, and in the region of Belgrade it is closer to 34.9 years (Petrović 2018). In 2016, the vast majority of marriages (31,669) took place between those of same nationalities, and the number of mixed marriages was only 4,552. Besides late marriages, the low intensity of marriages is also an increasingly common tendency, as young adults tend to choose other forms of relationships. With the decline in the number of marriages and the increased age of getting married, the number of singles is also increasing, following the Western European trends. In case of Serbia, this has led to a drastic change, since the ratio of singles among men between 30 and 34 years has rose up from 39% in 1991 to 52% by 2011. With regards to divorces, in 1991 the number of divorces was 1.06% for every 1,000 people (8,018), which was still over 1.3 in 2002 (9,982) (Kocić et al. 2008, 42), and 1.3 in 2017 (9,262) (Mdpp.gov.rs 2018). While in 2003 every fifth marriage ended in divorce, this ratio has become even higher and according to the latest figures, every fourth marriage ends in divorce by now. As for the number of divorces, in 2016 there were 9,000 of them, most of which took place in the North of the country (5,511 cases). The average age of men getting
a divorce is 43.5 years, while for women it is 40. The mothers are given custody over the child(ren) only 40% of the time.

2.3. Changes in mortality

The mortality rate in Serbia after the year 2000 can be regarded negative. During the 1950s and 1960s, on average the mortality rate was around 60,000, which by the 1970s exceeded 70,000, and 80,000 by the 1980s, and so the rate of mortality increased in proportion to the increase of the number of people. Starting from 2000, however, it was over 100,000, which has not produced better numbers ever since. In 1953, life expectancy for men was 57.7 years, which increased to 68.5 by 1990. For women, this number started from 60.4 in 1953 and reached 74.2 by 1990 (Worldpopulationreview.com [s. a.]). Based on the latest available data, the current numbers are 72.8 for men and 78.8 for women. In spite of the changes in the rate of mortality, Serbia is lagging behind the average of the European Union (which was 78.1 for men and 83.6 for women in 2014). The reasons behind the unsatisfactory statistics is partly due to the underdeveloped healthcare system, since a large part of deaths are the results of vascular disease, heart attack and tumours (IHME 2016).

2.4. Demographic ageing

The rapid changes in fertility and mortality rates have led to intense demographic ageing in Serbia. The country is among the states struggling with the issue of the most rapidly ageing population (Penev 2014), due to the decrease of fertility rates and the increase of the average life expectancy. Those having been born between 1950 and 1980 are facing the problem of gradual ageing, while the ones being born later start a family at a later and later time and at the same time with fewer children per family. The effect of the wars in the 1990s on the ageing of the Serbian society is something that also needs to be considered. During the 1990s, the rate of emigration and its effects on the changes of the population cannot be neglected, because it was mostly the younger generations (under the age of 40) that were affected by this phenomenon. The period between 2002 and the present days has seen a rate of emigration similar to that of times of peace, when it was mostly the younger generation that decided to leave the country, adding to the increased rate of ageing.

2.5. Changes in the educational structure

The improved and expanding educational system was another factor contributing to the changes in the number of marriages and childbearing in case of the younger generations, the delayed cases of which were previously a result of widespread secondary school education, while in recent decades they have been influenced by higher education and career building. The statistical numbers all seem to support the above, as while in 1953 43% (the largest part of the population) did not have educational attainment, 42% finished elementary
school (4 years), according to a 2011 survey 20.76% finished the first eight grades, 48.93% finished secondary or grammar school, and 10.59% managed to get a degree from university and 5.65% from college, 11% had incomplete primary school, and 2.68% were without educational attainment (RZS 2013, 33). 30% of the people in the age group between 30 and 34 have a higher education degree (RZS 2013), the number of illiterate people has dropped by 50% (to 127,000 people in 2011), out of whom 82% were women (with an average age of 71 years and mostly living in rural areas).

2.6. The ethnic structure

The ethnic composition of the Serbian society has undergone a major change by the turn of the millennium. The primary reason for this was the period of wartime between the different ethnic groups, pushing many to leave the country, and also the assimilation of mainly the minority groups, which proved to be successful. A third important element was the result of the natural reduction of the population. The significant amount of “disappearance” of the Muslim minorities (Albanians and Bosniaks) is apparent. Finally, the decrease in the number of Hungarians and Croatians has produced the largest values.

With respect to the absolute values, the Serbian majority of the population has grown and consequently, their relative number within the whole of the society has grown. The figures obtained from the survey conducted in 2011 clearly show that there are two main communities that have seen large growth in numbers. It is important to note that the growth in the number of Vlach people is due to the self-reclassification of the people not identifying themselves as Roma, but still considered one nonetheless. In the last 60 years, the Roma population has tripled in number, the reason for which is the high rate of reproduction. Experts warn that the statistical figures do not reflect the reality, as there are many who do not identify themselves as Roma people, and therefore the estimated number was somewhere between 250,000 and 400,000 in 2002. The Roma NGOs, however, predict that this number is closer to 750,000 (OSCE 2008, 20). It is also important to note that the mortality rate among the Roma population is four times higher than the country average. The community lives under similar circumstances which characterises the Balkan region, and are given similar opportunities as in Western Europe, and the discrimination impacting them is very significant. Furthermore, the rate of unemployment among the Roma population is much higher than in case of other ethnic groups, and they also excel as regards crime rates. The government has worked out several programs and has launched numerous projects all with the aim of reintegration, all of which are yet to prove to be fruitful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>5,152,939</td>
<td>5,988,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>565,513</td>
<td>5,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>145,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

Ethnic composition of Serbia (1953, 2011)
In the 1990s, Serbia was characterised by great differences between each region (Szügyi 2015), and in the 2000s, the main focus was to change this situation. As the European integration process continued, the NUTS system was gradually adopted, and the (more developed) region of Northern Serbia was created, followed by the less developed region of Southern Serbia, in compliance with the NUTS1 system. The standard of living the regions of Northern Belgrade and Vojvodina are higher as regards the unemployment rate and GDP, while in the case of Šumadija, Western Serbia and Southern and Eastern Serbia, lower income rates and emigration still prevail. At this point, the fifth NUTS2 region is not discussed (Kosovo and Metohija), because it has not been considered an integral part of the bigger Serbia since 2008.

Serbia is on the way to becoming a homogeneous Serbian state, but it is important to address the territorial spread of the ethnic groups discussed in the previous chapters. According to the poll numbers, the largest minority groups are found in the Vojvodina region and the border areas, close to the parent state. Its historic background makes the Sandžak region an exception, which is mostly dominated by the Bosnian minority groups, who are less interested in keeping close relations with the other Bosniak groups scattered all over
the other parts of Serbia. Regional diversity can be seen among the different regions of
the country, as well as someone living in Southern Serbia identifies themselves to be of
different ethnicity than those living in areas, such as Vojvodina or the capital city. This trend
can also be experienced between native Serbians and those that only settled in the country
as refugees during the time of war. All these factors may sometimes lead to tensions even
within the same ethnic groups.

3. Population outlooks and decision-makers’ reactions

As seen in the previous chapter, the fertility rate in 2016 reached 1.46, which is expected
to get closer to 1.67 by 2030, and 1.73 by 2050. It is a slow increase, but the population of
the country will still decrease in number. By 2050, the rate of population drop will rank
Serbia on the 116th place in the world ranking (Worldometers.info s. a.). The estimates
published in 2009 predict that the number of people under the age of 18 will only grow
from 17.3% to 18.6% by the year 2030, while for those over 65, it will change from 17.3%
to 22% by 2030. These figures suggest that while in 2007, Serbia was in first place within
Europe with regards to the highest number of young people, the country will drop to the 4th
place by 2030, and the current 5th place regarding the people in the over-65 age group will
change to the 24th place (Stojilković Gnjatović – Devedzic [s. a.]). This is still a decent
value compared to the whole of Europe, but the problem of ageing will seriously impact
the country. By 2030, the median age will reach 43.2, and 46.4 by 2050 (Statista.com
[s. a.]). The reasons behind this trend are attributed to the reforms of the pension scheme,
the growth in the number of newborns, the improvements of the healthcare services and
social security.

The future projections of the Minister without Portfolio puts things in a somewhat
different perspective. The official predictions include two different scenarios. According
to the analysis with the lowest values, the number of people under the age of 15 will reach
11.7% in 2041, compared to 14.4% in 2011, and the amount of people in the over-65 age group
will change from 17.3% to 25.5%, while the ratio of those in the over-80 age group will more
than double, from 3.5% to 7.8%. At the same time, the median age will grow from 42.1 to
46.5. The optimistic scenario shows different numbers: people under the age of 15 will add
up to 15.9% of the population, the age group over 65 will reach 23.6%, and people over 80
will amount to 7.3% of the population, with a median age of 44.1 years (Mdpp.gov.rs [s. a.]).

In 2006, when the National Strategy of Ageing was drafted, the demographical
priorities were not on the agenda, and so at this time, the government put emphasis on
the social security, social integration and maintaining the standard of living of these social
groups (National Strategy on Ageing 2006). The strategy was covering the period between
2006 and 2015 and was later not extended, which presently leaves the Serbian government
without a separate document that would address this issue.

The Serbian government first started dealing with the issue of population decline
when the Pronatalism Strategy containing 8 directions and about 70 different measures
was adopted. The goals of the strategy are the following: 1. Reduction of economic
costs of childbearing; 2. Reconciliation of working life and parenting; 3. Alleviation in
the psychological costs of parenting; 4. Promotion of the reproductive health of adolescents;

In 2015, the Serbian government adopted the National Youth Strategy for the period between 2015 and 2025. Ensuring social reproduction meant that the strategies of the government for the youth has gained more importance, with the aim to determine the future basis of the Serbian society. The top priority was set to be providing them access to the labour market and improving their standard of living. The goal is to improve their employment numbers, general health condition and welfare, increase the level of qualification, their active participation in the society, the re-integration of the socially vulnerable groups, to promote mobility, and finally their involvement in creating cultural content (National Strategy on Youth 2015).

“In December 2016, the Government of the Republic of Serbia established a Population Policy Council, composed of nine different ministers, representatives of the Commissariat for Refugees, Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, National Statistical Bureau, and Centre for Demography of the Institute of Social Sciences. Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is chairing the Council, which will propose different measures and policies for stimulating birth rate in Serbia and improving overall population policies in Serbia” (Perform.network [s. a.]). The demographic strategy for the next 30-year period was adopted by the Serbian government in 2018, which sets the issue of emigration and its decrease as its top priority, by enabling economic activities, promoting an increasing number of births, reducing infant mortality, and increasing the living standards of the middle-aged and older classes and their rate of participation in the labour market. The strategy sets out the reduction of the cost of raising a child, improving the chances of people raising their child(ren) to find employment, keeping reproductive health, tackling the problem of infertility, promotion of healthy motherhood and the involvement of the local governments in the field as some of its general aims (Birth Strategy 2018, 16). Various instruments have been allocated in order to achieve these goals, the screening of which has been split between the ministries with the aim to align the implementation of the inter-ministerial demographic strategy.

The new family policy law entered into force in January 1, 2018, but it will only be adopted in practice from 1 July 2018, which, in accordance with the strategy, contains the legal requirements as well, and also covers the scope of activities. For instance, the mother, and in some instances the father too, is eligible for family allowances upon the birth of the child. The amount of the allowance used to be 39,500 Dinars (334 €) after the first child, which from 1 July will increase to 100,000 Dinars (845 €). Prior to the new policy, the allowance was set out to be 154,472 Dinars (1,305 €) (paid in monthly instalments of 6,436 Dinars [54 €] per month for a period of 24 months), while after the third child, 370,713 Dinars (3,133 €) was determined (11,584 Dinars [98 €] for a period of 24 months). The mother or the father was eligible for 370,713 Dinars (3,133 €) after a fourth child (monthly 15,446 Dinars [130 €] in instalments for 24 months). Mothers or fathers paying property tax on a taxable amount of more than 30 million Dinars (253,526 €) are not eligible for family allowance (Pesevszki 2018). The government provides additional subsidies for those living in the region of Vojvodina; here the allowance after a third child is set out to be 12,000 Dinars (101 €) per month.

The question of maternity (or paternity) leave is regarded an important issue, and the mothers and fathers in Serbia are all eligible for it for a period of not more than a year.
The legislative background for it, however, proved to be inflexible, and lead to great stiffness in practice. A similar issue was the gender-based inequalities appearing in the wages, because in 2014, the women with the same qualifications earned 76% of the wages paid for men, and therefore, it was more often than not the men who were “forced” to seek employment instead, not using this opportunity.

Another major problem is infertility, which concerns 10% of the total population of Serbia. To provide a solution for it, starting from the end of 2017, the Serbian government subsidises three insemination attempts, and has increased the upper limit of eligibility from 38 to 42 years (Mno.hu 2017). Vojvodina also addresses the issue of fertility, contributing to the costs of artificial insemination with an annual amount of 200,000 Dinars for the second, third and every successive child (Vajma.info 2018).

The pension scheme in Serbia is based on two pillars: the state pension scheme binding for all, and the supplementary pension funds scheme. There are ten available of the latter, but their relevance is rather low, even though the state subsidises voluntary pension fund membership. The retirement age for men in Serbia is 65 years, and for women it is 62 years and 4 months, but to be eligible for the retirement benefits, one has to have at least 15 years of active employment covered by pension contribution. The reform of the pension scheme was launched as a result of the economic crisis of 2008. One of the reform efforts is the existing measures of state budget cuts, where 10% of the pension is deducted as solidarity contribution. The other one is to converge the age of men and women, as a result of which by 2032, both men and women can retire at the same age. Those who have 40 years of employment, but their age does not reach the age set out in the statutory rules are eligible for early retirement. This, however means that before reaching the age of 65, they receive a reduced amount of pension (a monthly 0.34% reduction).

As discussed in the first chapter, it is the Roma population that faces the biggest problems paired with a dynamic population growth. In order to remedy their situation, the Roma Convergence Strategy was drawn up in 2016, with its main goals set out for the period lasting until 2025. The main priorities of the strategy include education, housing, employment, healthcare and social security, which are all areas where a decisive progress must be made in order to increase the standard of living. The strategy does not specify expectations regarding the demographic concerns (The Strategy of Social Inclusion of Roma 2016).

According to official numbers, the largest minority group in Serbia is the Hungarian, but their numbers have drastically decreased in the recent decades. In order to avoid a further drop, the Hungarian National Council drew up a Population Action Plan for the period between 2013 and 2017. The document contained five strategic goals: 1. The mitigation of the economic disadvantages of childbearing, providing child-friendly employment opportunities; 2. Increased mental and ethical appreciation for childbearing and maternity; 3. Encourage and subsidise maturity for maternity and paternity; 4. The protection of the lives of the mother and the foetus; 5. Secure acceptance for childbearing, and the idea of family in the minds of the public through education and the media (Population Action Plan 2013). The local governments proposed actions for the media, the minority institutions, civil

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1 The Hungarian National Council is the institute for safeguarding the cultural autonomy of the Hungarian people in Serbia.
society organisations, the churches and private enterprises to support the preservation of the Hungarian population. Unfortunately, the hopes for the Action Plan have been dissipated rather quickly, because the birth-rate of the Hungarian population is still low, and the rate of emigration is still high.

4. Migration trends: Perceptions and responses

Apart from the natural reduction of the population, another concern is emigration. Serbia is traditionally a country of emigration. The reasons behind the migration trends of the last 25 years were economic in nature and also necessitated by the devastation of the Yugoslav Wars. The war between 1991 and 1995, which lead to the fall of Yugoslavia, significantly changed the ethnic composition and population numbers of the region. During this time, Serbia became mainly a host country for immigrants, where a large number of refugees of the former Yugoslavian regions came to seek shelter, and whose number exceeded the number of emigrants. This fact is underpinned by the positive migration balance of Serbia (and Montenegro) between 1990 and 1995, with a growth rate of 3.9% for every 1,000 people. The number of emigrants and immigrants levelled off by 2000 (Bonifazi 2011). The first period (1990–2000) was marked with the regional armed conflicts and serious social and economic turbulences. The international community imposed sanctions on the FRY twice, in the period of 1992–1995 and in 1998; a year later NATO intervention resulted in the bombing of the country. In this period, Serbia received a large number of refugees originating from other former Yugoslav republics; according to the refugee registration from the year 1996, the number amounted to 523,000 refugees and 72,000 war-affected persons. The second period, from October 2000 till the present time, is a period of recovery. In the first half of political and economic transition period (2000–2005) the emigration rate more than doubled, compared to the previous period, reaching −7%. In fact, the number of those who have left Serbia had been declining since 2000. However, as many migrants had already left Serbia during the nineties for a temporary stay abroad (attending universities or in training) and did not have to return back to their home country to seek an immigrant visa, they only changed their status from temporary to permanent resident in the 2000–2005 period, thus contributing to a high negative migration rate for this period. Therefore, the majority of those 339,000 persons counted as net migrants who had been living abroad since the 1990s (European Commission 2012).

The 2002 census recorded a total of 414,839 persons working and living abroad, representing (5.3%) of the total population of the Republic of Serbia. The data obtained in the 2002 census show that out of the total number of people from central Serbia working and living abroad, most are situated in Germany (23.0%), followed by Austria (22.1%). These countries which host almost half (50.4%) of all persons working and living abroad are followed by Switzerland (17.5%) France (7.3%), Italy (5.3%) and Sweden (3.3%), while the share of other European countries is significantly lower (Migration Profile of Serbia 2013). Overseas countries that are interesting for students and highly educated persons, popular new destinations are Italy (attractive for those with high school) and Great Britain (popular with the most educated youth) (IOM 2016). The data provided by World Bank show
that the emigrants leaving the Republic of Serbia were 196,000 in 2010 (2.0% of the total population) (Migration Profile of Serbia 2013).

As regards labour migration in 2009, the Republic of Serbia has been primarily acting as a country of origin. “Comparing the scope of flows of migrants from Serbia arriving for work-related purposes, it is possible to single out four key destination regions, listed in the order of priority: (1) Mobility within the Western Balkan region (prime destination countries being Montenegro and Croatia); (2) Employment in Eastern European countries (Russian Federation, Belarus and others); (3) (Temporary) labour migration towards the EU; (4) Regular and permanent employment migration of Serbian nationals in overseas countries (Canada, US, Australia)” (Manke 2010, 12), mainly for highly skilled migrants (and migration for the purpose of family reunification).

It would be crucial to have the exact statistical data to be able to precisely study migration and emigration. These, however, are not available because Serbian emigrants do not tend to register themselves as employees in the country of destination, which makes their tracking difficult (UNICEF [s. a.]). The figures of the 2011 Census show that emigrants that originated from Serbia were in majority made up of those working abroad (51.3%), together with their family members (36.4%) registered as dependents, while the number of students was as low as 3.9%. It was predominantly men that were represented among those working abroad, while for family members the opposite was true. As for the students, there were slightly more women among them. “Consistently in the registered emigrant contingent by far the highest share, 80.5%, were persons of ages 15–64, followed by children under 14 (16.2%) in the structure of this contingent, and the smallest share were elderly of 65 and more years of age (3.3%)” (Rašević 2016, 19). The education structure of the emigrants registered by the 2011 Census also proved to be better than the statistical numbers in relation to the population in the country. 6.0% of the emigrants aged 15 and above had not either completed primary school or had no primary school education at all, while 27.5% of the emigrant contingent was registered with completed primary school, 38.8% with high school and 15.7% with higher education. The Census prior to the one in 2011 registered a worse education structure. In addition, the 2011 Census showed that the distribution of external migrants in accordance with the length of stay differed from the relevant distribution obtained from the previous Census in the number of persons that had been abroad for under 4 years (42.3%). “This can be explained by methodological and organizational solutions of the 2011 Census, increased departure of asylum seekers, negative effects of the global financial crisis in Serbia and receiving countries, and/or possibly by circular migration” (Stanković 2014). Persons that had been abroad between 5 and 14 years participated with 26.5% and those that had been outside the country for 15 and more years participated with a share of 31.2% in this structure (Rašević 2016).

As regards the changes of the migration in Serbia, the experts have developed two scenarios. The Czech scenario estimates that the integration process of the country will further increase the rate of emigration, being mostly economy-driven in nature, because economists say that the lagging-behind cannot be made up for in the next decade. The number of people emigrating will be counterbalanced by people emigrating from third countries, which will still remain lower. The Polish scenario predicts that the EU accession will result in an exponential and intensive emigration wave, which will probably be short-lived. This scenario is backed by the statistical surveys conducted in recent years,
the fact that the legally employed people of the Western European baby-boom generation will have retired by 2020, and also the prevailing differences in wages between Serbia and the Western European states (Nikitović [s. a.]).

The strategy addressing the issue of migration in Serbia was adopted back in 2009. The introductory part and the justification for adopting the strategy is clearly about Kosovo and the status of the Serbian refugees fleeing Kosovo. According to the strategy of the government, there are about 4 million Serbian citizens living abroad, about half of them in either of the EU member states, and the other half in overseas countries. Three main priorities have been identified (Strategy for Migration Management 2009):

1) Establishment of mechanisms with an overall and coherent control system for the migration trends. The main task is to converge with the EU norms, migration-related data collection and the continuous updating of the migration profile of the country. There are no specified goals or measures set out for the problem of emigration.

2) Improvement in the strategic, legal and institutional framework of the uniform treatment of migration. It includes actions such as convergence with the European asylum policy, convergence with sectoral policies, increasing the capacity and the level of coordination of the institutions concerned with migration.

3) Protection of the rights of the migrants, providing assistance with their integration and social acceptance, and raising awareness of the issue of migration. The goal set out is the enhancement of accountability, development of the staff of civil and government institutions concerned with the issue and strengthening inter-cultural relations.

The document consisting of a mere 52 pages is mainly concerned with the status of the refugees and was intended to promote legislative harmonisation. It occasionally also referred to the improvement of institutional capacities. The initiatives were, however, barely realised due to the economic crisis and the inertia of the government.

The renewal of the strategy addressing the issue of migration has not taken place up until today, so the Serbian government currently lacks a comprehensive, long-term document addressing immigration, emigration and the question of migration as a whole that is available for the public entities, the private sector and the members of the Serbian society alike.

5. Conclusion

Similarly to the other states of the Central and Eastern European region, Serbia is also battling with demographic changes. One of the serious problems is the deterioration of the indicators pertaining to fertility rates, and an atmosphere of increased determination to leave the country. The government has been trying to face the matter of natural decrease in population, resulting in coordinated actions since the change of government in 2016, putting Slavica Đukić-Dejanović, Minister without Portfolio in charge of demography-related matters. Thanks to his work carried out so far, the national strategies have been aligned, which for one thing means the coordination of the labour market, educational, youth and
healthcare systems. The question of demographics has gained political weight within the government, leading to the introduction of various reforms; the reform of the pension scheme, the modernisation of the healthcare system and the increase in employment levels are all priorities that are necessary to be able to solve the problem at hand.

The management of migration is also a serious problem, because the increased level of emigration, a result of the Balkan Wars, still prevails. In the 1990s, the rate of influx of immigrants in Serbia was high, which mostly meant the Serbians living in the surrounding countries resettling due to the Balkan Wars. Starting from 2015, the new migration crisis brought forth an increased number of asylum-seekers, only a handful of whom seek to settle in the country permanently.

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Demography and Migration in Slovenia since Gaining Independence

1. Introduction

The failure of state socialism and the processes which took place in Central and Eastern Europe gave the Slovenians not only a new political system, but also the opportunity to create an independent state, for the first time in history. After more than a quarter century of statehood, Slovenia looks back on a more successful period than most of the other former communist countries, and it had a special path of post-communist transition. The Slovenian transition process deserves special attention because of the key role it played in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its relative economic and social success, which had its demographic effects as well.

The possibility of the emergence of an independent Slovenia was the result of the developments mostly based on the declared will of the Slovenian political elites and citizens and the changes in international relations, as the long-time interest of the great powers for the existence of a Yugoslav federation disappeared. It was due to the support of these great powers that the Yugoslav state was created in 1918 and was “brought back to life” after the Second World War. Secession in 1991, however, was made much easier by the fact that apart from an “indigenous” Hungarian and Italian minority, a negligible number of other minorities and immigrants, who came mainly from other parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia was ethnically relatively homogenous (Prunk 1996, 8). Labourers from the other Yugoslav republics came mainly in the second half of the 1970s. While in the 1980s the rate of guest workers was between 100,000 and 150,000 in a country with a population of just under two million (Repe 2002, 27).

After the declaration of independence, the Slovenian economy underwent a phase of temporary decline. Similarly to the other ex-socialist countries of the region, the transition brought a serious economic recession in Slovenia, too: in 1993 the GDP only reached 70% of the 1987 level (16 billion USD). The Slovenian economy went through a double transformation: from a socialist economy to a market economy and from a regional into a national one (Koyama 2003, 15). The losses suffered by business interests in other member republics were negligible when compared to the decline caused by losing a common Yugoslav market of 23 million people. According to certain calculations, Slovenia lost 45.2% of her total exports, while unemployment grew from 2.6% in 1989 to 7.3% in 1991 and reached 9.1% in 1993, to remain a serious problem for the coming years (Koyama 2003, 16). Unemployment mostly affected the region of Maribor and had a heavy impact...
on young people at the beginning of their career and unskilled labourers. At that time, the main ambitions of Slovenian companies were to break into Western markets and undergo technical modernisation.

Owing to a fortunate initial position, Slovenia was able to perform the structural transformation of its economy without involving foreign capital on a massive scale. Thus the political and economic elite did not need to seek the favours of international financial organisations and foreign investors. Avoiding political shocks and rejecting foreign advisors proved useful for the economy and as a consequence, the indicators of the Slovenian economy were better, the costs in social terms lower than in most other countries of the region. This relative success was mostly owing to a better starting position. The post-communist transition did not force Slovenia to sell out her collective property and privatisation caused less damage to the national economy.

The structure of the economy has changed strongly since 1991. The share of income from agricultural activities in GDP decreased by more than half, from 5.7% to 2.1% in 2017. The share of income from industry and construction, which amounted to 44% of GDP in 1991, was 33.9% in 2017. On the other hand, the share of income from services increased sharply, from 50.3% to 64.8%; Slovenia’s most important trading partner from gaining independence was continuously Germany. A Slovenian, born at the end of the 1980s, has changed three currencies, the comparison between average wages in the last twenty years is thus very hard. The comparison of data on how long it took to earn money for a particular product or service in 1991 and how much in 2017, shows that for the majority of products, less work should be done. According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita amounted to 5,100 Euros in 1991, while in 2017, it was more than four times higher, 21,000 Euros, when Slovenia ranked 16th in terms of GDP per capita among all the member states of the European Union (RTVSLO 2018b).

2. Demographic trends in the independent Slovenia and scenarios for the future

The population of Slovenia has been stagnating at around two million since 1991, but with an increasing proportion of elderly citizens. On 1 January 2017 the population of Slovenia consisted of 1,025,125 men and 1,040,770 women. The proportion of women among citizens was 51.3% this share has been slowly decreasing for a number of years. (RAZPOTNIK 2017b) The population (according to the population census 2002) consists of Slovenes 83.1%, Serbs 2.0%, Croats 1.8%, Muslims (including Bosniaks) 1.6%, Hungarians 0.3%, Italians 0.1%, others 2.2% and 8.9% of unknown ethnic background. (Government of the Republic of Slovenia s. a.) After 1992, the number of births dropped, the rate of natural increase became low. At the same time, life expectancy started to grow, with the proportion of the over 65 years old citizens increasing from 10.6% in 1990 to 17.9% in 2015. (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 3). The average age of the population of Slovenia increased by more than seven years since independence. The demographic projection scenarios make it clear that the demographic transition to a society with an ageing population will intensify in the coming years and decades.
Life expectancy at birth is constantly rising, from 74.1 in 1995 to 80.5 years in 2015 and it is projected to increase in the future. Girls born in Slovenia in 2017 can expect to live 83.7 years, while boys just over 78 years. (RTVSLO 2018b) The fertility rate (1.58 children per woman in 2016) is not sufficient for the replacement of the population, since it should be at least 2.1 children per woman (Žnidaršič 2016). The authors of the demographic projections prognosticate that Slovenia can expect an increase of the population in the coming few years, but after a peak in 2025, the age structure of the population will transform. By 2035, for 100 active citizens in the 15–64 age group, there will be 64 dependents (young and elderly) citizens. The life expectancy at birth will be 83.4 years, and the median age of the population will grow from 36 years in 1995 to 48.1 years by 2035 (Savarin 2016). The proportion of children under 14 years will fall by 5%, the active population (between 15 and 64 years) will decrease by 1% (Republic of Slovenia − Statistical Office 2016). In the school year 2017–2018, the number of primary school students was almost 44,000 lower than in the 1991–1992 school year. However, the number of children in elementary school has been increasing again since 2011, as a result of an increase in the number of births in the period of 2004–2010 (RTVSLO 2018b).

By 2060, every third Slovenian could be 65 years old or older (Jacović 2015). According to the EUROPOP2013 population projections, Slovenia’s population will be 2.041 million at that time, so nearly on the same level, as in 2017. Increasing life expectancy will raise the age dependency ratio from 57.1 in 2013 to 98.0 in 2060 (Razpotnik 2017b). The main scenario calculates with a relatively high migration increase in the future, despite modest migration in the last years (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 3). The decline of the number of births since 1980 has led to a decrease in the number of women of childbearing age in the last years and this trend will continue in the coming decades. In 1991, there were less than 400,000 pensioners in Slovenia, while in 2017, their number was 616,000. In 1991, the ratio between the number of pensioners and insured persons was 2.0, in 2017 it was 1.49. At the same time, the wage-to-pension ratio is worsening. In 1992, average net retirement pensions reached 78.4% of the net wages, while in 2017, it was only 58.4% (RTVSLO 2018b).

By 2060, the number of elderly citizens would exceed the size of the working age population, the latter would decrease by half a million in comparison with 2013. There are two scenarios, the main projection scenario assumes an increase in the fertility rate from 1.56, the average level of the last few years, to 1.75. In spite of the fact, that in international comparisons, Slovenia has a relatively favourable family policy and related measures, it is questionable whether it would be enough to increase the birth rate. The low fertility scenario assumes a decrease in the fertility rate to 1.40 by 2060, it means that it calculates with around 2,000 less newborn children annually in 2014–2060 compared to the main scenario (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 4). Demographic projections show that the population of Slovenia will continue concentrating in the mostly central, more urbanised part of the country (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 14).
3. The main demographic challenges of Slovenia

Demographic trends will affect social protection systems and fiscal sustainability. The ageing of the population will increase the pressure on expenditure of pensions, health care and long-term care. The European Commissions’ long-term projections, based on EUROPOP2013 demographic projection scenario, show that without changes, the age-related public expenditure would reach about one third of the Slovenian GDP by 2060. This is among the highest in the EU, and the European Commission also emphasises that Slovenia is the only EU member state with a high long-term risk regarding its fiscal sustainability, and it also ranks among the group of countries with a high risk over the medium-term (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 8).

The ageing of the population causes the most acute problems for the pension system. The ratio between insured persons and pensioners is worsening rapidly since 2001 (2000: 1.80; 2015: 1.37) (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 9). The Slovenian pension legislation ensures relatively early exiting from the labour market. In 2015, the Slovenian government succeeded in the stabilisation of the ratio between insured persons and pensioners, but the prognosticated demographic change will make it a temporary state. In the last few years, Slovenian budget transfer to the pension fund exceeded 1 billion Euros per year. The pension system is already unsustainable. According to the projections of the European Commission, in approximately two decades, the number of pensioners will exceed the number of insured persons.

To a functioning health care system, the country will also have to use a greater share of GDP, due to mainly demographic but also non-demographic factors. The projections of the European Commission assume an increase from 5.7% to 6.8% of GDP in 2030 and 7.5% in 2060. According to several studies conducted on Slovenia, the efficiency of the health care system is average, but with a gradual improvement in efficiency, it would be possible to significantly slow expenditure growth over the long term. The number of healthy life years is very low compared to other EU countries. In Slovenia, there is no comprehensive system for long-term care, while according to the scenario of the European Commission, the share of public expenditure on that will more than triple (to 4.2% of GDP) by 2060. (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 9–11).

The decreasing of the working age population has been a rising problem in years of growing economy. The shrinking Slovenian labour force could slow productivity growth and reduce the potential for economic growth. The activity rate in Slovenia is high among the adult population (30–54) and the country has the highest female activity rate in the EU, but is below the EU-average among young and elderly citizens (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 5). If the economic activity remains high and the migration modest, in this case, increased recruitment needs could not been satisfied in the future by higher employment among young and elderly citizens.

The low employment rate of the older population (55–64) in Slovenia is caused mainly by the low retirement age of those with the required statutory years and insufficient incentives to remain in employment. The Slovenian Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (UMAR) emphasises some key factors in connection with that: “(i) undeveloped age management in companies; (ii) a failure to adapt work conditions to older workers; and (iii) an active employment policy and educational policy that does not
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promote lifelong learning among the older population and fails to equip them with the right skills.” UMAR suggests the following: “(i) implementation of training programmes for older employees in the context of lifelong learning; (ii) implementation of programmes to change opinions and stereotypes about older employees; and (iii) promotion of intra-company active ageing strategies” (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 6–7).

Another problem is the late entry of young people (20–29) into the labour market, what is caused by the fact that the average rate of participation in education is relatively high in Slovenia. The rate of participation in education among young people is gradually rising; for 18-year-old citizens it grew from 67% to 82% between 1998 and 2012. As a result, the share of 25–34-year-olds with tertiary education has also grown. In 1996, the share of people in the 25–34 age group with tertiary education was 15%; by 2015 it reached 41%. The increased participation in education on the other hand delays the entry into the labour market. The share of employed persons in the 15–24 age group thus fell from 38% in 1996 to 30% in 2015 (Republic of Slovenia – Statistical Office 2016). According to European Commission projections, the enrolment in primary schools will increase until 2020; on the other hand, the number of students in secondary schools and tertiary programmes will decrease.

The Slovenian Development Strategy 2030 deals with the effects of demographic changes of the coming years. The government realised the problems of increasing pressure on the financial sustainability of social protection systems. The current regulation of compulsory social insurance is already insufficient to demand, since the financing of social protection systems requires additional funding from the state budget. Due to an ageing population, growing expenditure on pensions, healthcare and long-term care, and also the increasing amount of precarious work, these demands will be even more difficult to finance, changes of the current regulations will be needed. Slovenia’s development goals are the following: “a) introducing the concept of sustainable working lives, which allows employees to work longer and retire healthy; b) creating high-quality jobs which create high value added, are environmentally responsible and provide conditions for adequate pay and a high-quality work environment; c) promoting the increased inclusion of marginalised and underrepresented groups on the labour market; d) adapting jobs and the organisation of work to demographic changes, technological developments and climate changes; e) improving the secure transparency system and reducing the dangers of unemployment and inactivity, particularly in areas with high unemployment; f) promoting employer activities designed to improve employees’ physical and mental health, occupational health and safety and make it easier to balance work and care responsibilities; g) promoting the employment of both sexes in gender atypical and deficient professions” (Šooš et al. 2017, 12).

The Slovenian Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (UMAR) suggests to solve problems, such as high segmentation in the labour market for young people and relatively low social and economic inclusion of the elderly, through the reform of the social protection system, strengthening lifelong learning, promoting a healthy lifestyle, adapting the working and living environment (ZUPAČIČ 2018, 7). On the other hand, UMAR emphasises, that social inclusion and participation in society of the elderly are relatively high in Slovenia, and they see improvement of the situation of the elderly and the health status of the population. They state that the recovery of the economy also improved the material position of the population, the risk of social exclusion and income
inequality of the population that have deteriorated in the crisis has been improving since 2015; in both areas Slovenia remains much more successful than the EU average. Beneficial results and improvements in recent years are also present in the field of gender equality, participation in society and discrimination. However, there are still significant inequalities in the labour market what is reflected in the relatively high proportion of overtime and temporary employment, especially among young people. There is also a relatively low rate of older workers’ employment and a high risk of elderly women’s poverty, which increases the risk of their social exclusion. The elderly people are also characterised by a low participation in society and increased exposure to discrimination. Health care is marked by positive movements, but in Slovenia, a significantly smaller share of life is spent healthy than the EU average. Although access to public services, with the exception of long-term care, is relatively good, the rapid ageing of the Slovenian society is increasingly influencing the sustainability of social protection systems (Zupančič 2018, 10).

In Slovenia, there was a debate for years about the government’s plans for a special demographic fund, the Demographic Reserve Fund (DRS) that would cover pensions in a few decades, solving the problems of the unsustainable Slovenian pension system. The question of the fund was the source of huge tensions between the parties of the 12th government of Slovenia (2014–2018) led by Miro Cerar: the Modern Centre Party (SMC), the Social Democrats (SD) and the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS). DeSUS advocated an independent and autonomous demographic fund, claiming that the fund would be only an “empty box” if it would be created the way the Ministry of Finance plans (Fajnik 2017). In January 2018, the parliamentary group of DeSUS filed a bill on the demographic fund, as a stand-alone action in the legislative process. The leader of the party, Karl Erjavec explained that this was a necessary step, because otherwise the state will not be able to provide money for pensions to today’s middle and younger generation (RTVSLO 2018a). Experts emphasise, that the battle was about whether the Demographic Reserve Fund should be a truly “independent autonomous fund” or only a dividend recipient. The battle for DRS was thus not a battle to improve the position of the pension fund, but rather about who will manage the state property. It was a battle for political influence, for the possibility of recruiting own personnel in control and management positions in companies. If DRS will independently manage its portfolio, its managers will also have this power, but if it is merely a portfolio investor, it will only be entitled to annual dividends, without affecting recruitment (Damijan 2017).

The views expressed by the parties regarding demography and pension issues are evident from their programs that were published in the campaign before the parliamentary elections in the summer of 2018 (Toplak 2018). Most programs do not provide a deep analysis of the problem. The most popular Slovenian party, the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) supports the creation of a demographic fund and the regulation of the long-term care system for the elderly. They want to make it easier for pensioners to work after retirement. The party is committed to support families by reducing VAT and supporting childbirth allowance for multiple births (SDS [s. a.]). SDS would provide tax relief for young families when purchasing their first home. The centre-left List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ) would also help pensioners to work after retirement. They are the proponents of a comprehensive pension reform (with a minimal net pension of 600 €) and the establishment of a long-term care system for the elderly (Lista Marjana Šarca [s. a.]).
The party of the former Prime Minister Miro Cerar, the Modern Centre Party (SMC) also supports the creation of a demographic fund. They would encourage new jobs improving care for elder people, people with disabilities and others who need help to facilitate independent living. The SMC does not have a special chapter in their programme on demographics, but they stated that the state should change housing funds for favourable rent/construction for young people, young families and the elderly. It would also strengthen the role of the kindergarten as a place of socialisation (Stranka modernega centra [s. a.]).

The centre-left Social Democrats (SD) would establish a long-term care system and introduce a reserve demographic fund, higher income tax relief for families, facilitating measures for reconciling work and family life. SD would set up a free kindergarten program (Samozavestna Slovenija 2018). The centre-right New Slovenia (NSi) plans a pension reform by introducing a compulsory second pillar. They also promised tax deductions for families, facilitating the reconciliation of family and professional life, a positive attitude towards reconciling family and professional life. In the year after the marriage, they would give each spouse an additional day off (N.Si [s. a.]). The left-wing, The Left (Levica) emphasises the importance of measures to stop the departure of young people abroad by “fair pay for fair work”. They claimed that the minimum wage should be raised, with which other wages will raise as well, thereby increasing the payments into the pension fund. The Left would extend maternity leave for women. They would extend the right to paid parental leave for man and they also emphasise the importance of free kindergartens (Levica 2018). The Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) calls for the introduction of individual accounts of insured citizens, which will enable the insured to inspection concerning the status of paid contributions and immediate calculation regarding the amount of the pension. The party claims the pensions should be adjusted to 70% with wage growth and 30% with inflation growth. DeSUS would establish an office for the elderly and an advocate for them (Program Stranke 2011).

4. Migration trends and their perception

Slovenian Lands had more emigrants than immigrants for decades, net migration became positive during the 1960s. Due to political changes in 1991, net migration became temporarily negative, but after that, traditional immigration streams from some former Yugoslav republics resumed soon (Zavod Republike Slovenije za statistiko 1995). At the end of 2016, 114,438 foreign citizens represented 5.5% of Slovenia’s population (Razpotnik 2017b).

In the period between 2005 and 2009, immigration was growing especially in the construction sector, but the majority of immigrants did not get citizenship, so they were forced to leave when a lot of employers collapsed due to the economic crisis. From 2010, there is a weak recovery of immigration, with a slight surplus. Immigration alone amounted to more than 30,000 before the financial crisis of 2008, while it has stabilised around 15,000 after 2010. In the last years, Slovenia’s migration surplus is lower than in the 1990s (Josipovič 2018, 3).

In 2016, Slovenia had positive net migration of foreign nationals for the eighteenth consecutive year: 7,006 more individuals immigrated to Slovenia than emigrated from it.
However, it was also the seventeenth consecutive year when the net migration of citizens was negative: the number of those leaving was for 5,955 higher of those who returned to the country. In 2016, 16,623 people immigrated to Slovenia and 15,572 emigrated from it. The number of Slovenian citizens immigrating to Slovenia in 2016 was 2,900, in the same year 13,800 foreign citizens came to the country, while 8,800 Slovenian citizens and almost 6,800 foreigners emigrated from Slovenia. Net migration in 2016 was the highest since 2011: 1,051. Most foreign immigrants come to Slovenia usually from Bosnia and Herzegovina (35% of all foreign immigrants in 2016), and many come from Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia and Macedonia. The most popular destination of emigrants with Slovenian citizenship is usually Austria (27% of all emigrants in 2016), followed by Germany (20% in 2016), Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In 2016, the educational structure of emigrants was similar to that of the entire population of Slovenia.

According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, among the 16,623 people, who immigrated to Slovenia in 2016, nearly two thirds were in the 25–64 age group. Among them 23% had basic education or less, 58% had upper secondary education and 19% had tertiary education. 69% of the 15,572 people who left Slovenia in 2016 were in the 25–64 age group. Among them, 20% had basic education or less, 55% had upper secondary education and 25% had tertiary education. Nearly 36% of immigrants with Slovenian citizenship in the 25–64 age group had tertiary education, while among foreign immigrants the share of tertiary educated was significantly lower: 15%. Among emigrants in the same age group, the difference was even more pronounced: 36% of emigrants with Slovenian citizenship had tertiary education, while about 12% of foreign emigrants were tertiary educated. Among those who immigrated to Slovenia in 2016, 106 held a doctorate of science; among emigrants, 156 had attained this level of education (Republic of Slovenia – Statistical Office 2016).

Emigration from Slovenia started to grow exponentially from 2005, especially among young people (the majority of those leaving is under 35) and have high levels of education. The level of daily labour mobility is also growing. Peripheral areas, especially the north-eastern part of the country suffer more from emigration and brain drain then the central parts of Slovenia (Josipovič 2018, 9).

Net migration is the most uncertain factor in the future scenarios. It has been strongly contingent on the structure of Slovenia’s economic growth in the last decade. Economic growth was the highest in 2007–2009, driven by construction activity, so migration was high, too; but after that, it has been almost non-existent. Slovenia needs a more suitable migration policy, since without positive net migration the working age (20–64) population would shrink (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2016, 3). In 2016, 110,459 internal migrations (changes of residence within a country) were detected. The majority of residents who changed their settlement of residence (80%) moved to another municipality. More than a half of internal migrants were 20–39 years old (RAZPOTNIK 2017a).
5. Effects of the 2015 migration crisis, views of the political parties on immigration

The so-called Balkan Migration Route switched to Slovenia when Hungary closed its border with Croatia. After a crisis situation on her southern border in October 2015, Slovenia, a country on the edge of the Schengen Area, started to build a razor-wire fence from the next month. The government stated that the country needed the barrier to control the flow of migrants, especially because it lacked manpower and equipment to handle the influx of thousands of people, who wanted to cross the country on their way towards Western Europe. Slovenia amended the country’s defence law, passed a bill that allowed police to seal the 670-kilometre long border with Croatia to prevent migrants from entering the country. Between 17 October and mid-November 2015, over 200,000 migrants entered the country.

Since the crisis, the question of immigrants became one of the most important topics of Slovenian politics and has been one of the central themes before the parliamentary election in June 2018. Parliamentary political parties have different views on the key question, whether migrants are a security or a humanitarian problem. The more the party is on the political spectrum on the left, the more they look migrants from a humanitarian point of view, and contrary: while parties from the right tend to emphasise the security component (Delo.si 2018).

The winner of the parliamentary election in 2018, the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) had a campaign largely based on anti-immigration rhetoric. The party is pro-European, but anti-immigrant and strongly opposes to EU asylum quotas. In their opinion, each country should provide its own security. They advocate consistent protection of the Schengen border. For those who are real refugees, they would offer adequate shelter (SDS [s. a.]). In the campaign, SDS emphasised that the question is the existence of the EU, its culture and values. The SDS believes that migrants are an economic problem and warns that Slovenia does not distinguish between refugees and migrants.

As a result of the election in 2018, and due to the anti-immigration campaign, the nationalist Slovenian National Party (SNS) led by Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti became a parliamentary party again, after a seven years long break. The party is renowned for its Euroscepticism and it opposes Slovenia's membership in NATO. The leadership of the SNS emphasise, that there should be no migrants in Slovenia and they want to mobilise the Slovenian army on the border in order to stop immigration (Demokracija.si 2018).

On the other hand, members of the left-wing The Left (Levica) say that refugees are not a problem, the real problem is that the issue has been used by the right-wing parties to instigate intolerance and hatred. The party advocates a “human attitude towards refugees”, claiming that the conflict in the Middle East should come to an end and that Slovenia needs to leave the NATO alliance (Levica 2018).

The centre-left List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ) emphasises, that the Slovenian border should be adequately protected, including by the fence at the border. The opinion of LMŠ leaders is that EU-members should protect external borders together.

The centre-left Social Democrats (SD) and the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) believe that this is primarily a humanitarian crisis, but the security problem should not be neglected, in accordance with internal and European law. The SD emphasises, that “Slovenia remained a humanitarian state during the crisis, showed
humanity and helped the people”. They think that modernisation of the national security system is necessary (Samozavestna Slovenija 2018).

The leading party of the former coalition between 2014 and 2018, the Modern Centre Party (SMC) considers that it is a humanitarian and security issue. The state must grant national security, as well as the security of its citizens and the party emphasises that strengthening of the army and the police is necessary (Stranka modernega centra [s. a.]). The question of immigrants was the source of tensions between the leaders of SMC.

The centre-right New Slovenia (NSi) shares the view that it is primarily a security issue and also a humanitarian question, but they have no dilemma that the state must have control over its borders. They advocate the closure of the border and a clear message to migrants that the Slovenian border is sealed off. They think police and the army should protect the border, and “it must be closed for the protection of the lives of migrants” (N.Si [s. a.]).

Concerning the question whether to remove or even pull more wire fences on the southern border, most of the parties argue that due to the current situation on the Balkan route, the fence should remain. Only the Left stands out on this issue, they would immediately remove it from the border. There are small differences between the parties in this topic, because some (SMC, LMŠ, SD) would replace the wire fence with a panel fence, while the right-wing parties pay no attention to this kind of difference. Some parties, including DeSUS would use more sophisticated and technically perfected protection approaches on the southern border (modern technology, satellite images, more helicopters).

Apart from The Left, who says that spending on military needs should not be increased, all other political parties would spend more on the defence and security system. SDS leadership thinks Slovenia should invest more, “if it wants the army to survive”. DeSUS insists on the reintroduction of military service for all young people, which would last only three months, during which time they would gain basic military knowledge. While The Left opposes the formation of two medium battle groups, for which Slovenia will spend 1.2 billion Euros by 2025, all other political parties point to a “dynamic and unpredictable” environment, which will require more resources (Delo.si 2018).

A longer perspective (studies from 2002 onwards) shows that the Slovenian public opinion at the declarative level is relatively open to migration, but it becomes much more restrained when refugees appear at the state borders. After the refugee crisis of 2015, Slovenia’s public opinion became more polarised regarding the issue. It is expected that the public opinion will move in line with the greater or lesser presence of refugees at the border as the key reference point of (non)support. (Zavratnik et al. 2017, 882).

6. Summary and outlook

The median age of the population of Slovenia increased by more than seven years since gaining independence and the demographic transition to a society with an ageing population will intensify in the coming years and decades. The key feature of the changes is a decrease in the proportion of the working age population and an increase in the number of elderly people. The process of population ageing will be more intense in Slovenia than in the other EU member states.
The inevitable ageing of the population, the demographic trends will affect social protection systems and fiscal sustainability. There will be an increased pressure on expenditures concerning pensions, health care and long-term care. The establishing of a stable pension system will be a challenge; the health care system will have to use a greater share of GDP. The increasing proportion of the older population will increase the pressure on age-related general government expenditure. Demographic changes increase the need for planning, construction and transport policies adapted to fulfil the needs of elderly people.

The decline of the working age population will impede economic growth. Assuming migrations remain modest, even higher employment among young and elderly people will not be sufficient to meet the increased recruitment demand driven in case of a stronger economic activity. An altered age structure of the reduced supply of labour could also slow down productivity growth and affect the structure of consumption. The demographic change requires reforms in the education system as the demand for lifelong learning.

It is necessary to conduct active employment policies for the elderly, which represent the majority of the long-term unemployed people in Slovenia and represent the main labour force reserve. The net migration of Slovenia is the most uncertain factor in the future scenarios, because it has always been strongly contingent on the structure of Slovenia’s economic growth in the last decade. From 2010, there is a weak recovery of immigration with a slight surplus, and it has stabilised around 15,000 after 2010. Slovenia needs a more suitable migration policy, and without migration growth, the working age population would shrink. In this regard Slovenia enjoys a particularly favourable position due to its connections with other countries of the former Yugoslavia.

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Trends in Demography and Migration in Slovakia

From One of the Most Progressive to One of the Most Decreasing

1. Introduction

After 1989, and predominantly since its independence in 1993, the Slovak Republic has experienced significant demographic changes, which do not differ from the experiences of transforming post-socialist countries. The short overview presented in this chapter devoted to the development in the Slovak Republic points to several common features with other CEE-bloc countries as well as to some specifics. The chapter presents not only the most significant and most interesting features of demographic development, but also focuses on how demographic development is reflected in official documents of the central government and institutions, or how the local demographic development is perceived by local leaders and the population.

2. General trends after 1990: Unstoppably leading towards intensive ageing

2.1. Changes in fertility

If anything can be characterised as a considerable change, then it is the transformation of the character and intensity of fertility. While some countries of the former Eastern Bloc have already experienced a decline in total fertility rate under the so-called replacement level of two children per woman in the 1980s, female fertility in Slovakia still remained at one of the highest levels in the European area. It dropped below two children per woman only in 1992, while the decline itself was characterised by great dynamics. In the course of a decade, Slovakia ranked among the countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world, when in 2000 it fell below the so-called lowest-low fertility defined by 1.3 children per woman. For the next eight years, fertility remained below this level. Slovakia reached the full bottom in 2002, when the fertility rate reached the value of 1.18 children per woman. Between 2001 and 2003, the Slovak population experienced the first and still the only natural decrease (more deaths than births) in history since the First World War. A decrease to such low level was mainly caused by the postponement of childbearing to a higher age and the coexistence of two reproductively different generations of women. While

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older women followed a socialist pattern of reproduction characterised by early onset and ending of reproductive plans, younger generations of women (born in the 1970s) started to gradually and increasingly postpone their entry into parenthood. The significant impact of this postponement is also demonstrated by the so-called adjusted tempo fertility rate that was at a substantially higher level than the values of the total fertility rate. Approximately from 2004 and 2005, we are witnessing the onset of the recuperation phase and the fertility rate is gradually increasing. In 2016, it reached almost 1.5 children per woman. However, this is still a very low value compared to the level at the end of the 1980s. On the other hand, one must point out that since 2012, the figures do not include the children born abroad to women with permanent residency in Slovakia. This is about a tenth of the total number of born children, which would increase the fertility rate over 1.6 children per woman. In the last few years, less than 60,000 children have been born in Slovakia on an annual basis, while in the periods of the highest birth rate – in the early 1950s and late 1970s of the previous century, it was more than 100,000 children. The decline in fertility and the associated fall in the number of births caused a significant ageing of the population of Slovakia. One of the important transformational changes in fertility is the abovementioned postponement of childbearing to an older age, which is also reflected, for example, in the development of the mean age at first birth. From the original level of approximately 22.5 years (early 1990s), the age has risen to 28 years. In addition, we also see changes in the character of fertility in terms of legitimacy. The close link between marital life and reproduction has relaxed, which has also reflected in a significant increase in the proportion of children born outside of marriage, from less than 8% to about 40%.

2.2. Transformation of family behaviour

In the last quarter of the century, family behaviour in Slovakia has also undergone no less dynamic and revolutionary changes. Until the early 1990s, not only early marriage was typical, when the average age at first marriage was at 22.5 years for women and under 25 years for men, but also the high intensity with which both sexes entered the marriage. According to values at the end of the 1980s, only about 10% of women and 15% of men had no marriage experience. On the other hand, however, the risk of divorce has increased, when it was about 20% before the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The beginning of the 1990s has brought a dramatic change in marital behaviour when the intensity of marriages fell sharply while the average age at the first marriage has increased. Unlike fertility, however, the phase of marriages at an older age is not significant so far, and therefore the number and share of single individuals in reproductive age is rapidly growing. This was confirmed by the results of the latest 2011 population census, when single individuals still prevailed in the category of 31-year-old men and 28-year-old women. According to the latest available data, approximately 35% of men and 30% of women would remain single if the intensity of marriages remains stable. Continuous growth in the mean age at the first marriage currently causes its values to approach 32 years in men and to exceed 29 years in women. In addition to postponing marriage start-ups, the low intensity of marriages is also affected by an increasingly frequent tendency to various forms of unmarried cohabitation of single young persons. The 1990s also brought faster growth of total divorce rate, up until 2008
and 2009 when it peaked at more than 41%. From that point forward, we are witnessing a slight decline and, according to the latest data, about one third of 100 marriages will end in a divorce (ŠPROCHA–VAŇO 2015).

2.3. Changes in mortality

In terms of the mortality process in Slovakia, the period after 1989 can be assessed positively. It was in the early 1990s that brought along the breakdown of more than two decades of stagnation and in case of men even a slight deterioration in mortality rates. This is confirmed by the development of the mean life expectancy at birth, which represents a synthetic indicator of the mortality rate. From 1990 to 2016, it increased by more than 7 years among men and by approximately 5 years among women. According to the latest available data and providing that the mortality rates remain unchanged, boys just born in Slovakia have a chance to live up to 74 years and girls more than 80 years (ŠPROCHA–MAJO 2016a). Compared to the most advanced European countries, however, Slovakia is still lagging relatively far behind in terms of mortality rate. The main cause is, above all, the worse mortality rates among men in the older productive and younger post-productive age among women, especially in post-productive age. Despite the positive developments in mortality rates, the results of the EU-SILC and EHIS surveys show, that the Slovak population has the perception of leaning to a worse qualitative degree than most of the EU28 countries.

2.4. Demographic ageing

Rapid changes in fertility and also in mortality resulted in intensive demographic ageing. The Slovak population is among the fastest ageing in Europe. The reason is the sharp fall in fertility to the lowest values in Europe, while by 1989 the total fertility rate in Slovakia was above average. The fertility dominated ageing is taking its course. At the same time, the average length of life – mortality dominated ageing – is increasing and intensive ageing takes place from the middle. The large cohorts of the 1950s and 1970s are gradually getting older, while these baby-booms were very intense in Slovakia. The mean age in Slovakia reached the level of 40 years in 2015, and the ageing index is approaching a threshold of 100 seniors per 100 children. The Slovak population, however, still belongs to the younger ones in Europe, although this situation will only remain the same for a few more years. The economic dependency ratio has decreased after 1990 due to declining birth rates and the shift of larger generations to productive age but has been rising again since 2010. The senior part of the population has and will have a substantial impact on its growth (BLEHA et al. 2013).
2.5. Changes in the educational structure

Changes in the educational structure are mainly the result of transformation of the educational paths of young generations that have a pronounced tendency towards complete secondary education and in the last decade also towards tertiary level of education. This transformation of the composition of the population according to the highest achieved education applies to a greater extent to women who, at a younger age, historically achieve higher education than men. In the last intercensal period, the need to improve the quality of human capital, however, has also affected those who had completed their education in the previous period and finished their educational paths with respect to their age. As a result, at the age of 25–29, a quarter of men and about a third to 40% of women achieved university education, while in the early 1990s it was only about one tenth of the respective age group (Šprocha–Majo 2016b).

2.6. The ethnic structure

The ethnic structure of the Slovak population is the result of a long-term historical development. The Romani population has a specific position, which is characterised by several problematic perceptions due to its allochthonous origin and a long-term not only spatial segregation. This means above all a high level of long-term unemployment, a very low level of education, disastrous living conditions often found in segregated settlements and also aspects related to mortality, health status and reproduction. From the point of view of reproductive behaviour, the persistence of early partner and maternity patterns is still confirmed, with high chances of becoming a mother repeatedly at a young age. The result is not only the significantly higher fertility rate of Roma women, especially women living in segregated settlements in the eastern parts of Slovakia, but also the different size of their families. Combined with the problematic situation on the labour market, social transfers linked to maternity and parenting are a very important income for family budgets. On the other hand, a complex of external factors (e.g. inadequate living conditions, low food quality, excessive use of tobacco and alcoholic products) along with some genetic predispositions greatly impact the quality of health and contributes to a significantly shorter life expectancy. Multiple social exclusion results in a situation where Roma people live in mostly segregated settlements in marginalised areas of eastern Slovakia, where they are unable to break out of these problems by themselves and are in many ways fully dependent on help from outside (Šprocha–Bleha 2018).

2.7. Regional heterogeneity

The regional heterogeneity of the population development is considerable. The Slovak Republic is a country of significant regional contrasts in terms of regional disparities and socio-economic disparities. A simple view at GDP per capita by NUTS-III and NUTS-II regions reveals that regional inequalities in Slovakia are among the highest in the EU and have been increasing after 1989. Most underdeveloped regions are located in the south.
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of Central Slovakia and in Eastern Slovakia. The territory is thus divided diagonally, while the northwest is more developed than the southeast, thus manifesting the factor of macro-location attractiveness (Korec 2005). Demographic processes are partly affected by regional disparities, although fertility differences are also given by the cultural and ethnic specificities of individual regions. In principle, northern and eastern Slovakia is demographically younger, with higher reproductive intensity and higher fertility rates. The spatial picture in terms of mortality is more mosaic. Residents live longer in the cities than in the countryside. The lowest average life expectancy is in some rural regions in the south of Central and Eastern Slovakia, mostly as a result of the educational and social structure as well as environmental factors.

Regional disparities mostly affect the internal and external migration. In the last two decades, the number of districts (LAU-2), which are showing a positive migration balance concerning national migration, is decreasing. In addition, these districts are concentrated in the western part of Slovakia. In Eastern Slovakia, there is no district with a positive migration balance, except for the suburban zone of Košice. On the contrary, the figures of migration increase are growing in the region of Bratislava, in Bratislava itself and in the districts of the Nitra, Trnava and Trenčín regions. Thus, internal migration has a distinct east-west gradient. Population mobility and the willingness to move have risen, especially for work reasons, but is still below the EU average. The number of long-distance migrations has also increased, which is related to the aforementioned relocation from Central and Eastern Slovakia to Western Slovakia (Kakaš 2017). For example, the number of migrants to Bratislava 15 years ago declined sharply with increasing distance, and now the number of migrants from the seven self-governing regions to the Bratislava Region is almost equal. Therefore, regional disparities are significantly manifested in migration patterns in Slovakia.

3. Population outlooks, forecasts and decision-makers’ reactions

The Slovak Republic has a longer time series of forecasts at national and district level (LAU-II), from which NUTS-II and NUTS-III forecasts can also be deduced by using the top-down approach. A latest forecast at the national level was published in 2013 (Bleha et al. 2013), and an update of this forecast is planned in 2018. The forecast’s horizon is 2060. The results of the latest forecast can be summarised as follows. An increase in total fertility is expected in all three fertility scenarios, but even the high scenario does not expect to exceed the replacement level of two children per woman, however: the threshold of 1.9 children per woman may be reached. This would put Slovakia at the top of the ranking of the European countries according to the current values. The medium, most likely scenario expects an increase in the total fertility rate to 1.65 children per woman. The prediction in the low variant is approximately at the level of 1.5 children per woman in 2060. All three variants assume an increase in the average maternal age, another shift in the reproduction paths and the overall ageing of the fertility age profile. A substantial part of the increase in fertility will be provided by the age group of 30–34 years, and to a lesser extent also by the age group of 35 years and over. Concerning the mean life expectancy, an increase to 82 years among men and 86 years among women is projected in the medium scenario. Decline in the mortality rates in the 60–79 age group for men, and in the 60–79 and 80+
age groups for women will be most likely contributing to this increase. In the case of migration, the assumptions are optimistic: in the medium scenario, Slovakia should gain about 12,000 inhabitants a year from around 2025. However, an update of national forecast will also take into account some estimates that will make the migratory numbers more realistic. It can be assumed that after the establishment of the independent republic in 1993, Slovakia is experiencing a negative net migration. The forecast assumptions have concluded the following results. Slovakia will be one of the fastest ageing populations among the OECD countries. The reasons were further discussed in Chapter 1. The average age will reach almost 50 years in 2060, the only growing segment of the population will be the senior group over the age of 65, and the ageing index will exceed the threshold of 200 seniors per 100 children. The economic load index will also increase significantly. The number of seniors in 2060 will be at least 2.5 times higher than in 2016. The natural increase after 2020 will gradually change into a natural decline in all three scenarios. In 2060, Slovakia will annually lose about 30,000 inhabitants a year in terms of the difference between the number of the born and the deceased.

What is the response of the government and the decision makers to these unfavourable prospects? First, it should be noted that the forecasts at the national level have been available since the 1990s, including the forecasts of the UN, the World Bank and Eurostat. The response of the government over the past 25 years cannot be described as excellent and complete, but some important measures have been taken. From the sphere of adaptation measures, the pension system reform should be mentioned first. This change was introduced in 2004, with Slovakia predating a number of surrounding countries. The entire system of contributions was changed and the second pension pillar was established. The parameters of the pension system were changed several times in the next period and the second pension pillar was opened several times. An important measure is the increase in retirement age. At present, its increase is driven by a rise in average life expectancy. In 2017 and at the beginning of 2018, efforts were made to set the ceiling for retirement age initiated by trade union leaders who took advantage of a petition. The petition should be addressed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in the course of 2018. The draft of the trade unionists suggests the ceiling of 64 years.

In addition to the mitigation measures, some measures have been taken to address the direct or indirect impact of demographic processes, especially birth rates. The Concept of State Family Policy was adopted for the first time in 1996 and the Proposal for Updating the Concept of State Family Policy for 2004–2006 was adopted by the Government of the SR in 2004. The Proposal for Measures to Reconcile Family and Work Life with a View to 2010 was adopted in 2006. Such measures appear to be effective and necessary alongside direct financial support (McDonald 2006). Measures are being proposed to promote teleworking, part-time work, but also to extend working hours in pre-school facilities and to choose the length of parental leave. In 2006, a material entitled What Is and What Should Be the Strategy to Tackle the Demographic Changes in the SR was published for public discussion (BLEHA et al. 2006). Overall, however, the progress in the field of strategic management of fertility and development of families and household cannot be evaluated
as satisfactory, although there are certainly some positive changes. Slovakia is one of the countries with above-average length of parental leave (a total of three years), the parental allowance is almost EUR 215 per month from January 2018, and from the 34th week of pregnancy the woman is entitled to the sickness insurance benefits for a maximum of 34 weeks. Exceptions include multiple births and single mother cases. The level of benefits is based on previous income of the mother (currently 75% of the gross wage). There is one-off contribution of nearly EUR 830 for the first to third child, which is paid at childbirth. Direct financial support is important, but equally important are measures to reconcile family and work life. In the last approximately 10 years, the Slovak Republic has been facing a lack of spaces in pre-school facilities, especially in the cities and surroundings of cities with a high degree of immigration. There are several government initiatives to build pre-school facilities, but the shortage persists. In the school year 2016–2017, the Centre of Scientific Information of the Slovak Republic stated more than 11 thousand outstanding applications, which is about one-fifth of the number of births per year, while in some regions the situation is even more critical, especially in the western part of Slovakia. Yet forecasts indicated an increase in the number of births already at the turn of the millennia.

The number of fathers who remain on parental leave is also rising in Slovakia. However, it still only concerns relatively low figures, the threshold of 1,000 fathers on parental leave was exceeded in 2017 (publicly available data of the Social Insurance Agency). Interesting measures include, for example, the annual Family-friendly Employer competition, which has been organised by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family in the past 15 years, based on measures aimed at reconciling family and work life, as well as supporting balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions.

The analysis of electoral programs of relevant political parties in the field of population and family policy in the first decade after 2000 points to the fact that not enough attention is paid to this issue, only a few pages of exact, concrete measures that are clearly linked to demographic problems, and that are explicitly made with pro-population intentions (BLEHA 2010). With regard to population and policy research, several research studies are regularly published by the Institute for Labour and Family Research. In addition, relevant research is also carried out by some academic institutions aimed at demographic and population studies, such as the Demographic Research Centre at Infostat and the Department of Human Geography and Demography at the Faculty of Natural Sciences of the Comenius University (BLEHA–VAŇO 2007). There is little information in Slovakia about how people perceive demographic changes. The pilot survey was carried out more than 10 years ago (BLEHA 2007) and revealed some interesting results. It confirmed that people perceive demographic changes and also understand the terms such as demographic ageing and the connection between demographic processes and the changes in the pension system. However, it is necessary to update this survey, extend the number of questions and samples.

Some research has been done at the local level, as demographic development is spatially heterogeneous, and cities and municipalities are facing many problems. Bleha (2011) carried out a research focusing on the views of local government representatives on demographic developments, on issues related to the demographic development of settlements, larger cities and smaller rural settlements. Representatives of municipalities are aware of the importance of demographic development. The decreasing population is seen as a problem, but the composition of the population by age is seen as a much bigger
problem. Mayors are equally aware of the fact that even the spontaneous and unsettled growth of the population can cause problems. This development is already happening and several growing municipalities in the background of cities (especially Bratislava) face significant problems (Šveda–Šuška 2014). Some studies are also taking place that focus on downsizing of larger cities in the Slovak Republic and the reactions of local representatives to this process (Buček–Bleha 2012; 2013; 2015). Interesting but disturbing results have been brought to light by a recently published study (Bleha–Farbiaková 2017). The authors examined the quality of demographic parts in the strategic and planning documents of municipalities on the example of two of the eight self-governing regions of Slovakia. The findings are not very positive. The greatest shortcoming is the absence of a demographic forecast or its poor quality. Another problem is the formality of documents and measures, often done as a template and not taking into account the specificities of the given municipality.

4. Migration trends: Perceptions and responses

Managing and influencing migration belongs to the population policy in the same way as pronatalist and family measures. In recent years, the debate on foreign migration in Slovakia is much greater than the debate on pronatalist measures. It is quite natural in view of the development of the migration situation in the last 3–4 years. Slovakia faces a serious problem in terms of foreign migration. Although official migration data depict Slovakia as a country that has been gaining population by migration for over two decades, the reality is quite different. The issue of undocumented migration is as big as in other countries of the former Eastern Bloc. This chapter briefly addresses two major issues.

The first problem is the drain of skilled and less skilled labour, which has both demographic and socio-economic consequences. Divinský (2007) estimates that Slovakia is a country with declining population rather than a country with growth due to migration tendencies.

In addition to updating data based on routine evidence, the update also uses a new approach based on an alternative prediction on real emigration estimates, that is, estimating the degree of its underestimation, and simplifying its factuality. For the first time it was applied for the prediction of the migration future for the Slovak Republic in the study by Bleha et al. (2014). It is based on the results of two studies. Jurčová and Pilinská (2014) estimate that between 2001 and 2010, the average annual loss of population due to foreign migration reached approximately 1,900 persons, and between 2011 and 2013, the average annual loss of population due to migration was between 9,700 and 10,480 persons. The Financial Policy Institute (Haluš et al. 2016) estimated migration surplus/loss based on data from the Central Register of Health Insurers. Both studies use methods that have their limits and shortcomings, but they undoubtedly provide refined data on expatriates and, ultimately, specify the migration balance. The Financial Policy Institute made estimation until 2015. The migration loss should be around 6,000 persons in the last estimated year (2015), decreasing to this value from around 15,000 persons in 2013.

There is no doubt that Slovakia is losing young people, a skilled labour force. However, measures to prevent this undesirable situation are scarce and inefficient. There is no
A comprehensive strategy that would offer more efficient solutions. There is a government support scheme approved in 2015 that aims at promoting the return of researchers and academic capacities back to Slovakia. However, this scheme does not attract much interest of the Slovaks working at foreign universities and research institutions. In the first year, the scheme only attracted four people (Horáková 2016). The brain drain into the Czech Republic is probably the biggest problem. This is largely reflected in the fact that Slovakia is third in the OECD in terms of the number of young people leaving to study abroad. The number of Slovak students at the Czech universities has risen sharply in the last two decades, and despite a certain halt and a slight decline in recent years, there are still more than 20,000 of them, representing more than half of all foreign students in the Czech Republic. The same conditions apply to both Slovak and Czech students. According to the findings of the Scio Agency, Slovak students are of the same quality and in some respects even better than Czech students, for example in mathematics (Scio Agency 2018).

In summary, it can be stated that the development in terms of the emigration component of migration is unfavourable. Slovakia loses young people, loses its reproduction base and the important labour force. Although the migration crisis a decade ago has reduced the number of workers abroad, after its end, the number of Slovaks working abroad rose again within one year, but from 2014 began to decline again, reaching more than 140,000 persons in the third quarter of 2017. The breakthrough in terms of emigration development was the accession of Slovakia to the European Union. At the beginning of 2004, the number of workers was still three times less than three years later in 2007. Summarising by country was provided by the study of Šprocha (2014). Apart from others, it states the following facts. Since 2008, after the onset of the economic crisis, the number of Slovak citizens working in the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Hungary and Ireland has declined. On the contrary, there has been a significant increase in the number of Slovak citizens working in Austria, mainly due to the employment of old-age carers for whom the labour market restrictions were relaxed before 1 May 2011. The share of Slovak citizens working in Austria has gradually increased, and in 2014 the results of the Labour Force Survey indicated Austria to be the most attractive destination, with a slight head start over the Czech Republic. In 2014, approximately 39,000 people (29%) worked in Austria, and 38,000 (28%) in the Czech Republic. Germany was on the third place with more than 17,000 Slovak workers (13%), followed by the United Kingdom on the forth place with about 15,000 Slovak workers (7%). Nearly half of the men working abroad are employed in construction and almost a quarter in industry. Women are mainly employed in health and social care. About half of the women with Slovak citizenship work in this area. In terms of occupation, a third of the Slovak citizens work as skilled workers and craftsmen (almost half of them are men), and 30% of them work in trade and services (almost 2/3 are women).

Very interesting is also the development of the second main component, legal immigration into the Slovak Republic. In terms of official demographic data, the number of immigrants is increasing, but since 1993 it has never exceeded the threshold of 10,000 inhabitants per year. The number of immigrants approached the value of 9,000 in the pre-crisis period, but the crisis triggered a fall to around 5,000 inhabitants per

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4 Managed by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic.
5 According to the data of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.
year. The following increase in 2017 reached the number of more than 7,000 inhabitants. The number of immigrants also includes citizens of the Slovak Republic who have immigrated from abroad since 2012, including children born to Slovak citizens abroad. Regarding foreigners, the individual types of residence of foreigners in the SR are defined by Act No. 404/2011 Coll., as amended. Under this law, the EU/EEA citizens have a right of permanent residence in the Slovak Republic. Third-country nationals may have permanent or temporary residence in the Slovak Republic. The number of foreigners legally resident in Slovakia is steadily increasing from 2004 to 2017 (data of the Ministry of Interior of the SR), approaching the threshold of 100,000 people, which represents approximately a 4-fold increase. Citizens of the neighbouring Czech Republic have the largest share, and EU citizens account for more than half of all foreigners.

Recently we have seen a significant increase in the number of foreigners working in the Slovak Republic, both EU/EEA citizens and third-country nationals (data from the Centre of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the SR). In January 2018, their number was close to 50,000, with almost 28,000 from the EU/EEA. The clear cause of this growth is the economic boom in the Slovak Republic and a significant drop in unemployment to historically low values below 6%. The number of vacancies is rising and employers are talking about increasing job problems, especially but not exclusively in Western Slovakia. In the Bratislava and Trnava regions, unemployment is below 3%. At the same time, other big investors (Amazon and Jaguar – Land Rover) came to invest in Western Slovakia. In light of the above-mentioned facts, a rather intense public debate is developing. Representatives of employers are alerted and call for easier employment of foreigners. On the other hand, the government has prepared legislation limiting the number of employees from abroad. The State Secretary of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family said: “Our intention is to make foreigners dearer. All the measures are aimed at making the foreigners working in Slovakia more expensive, so that it is not more cost-effective to hire them instead of domestic labour force” (Trend.sk 2018). The number of inspections on the illegal employment of foreigners is also rising. The employment of foreigners also raised a relatively large wave of local dislike. There is a stormy debate in many cities and smaller settlements, where the representatives of local governments and local representatives are not unanimous. A petition against the construction of hostels was initiated in 2017, for example, in Nitra, with regard to the arrival of Jaguar – Land Rover.

With regard to illegal migration, after the accession of Slovakia to the European Union, the number of foreigners who illegally crossed the border or illegally stayed on the territory of the Slovak Republic declined by about 5 times. The number of asylum seekers in the SR has increased sharply in connection with the expected enlargement of the EU. In 2001, the number of applicants exceeded 8,000 persons and reached the maximum in 2004 when 11,400 people applied for asylum in the Slovak Republic. After the accession of the Slovak Republic to the EU, the number of applicants declined significantly, reaching only about 30% of the number in 2004 (ŠPROCHA–VAŇO 2015). In recent years, only a few hundred applications were made, regardless of the outbreak of migration crises in 2015. While the number of applicants is low, the rate of asylum admissions is very low. It is a maximum of dozens of people a year. The exception was 2016, when the asylum was received by 149 Assyrian Christians from Iraq. Slovakia has long been one of the countries in which the least people apply for asylum in terms of population size. Like the other V4 countries,
the Slovak Government has rejected the migration quotas introduced in 2015. However, Slovakia is the only one that does not face a complaint of the European Commission as it has accepted some refugees (although this is only a fraction of the quota set for Slovakia). As far as the attitudes of the population are concerned, according to a survey in 2016, the Slovaks were among the least open to migration and migrants (Esipova et al. 2017).

5. Conclusion

Demographic development in Slovakia does not go beyond the trajectory of other Central European countries. In some respects, changes have been more severe than in other countries, such as in the case of fertility breakdown. Demographic ageing in Slovakia seems to be one of the fastest in Europe and the world. In recent decades, Slovakia has responded to this development, for example, by a comprehensive reorganisation of the pension system. However, measures in the field of pronatalist policy have not undergone significant changes. New elements have occurred, such as paternity leave, and there are efforts to reconcile family and work life. But, on the other hand, the response to the temporary increase in childbirth was not adequate, and there is a lack of spaces in pre-school facilities. Pronatalist policies and strategies in the electoral programs of political parties, except for some, are either absent or too general.

The situation in migration is not good. The brain drain continues and the initiatives to stop it are not efficient enough. There is a high outflow of students leaving to the Czech Republic, where according to surveys, half of them is not expected to return. On the other hand, the economic boom in recent years is attracting more and more workers not only from the EU but also from third countries. At the beginning of 2018, their number reached 50,000. The employment of foreigners is subject to a heated public and political debate. As far as asylum policy is concerned, the number of applicants is low and the rate of asylum admission is very low. From the point of view of immigration and taking refugees, Slovakia remains a relatively closed country. This is also demonstrated by surveys on migration acceptance, where Slovakia ranked in the last places.

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Irina Pribytkova

Demography and Migration: The Case of Ukraine

General Remarks on Population Dynamics and Demographic Trends since 1989

1. Introduction

In the latest population census taken by the USSR in 1989, the Ukrainian population amounted approximately 51.707 million. After ten years since the preceding census in 1979, the number of inhabitants increased here by 1,949,000 or by 4.0%. Just in Ukraine the lowest rate of population growth was observed in the 1980s being twice less than the USSR average. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the formation of independent states constituted a breaking point in the development of migratory processes in Ukraine, and led to a change in their direction, structure and intensity of migration. The immigration into Ukraine in 1991 and 1992 (148.4 and 228.1 thousand, respectively) supported its population growth right up to late 1992. In 1993, immigration into Ukraine fell to 49.6 thousand, and in 1994 quite an appreciable flow of emigration from Ukraine was recorded for the first time. That year the migration losses amounted to 143.2 thousand people. Throughout the following years, Ukraine’s population invariably shrank in the course of migration exchange with other countries. Under pressure from the deepening problem of depopulation and increasing emigration, the population of Ukraine decreased in size quickly.

The motive power of depopulation was founded on the transformation of the demographic regime completed in Ukraine in the 1970s. Accumulated in the age structure potential of demographic growth due to high fertility in recent times proved to be very near the exhaustion. In consequence of its loss, the natural increase of the population reduced steadily and its transition into natural decrease became inevitable. It has happened in Ukraine in 1991 and coincided in time with the beginning of unpopular market reforms. Though these reforms are regarded as the main cause of losses in the natural increase of the population, in reality the connection of fertility tendencies with the political situation at the beginning of the 1990s is relatively weak.

In the present case more deep evolutionary conditionality of population reproduction processes take place. The transition to the regime of narrowed reproduction has started long before the reforms. A crisis of post transitional fertility has arisen in Ukraine still before the USSR dissolution. Already from the early 1960s, the net reproduction rates went down below mark ‘one’: the population of Ukraine stopped to reproduce itself.

The migratory accumulations of Ukraine have increased its populations in the period of 1960–1990 by 1128.6 thousand inhabitants. The portion of migration inflows in the total growth of population made up 10.0% during this time. In 1991–1993, the inflow of
immigrants into Ukraine from abroad has partly compensated the natural decrease of population having provided it with 488.3 thousand of new inhabitants. At the end of the 20th century, the Ukraine lost the migration accumulations made in the early 1990s. By 2000, the migratory situation in Ukraine has gradually improved, and this tendency is becoming stronger. Already in 2004, the Ukraine became a receiving part in the migratory exchange with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and with other countries – since 2006. This can be regarded as a turning point in the migration dynamics in Ukraine.

On the whole, the population of Ukraine has increased from 42.469 million in 1960 to 52.244 million in 1993. Later on, its diminution led to sizable demographic losses: as of 1 January 2006, the population number in Ukraine amounted to 46.930 million inhabitants. Without the population of the temporarily occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol, as well as the occupied territory of Donbas, the number of Ukrainians amounted to 42.217 million as of 1 January 2018 according to the estimate of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. The estimates of the resident population are carried out on the basis of statistics according to the state registration of births and deaths and change of registration of the constant place of inhabitants.

2. Population by sex and major age groups

When discussing the distribution of resident Ukrainian population by sex, it is necessary to point out the gradual increase in the male share of the population from the early 1990s onward. While the percentage of males was 46.2% in 1989, it had reached 46.5% by 2000. Within 2001–2017, the male share came back to the initial level and demonstrated a steady time series of the indicator: 46.2–46.3%. Overall, there were 860 males for every 1000 females in Ukraine in 1989. As of January 1, 2017 this number was 863. The most balanced ratios of males and females were noted at the beginning of 2017 in the Western region of Ukraine: in the Zakarpats’ka, Rivnens’ka, Lvivs’ka, Ivano-Frankivs’ka and Volyns’ka oblasts/regions: there were 925, 904, 901, 897 and 893 males per 1000 females, respectively (PRIBYTKOVA 2003, 226–227).

The structure of Ukraine’s population by major age groups is characterised by a gradual increase in the retired contingent. At the same time, the share of the population in the 0–15 age group (children and teenagers) has tended toward stable reduction. However, in the late 1990s the share of the population which had reached active working age (16–54 for females, 16–59 for males) began to increase, from 55.7% in 1991 to 57.9% in 2000. On the whole, the age structure of the Ukrainian population is regressive and provides evidence of decreased reproduction in the population. This slowdown in reproduction is also accompanied by depopulation and the development of imbalanced age structure. At present (as of 1 January 2017), the largest number of persons in the over-65 age group is concentrated in the northern regions of Ukraine as well as in its central ones where the portion of this age group now exceeds 16.2% (the average indicator for Ukraine on the whole). The most aged population lives in the Chernihivs’ka, Sums’ka, Poltavs’ka, Cherkas’ka, Kirovograds’ka, Vinnyts’ka regions, where their share reached 19.2%, 18.3%, 17.7%, 17.5% and 17.3% respectively. (PRIBYTKOVA 2003, 226–227).
3. Dynamics of ageing and life expectancy at birth

The ageing of the population has a marked influence on changes in the mortality level. The rising proportion of inhabitants aged 65 and over, in conjunction with the steadily declining standards of living is accompanied by a reduction of life expectancy at birth. Since the early 1990s, this index has dropped by 2.8 years, falling to 67.9 years in 1999–2000. The rate of decrease in life expectancy at birth is higher for men than for women: during the 1990s, this index decreased by 3–5 years for men, dropping to 62.4 years in 1999–2000; the rate for women has only dropped by 1.4, to 73.6 years. It should be noted that the mortality decrease recorded in Ukraine in 1996–1998 was accompanied by a rise in life expectancy at birth for this short period of time, although the index never managed to reach the level seen in 1990. Since the early 2000s, life expectancy at birth in Ukraine was characterised at first by stabilisation and from 2009–2010 this index showed a steady tendency for increasing. In 2016 average life expectancy was 71.7 years as a whole, (66.7 years for men and 76.5 for women). In spite of the rising in life expectancy at birth during the 2010s, the number of retired contingent in the meantime was characterised by a gradual decrease from 14.447 million persons as of 1 January 2001 to 11.956 million as of 1 January 2017. As for the contingent of pensioners by age, their number has shortened by 1.183 million – from 10.299 million in 2001 to 9.116 million in 2017. According to official returns of Pension Fund of Ukraine, the proportion of pensioners of all categories per 1,000 in average annual population has dropped, falling from 295 in 2001 to 282 persons in 2017.

To sum up, the decrease in average life expectancy declined after the collapse of the USSR. The drop in standards of living, unemployment and worries about the future forced many people to reconsider marriage and reproductive plans. The structure of Ukraine’s population by major age groups was characterised at this period by a gradual increase in the retired cohort. On the whole, the age structure of the Ukrainian population is regressive and provides evidence of decreased reproduction in the population. This slowdown in reproduction is also accompanied by depopulation and the development of imbalanced age structures. There is no doubt that the Russian aggression and the economic burden, connected with it, played a major role in the development of modern demographic processes, forcing people to postpone their marriage and childrearing plans and wait for better days.

4. Ethnic self-identification and its changing dynamics

As of January 12, 1989, 72.7% of the inhabitants in Ukraine identified themselves as Ukrainians, 22.1% as Russians and 5.2% attributed themselves to another nationality. Out of 37.4 million Ukrainians living in the country at this moment, 87.7% defined Ukrainian as their native language and 45.5% of them spoke fluent Russian. In distinction from Ukrainians, almost all Russians (98.3%) considered Russian as their native language though every third of them (32.7%) spoke fluent Ukraine.

In the latest population census taken by Ukraine in December 5, 2001 there were essential changes in the ethnical structure of the population. The share of title nation representatives increased in size and totalled 77.8%. The share of Russians has decreased
to 17.3% and a portion of other nationalities from different ethnic groups in Ukraine has dropped to 4.9%. The analysis of regional-civic and ethnolinguistic self-identification of the inhabitants in Ukraine, fulfilled by the author in 2014, revealed that the overwhelming majority of the population identify themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian ethnicity (88%), while the share of ethnic Russians in Ukraine (as they define themselves) has decreased to 10.1%. Besides, the native language and the language of family communication (even to a greater extent) often do not coincide with self-identification of Ukrainians. Representatives of other ethnic groups residing mainly in the Southern and Eastern parts of the country, as well as in the Transcarpathia region have decreased to 1.9%.

The decrease of the Russian population’s share is the result of many causes, such as migration losses, change of ethnic self-identification in case of birth in a mixed family or decrease of mixed marriages. At the same time the share of people having parents of the same nationality has grown from 73.7% in 1992 to 84.9% in 2016. Nevertheless, the convincing argument in favour of the further strengthening of national group identities (Ukrainian, Russian and others) is the growing share of marriages with partners of the same nationality from 53.4% in 1992 to 70.7% in 2016 (Parashchevin 2016, 542).

5. Language self-determination and language policy under the challenges of war

The language self-determination has also changed. In the period of 1991–2012 there existed some kind of balance between Russian and Ukrainian languages identified as native by inhabitants of the country. This situation is still preserved. In a rough outline the status quo is supported by the symbolic meaning of official Ukrainian as the core spiritual value for the whole history of Ukrainian state-building, but in many respects, particularly regarding the practices of everyday usage, it did not and still does not prevail. Although the Russian language is – as before – an unofficial language, it is still widespread in the sphere of unofficial communication and also in the media.

One of the important issues on the language policy in Ukraine is the status of the Russian language, particularly in the situation when the Russian ‘language card’, has become one of the main political justifications for Russian’s aggression towards Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and inspirations of armed separatism in Donbas. These changes have actualised the issues of forming the Ukrainian civic nation (Stepanenko 2017).

The informal status of Russian was broken with the adoption of a new Law on languages On Fundamentals of the State Language Policy in 2012, replacing the Law on languages from 1989 adopted in the Soviet period. The new Law has brought some clarity in the policy on languages with the attempt to fix the split between formal and informal practices in the language usage, above all regarding the status of the Russian language.

Public opinion in Ukraine is diverging regarding the issue of the Russian language. In the recent period, the number of supporters of its official status has decreased. In various polls, at least one third of the respondents supports the idea of its official status, according to the monitoring survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Science during the period from 1996 to 2016 (Table 1).
Sociological accounts, accumulated on the basis of the results of public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine, usually claim that the language issue is not a priority on the list of the troubles for Ukrainians. However, even though language is not considered to be the priority question for the major part of Ukraine’s population, which is predominantly Ukrainian–Russian bilingual (at least, in terms of understanding both dominant languages), this issue used to be at the focus of regular manipulations from different wings of Ukraine’s political spectrum. In Ukraine, the issue of language as a dividing indicator for voters’ differentiation and also as the way for their mobilisation usually comes in periods of electoral campaigns, in the times of crisis, and in situations when politicians have little or nothing to say or prove any significant achievements in the socio-economic sphere.

After the Euromaidan’s victory in February 2014, the parliament cancelled the new legislation on languages proclaiming Russian as the official regional language. Formally it would mean nothing more apart the return to the previous status-quo based on imperfect but compromising legislation on languages. Later on the legislative decision on the cancellation of the 2012 Language Law was recognised to be politically mistaken at the Ukraine’s official level. But this decision had not been signed by the President and therefore – it has no legal force, though veto was also not put on in. It was announced that a new language Law is at the stage of preparation. Meanwhile, this means that the 2012 Language Law is acting now. However, as a result of the real threat of Russia’s further military intervention and the ongoing military armed conflict in Donbas in 2014–2018, Ukraine was forced to leave aside language differences. The external threats to the country’s security and its territorial integrity have accelerated the processes of forming Ukrainian civic nations, particularly through developing Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism. Particularly it was revealed in the active participation of citizens from Russian-speaking Eastern and Southern parts of the country, both Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, in the defence of Ukraine’s territory in opening hostilities in Donbas (Stepanenko 2017, 205).

The experts involved in the analytical activity in the domain of language policy believe that long term delayed issues of languages in the Ukraine, particularly on the status of Russian and the lack of clear, compromising and consistent language policy, contributed to a fertile ground for the growth of political conflicts within and Russia’s external military aggression against Ukraine. The Ukraine’s language policy in order to be successful should also overcome the shortages of the still Soviet institutional legacy with its division of social reality into official and informal domains and its neglect to the rule of law. The current challenges for inclusive language policy in Ukraine, particularly regarding the Russian language, are searching for wise balance between the guarantees of the rights of Russian-

\[\text{Table 1} \]

\textit{In your opinion, should the Russian language be given the official status in Ukraine? (\%)}

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<td>32.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No responses</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source: Parashchevin 2016, 476}
speaking citizens of Ukraine and the need for the country’s protection against Russia’s aggression, in which the Russian language is used as a propagandist tool in a hybrid war against Ukraine (Table 2).

**Table 2**

*The attitudes of the population towards giving the Russian language official status in Ukraine, 2014 (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characters of response</th>
<th>Should the Russian language be given official status in Ukraine?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Under 30</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 30–54</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 55 and over</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elementary school</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secondary school</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secondary special school</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incomplete higher education</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Complete higher education</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kiev</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Big city (over 250,000 of residents)</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Town (under 250,000 of residents)</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Countryside</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Centre</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• West</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• North</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• South</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• East</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donbas</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationality</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ukrainian</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Others</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Native language</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ukrainian</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Others</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language of family</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mainly Ukrainian</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mainly Russian</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both Ukrainian and Russian (dependent on circumstances)</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Another</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Migration trends and their perception

In the late 1980s, before the disintegration of the USSR, a new tendency appeared in the dynamics, structure and direction of migrant flows in Ukraine. The flow of immigrants of Ukrainian origin into the former Soviet republics decreased, and at the same time the flow of Ukrainian emigrants back into Ukraine increased. The absolute and relative proportions of Ukrainian residents in the former Soviet Republics, with the exception of Russia and Belarus, were getting lower and lower.

In 1992, the development of migration processes took a radical turn: formerly unknown forms of migration as well as new migration priorities began to show up in Ukraine. Emigration of Ukrainians increased markedly, and a new form of short-term “shuttle migration” to move goods between Ukraine and Eastern European countries, and Turkey and China became more popular. Ukraine thus became an arena of illegal transit migration. Between 1989 and 1990, formerly deported people, such as Crimean Tatars, Germans, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks/Meskhetians, began to return to the Crimea. After the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, ecological migration became a national problem. Similarly, ‘brain drain’ also continued to gain ground. Migration flows between urban and rural areas changed their direction: in 1992, a positive net migration to the countryside was recorded for the first time. This tendency persisted until 1997. In 1997, rural inhabitants started to move to the cities once again and by 1999 their number had reached 22.1 thousand. However, the influx of migrants to the countryside numbered 12.1 thousand once again in 2000.

The main migration trends in Ukraine at the turning-point of the millennium looked as follows:

- a gradual reduction of ethnic Ukrainians returning home;
- the reduced tendency among formerly deported people to return to the Crimea;
- decreasing ecological migration from the Chernobyl disaster zone;
- the aggravation of the danger of illegal migration;
- increasing ‘brain drain’.

It should be noted that the intensity of migration flows in and out of Ukraine are generally decreasing. The dynamics of gross migration confirm this trend as well: it has diminished from 299,244 migrants in 1998 to 154,037 in 2000 (almost halved). Thus, the sharp rise in migration activity caused by the collapse of the USSR was basically over. Migration flows tended to decrease, and the migration situation was stabilising. The bulk of immigrants returning to Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians arriving from Russia. The contribution of such
countries as Moldova, Kazakhstan and Belarus to the repatriation of ethnic Ukrainians was not as big, but still significant in comparison to other CIS and Baltic countries.

However, the emigration of Ukrainians to foreign countries as compared with the previous years has shown a tendency to increase. Meanwhile, the absolute number of Ukrainians who have emigrated on the whole has been decreasing gradually. The same tendency has arisen in case of emigration to CIS and Baltic countries. Compared to previous years, the absolute and relative proportions of Jewish emigration from Ukraine have decreased. The same tendency has been observed concerning German emigration. Thus the contribution of migration processes to Ukraine’s demographic losses has been reduced considerably. As before, the major contribution to progressive depopulation in Ukraine was the natural decrease of the population.

During the 2000s, Ukraine experienced the diversification of interstate migration flows. If the total number of registered movements of the population between Ukraine and other states, including all migrants regardless of the directions for their travels, regions and countries of destination, decreased by two times, migration exchange with the far abroad countries during the same period has reduced by 2.2 times and with CIS countries by 1.9 times. The contribution of CIS countries to gross migration increased in 2002–2008 from 71.9% to 74.3%, and of the far abroad countries – decreased from 28.1% to 25.7%. Thus, the geography of interstate migration flows in Ukraine was gradually turning into the spatial structure of migration movements, existing at the beginning of the 1990s.

Changes in the size and structure of migration flows were followed by the improvement of the migration situation in Ukraine. Already in 2005, Ukraine turned into the country admitting immigrants and its migration losses over 2004–2005 were compensated by former citizens from CIS countries. However, for the first time since the 1990s, the increase of the population due to migration exchange with the far abroad countries was recorded in 2006. Over the next years this tendency has intensified. Even though the size of migration flows from abroad was not large, the very fact showed the turning-point in the development of the migration situation in Ukraine and its transformation from the country of emigrants into the country of destination for immigrants both from CIS and far abroad countries.

Migration situation in Ukraine turned out to be stable until the end of the 2000s. This meant a new migration balance, which has been inaccessible for twenty years. A certain stage of transformational changes in this sphere has been completed. The development of labour migration inside of Ukraine created a counter balance for the external migration due to the population movements from the rural areas and small towns and thus it strengthened their demographic potential. At the same time, the external labour migration of the Ukrainian population became the strongest movement of migrants abroad. Therefore, the issue of state policy development in the sphere of migration management and ensuring the protection of the human rights of Ukrainian citizens going to work abroad as labour workers remained as before.

In 2008, a large majority of Ukrainians have experienced the disastrous collapse of the mechanisms regulating the world economy and supporting the balance of world financial system. The difficulties in job placement, current unemployment rate and low wages were decisive reasons for people to look for a job outside of Ukraine.
7. Radical change of the migration doctrine of Soviet pattern in Ukraine

The migration doctrine of the Soviet period as a system of official views and regulations, as a leading political principle was based on the passport system, labour legislation and housing policy. The Soviet model of industrialisation with its orientation on labour-intensive sectors of national economy, labour division between large economic regions and levelling of economic development in the republics of the USSR was accompanied by the acceleration of labour resources mobility. The large-scale state programs were spread out for regulating the migration flows. The organised recruitment of workers and agricultural resettling of families were the most efficient ones. The system of professional and regional differentiation of wages and salaries was created for attraction of workers to regions with a lack of labour resources. But the main instrument of controlling and regulating migration flows in the USSR remained during the Soviet period without change: it was the passport system not economic policy, human rights and civil freedoms.

The migration doctrine has radically changed in Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR. In January 1994, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Law On the Procedure of Exit from and Entry into Ukraine by Citizens of Ukraine that guaranteed the right to leave the country and to return without restriction. This law burst the previous order. With its adoption, Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine On Employment admitting the labour or undertaking activity of Ukrainian citizens during their stay abroad acquired the additional force. Innovations in the sphere of migration policy were contained in Articles 24, 25, 26, 33 of the Constitution of Ukraine adopted on 26 June 1996.

And at last, in December 2003, the Parliament adopted the Law On the Freedom of Movement and Free Choice Residence in Ukraine. Propiskas did not exist any longer. It was changed by a registration procedure having the notification meaning. The freedom of movement is defined in the Law as a right of the citizen of Ukraine, as well as the foreigner and stateless person, staying in Ukraine on legal grounds, to move without restriction and by own wish throughout its territory in any direction, by any way, at any time, with the exception of restrictions established by Law. The Ukraine passed from the passport regime to the freedom of movement and free choice of residence and working place. The migration doctrine of Soviet pattern was exhausted. Its ideological and political postulates lost its validity.

8. External and internal labour migration of Ukrainians

According to the data of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine obtained in the public opinion poll concerning living conditions, economic and political situation, interethnic relations, social well-being, public moods and estimates of quality of life, conducted in 2016, the extension of mobile labour markets is lasting

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1 Propiskas was the main attribute of the Soviet passport system established in the USSR in 1932. It was a complex of legal sanctions for restriction of the right to choose the place of residence and direct attachment of citizens to their localities. The stamp of propiskas in the passport of Soviet citizens confirmed their legal trustworthiness. The Soviet Passport System had a police nature and totalitarian character.
in the Ukraine against the background of growing unemployment. The distribution of employed compatriots by place of work regarding their permanent place of residence was also analysed. Special attention was paid to the migration attitudes and plans of all employees: both those earned at home and abroad. It was stated that in comparison with “pre-Maidan” times their migratory intentions have not become stronger until 2016. But later on the turning point in the migration trend becomes obvious.

9. Forced unemployment and mobile labour markets

According to the results of the survey of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 11.0% of all inhabitants of Ukraine proved to be unemployed against their own will and actively looked for a job. Most of them were living in towns and the countryside. As a matter of fact, the number of Ukrainians who had not any paid work was four times higher (44.1%). Many of them lived at somebody’s expense, received social grant-in-aid, pension or stipend. Some of them were self-employed persons. More often people having no paid work live nowadays in the countryside (Pribytkova 2016, 372).

The main root of unemployment consists in the limited chances to find a job. Distribution of judgements regarding the opportunity of successful placement unequivocally points out the difficulties to make feasible a given initiative. Inhabitants from the countryside, small settlements and towns are the most deprived groups. The problem of looking for a job is really immanent first of all to the poor. People are ready to get any job but more than a half of them (55.2%) states that it is difficult. And in this case, the peasantry is the most suffering stratum of the population (65.2%). Inhabitants of towns and small settlements note as well that to get any job is a very complicated task for them (57.8%). Only citizens of the capital consider the search of any job a hard problem relatively rarely (only 25.7%). But inhabitants of large cities regard looking for any job as a difficult undertaking almost twice more often than metropolitan people (47.4%). (See Table 3.)

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2 According to official returns of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine on the economic activity of the population in the first quarter of 2016, the economically inactive population of Ukraine numbered 11,067.0 thousand inhabitants in the age of 15–70 (38.3% of the whole population of corresponding age). Out of them 7,147.9 thousand of Ukrainians belonged to the cohorts of able-bodied age (29.4%). The level of unemployment of the economically active population in the age of 15–70 has increased from 9.6% in the first quarter of 2015 to 9.9% in the first quarter of 2016. This index calculated for the persons of able-bodied age has exceeded the level of registered unemployment calculated for the economically active population of able-bodied age by almost four times (10.3% vs. 2.9%). On the whole the level of employment of the population in the age of 15–70 amounted to 55.6% and in the able-bodied age – 63.4%. Only 16.0 million of Ukrainians from 17.8 million of all economically active population were occupied by economic activity, the rest 1.8 million inhabitants of the country put together the considerable contingent of jobless compatriots looking actively for a job (Pribytkova 2016, 372).
Table 3
Forced unemployment and prospects for getting a job by place of their residence of Ukrainians in estimates, July 2016 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status and prospects for getting a job of Ukrainians in estimates</th>
<th>All inhabitants of Ukraine</th>
<th>Including those living in Kyiv</th>
<th>City (Over 250,000 residents)</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you now unemployed and actively looking for a job?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have nowadays any paid work?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does your work correspond to your education and professional level?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am currently not working</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is difficult to find a job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to my qualification and with a decent salary</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to my qualification but without a salary</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to a decent salary but without my qualification</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any job</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many times have you left Ukraine in order to gain temporary employment abroad?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 time</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 times</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 times</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3 times</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the next year, will you leave the country for temporary work?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pribytkova 2016, 372

The distribution of estimates of Ukrainians regarding forced unemployment and prospects for getting a job by the regions of their residence points out the territories of disaster
generated by unannounced war unleashed by the Russian Federation in the Donbas region and annexation of the Crimea. The forced unemployment in different forms is spread mostly at the Eastern and Southern regions and especially at the non-occupied parts of Donbas where to find any job is a hard task by the evidence of 71.1% of the inhabitants.

Thus, forced unemployment is characterised by a high level of development and possesses additional potential of eventual growth. When the needs to get a job in the place of residence proved to be unrealisable, people are looking for employers at another place. Thus, the mobile labour markets arise from lack of workplaces and are in progress on the ground of unreformed national economy, a vast unemployment and incompetence of the government management.

9.1. Mobile labour markets

When the whole resources of a placement at the local labour markets are exhausted, people look for a job at another country region, city, town or countryside. These urban and rural settlements, tied by labour migration flows, form the internal and international territorial migration systems (TMS). An essential premise of their forming is the transformation of migration doctrine and reconfiguration of migration flows.

The process of radical diversification of migration flows took place at the beginning of the Third Millennium. Already in 2005, the Ukraine turned into a country receiving immigrants and its migration losses where compensated by repatriates of Ukrainian origin who formerly lived in the countries of the collapsed USSR. In 2006, the increase of immigrants from the non-CIS countries was registered in Ukraine for the first time from the beginning of the 1990s. This trend lasted in the following years and in 2012 the number of newcomers from foreign countries increased by comparison with the preceding year 2.4 times more and run up to 76.4 thousand of immigrants. The labour commuting of workers have been possessing till now the qualification of a key form of internal migration in Ukraine, as well as the labour migration flows abroad are today the integral parts of mobile labour markets providing their continuous functioning (PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 368).

According to the data of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine obtained within the project Ukrainian Society: Monitoring Research of Social Changes in 2016, every fifth Ukrainian family (20.2%) has at least one member with experience of temporary work abroad. Among them, every fourth farmer household has sent own representative to earn a living in foreign countries. Urban inhabitants attend to the labour markets abroad more seldom: only 17.5% of families among townspeople and 16.4% among citizens have a member with temporary work experience abroad in 2016. Ukrainians employed abroad acquire diverse vital and labour experience dependent on duration and frequency of their life among foreigners. Most of our people (59.8%) have never left the Ukraine in order to gain temporary employment abroad (Table 3).

Internal mobile labour markets are existing and functioning in the Ukraine for a few decades in spite of the pressure and prohibitions generated by the migration doctrine of the Soviet period. Let us examine the structure of internal migration flows formed by labour commuting of working Ukrainians in their modern sample and design. The principal signs of internal mobile labour markets are a territorial disunion of permanent places of
residence and places of employment inside a country and everyday or weekly labour trips of working Ukrainians to another locality and return back home. Using a metaphor, we may define the inner space of Ukraine as a pulsing demographic field with a variable character of population. In this case we can state that the urban and rural settlements have a quite different day-time and night-time population with another size, structure, way and style of life (Pribytkova 2016).

As for coincidence of place of residence and place of employment, we would like to discuss the contents of Table 4. Attention of the reader is drawn to the considerable share of Ukrainian employees engaged in a labour activity out of their place of residence (19.8% or every fifth). An especially high index of participation in the consolidation of labour bond between city and countryside is inherent to the working peasantry (38.0%). The overwhelming majority of them are employed at the urban settlements (81.6%).

Employed townsmen in a close alliance with the working peasant masses render considerable support to the urban labour markets (83.6%). Data presented in Table 4 confirm the existence of mobile labour markets within Ukraine, united in the common system that are promoting employment both for the urban and rural population. There is a bilateral exchange of labour power between urban and rural areas in all regions of the country. In conclusion we would like to underline that unemployment is not only a quantitative but also a structural problem.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of working Ukrainians by place of employment regarding their permanent place of residence, July 2016 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does your place of employment coincide with your permanent place of residence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am working at my permanent place of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am working at another place (city, town, countryside)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am working abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type is the place of employment where you are working nowadays: urban or rural?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pribytkova 2016, 373
10. Migration attitudes and plans

The current dynamics of migration attitudes demonstrates practically stable time series of indicators in 2002–2016 (Table 5). However, a steady trend, as one would think, has experienced an unforeseen turning-point in 2016. The share of Ukrainians who wanted to leave the locality where they resided increased almost by 10% and ran up to 29.8% in 2016. Such considerable growth of attitudes towards eventual leaving for another place of residence was noted for the first time in Ukraine from the very beginning of Monitoring Research founded in 1994. According to the monitoring data, the share of the Ukrainian population having intention to move in the direction of Russia became less as compared with 1994 (4.5% vs. 12.7%). A fall in the size of this indicator was noted from the beginning of the Russian territorial expansion in 2014. The dynamics of migration attitudes towards countries located beyond the borders of the former USSR has an inexpressive trend: the share of eventual emigrants of foreign orientation is characterised by the same in size indicators: 10.8% in 1995, 10.2% in 2002 and 10.9% in 2016. But within of this time series, the indexes of a lesser size filled the intervals between them. Indicators with insignificant increase can be found only twice (12.1% in 2013 and 12.3% in 2015). Very likely it was the reaction of people to the Maidan events and the war at the Donbas. For the first time, the share of eventual emigrants had an intention to change the current place of residence in favour of another republic of the former USSR which has increased a little in 2015 and 2016 to 2.3% and 2.6% accordingly.

In any case, the attitude towards emigration has a tendency of growth. In 2016, 21.9% of compatriots announced that they have thought about emigration. Four years before (2012) only 14.5% of Ukrainians confirmed that during the last three years they have considered in earnest an eventual emigration. At the same time, the labour trips abroad became more numerous and frequent with a simultaneous decrease in population having never moved to foreign countries in search of a job. The share of those who never worked abroad was rapidly shortening (91.7% in 2002, 87.9% in 2014, 87.3% in 2015, 59.8% in 2016). Unprecedented growth of labour trips abroad taking place this year was observed at all groups of migrants with different frequency of occurrences. In 2016, the personal experience of work abroad had 14.9% of Ukrainians who went away for work once (4.7% in 2015), 8.5% – twice (2.6% in 2015), 6.1% – thrice (1.3% in 2015) and 10.7% – more than 3 times (3.8% in 2015). And 10.9% of our compatriots intended to leave the Ukraine for temporary work abroad the next year (Table 5).

Table 5

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<tr>
<td>Would you like to leave the village/city where you currently reside?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.1. Migration attitudes and plans of employed Ukrainians in 2016

The inhabitants of Ukraine working at different places of employment regarding their permanent places of residence are inclined to make various migration plans. Every fourth person (24.8%) working at the permanent place of residence would like to leave the locality where he or she resided. Almost every third person (29.8%) working at another city, town or countryside wanted to change the place of permanent residence. But labour migrants having temporary work abroad make a choice in favour of leaving for somewhere more often (37.5%). On the whole 25.9% of all employed Ukrainians have a predisposition to move towards places with a better quality of life (Table 6). They are going to look for such opportunities first of all beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union (14.2%) or at another location in Ukraine (10.8%) in the hope to maximise the earned income, improve the living standards and optimise their way of life. The same migration attitudes are immanent to the inhabitants working at their permanent places of residence (13.8% and 9.9%...
correspondingly). A share of those working at another city inside Ukraine and wanting to leave their place of residence amounts to 14.6% both inside Ukraine and beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. The inhabitants of Ukraine participating in the temporary labour tours abroad are the most motivated stratum of population inclined to move abroad forever (37.5%). This conclusion is confirmed by a very high share of volunteers among labour migrants who earned their living abroad and who have already thought in earnest about emigration (62.5%).

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration attitudes and plans</th>
<th>All employed inhabitants of Ukraine</th>
<th>Distribution of working Ukrainians by place of employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permane nt place of residence</td>
<td>Another place (city, town, countryside)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to leave the village/city where you currently reside?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you decide to leave your current place of residence, where would you go?

| To another location in Ukraine | 10.8 | 9.9 | 14.6 | 12.5 |
| To Russia                     | 4.8  | 5.3 | 3.0  | –    |
| To another republic of the former Soviet Union | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 12.5 |
| Beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union | 14.2 | 13.8 | 14.6 | 37.5 |
| I do not know                 | 22.4 | 22.7 | 21.7 | 12.5 |
| I would never leave my home city/village | 44.7 | 45.5 | 42.4 | 25.0 |

In the next year, will you leave the country for temporary work?

| Yes                          | 13.3 | 10.4 | 23.6 | 50.0 |
| No                           | 86.7 | 89.6 | 76.4 | 50.0 |

Have you ever thought in earnest about emigration?

| Yes                          | 25.9 | 25.3 | 27.1 | 62.5 |
| No                           | 72.4 | 73.4 | 69.8 | 37.5 |
| Other                        | 1.6  | 1.3  | 3.1  | –    |

Source: Pribytkova 2016, 375

The labour migration movements inside and out of the country are a kind of self-organising socio-economical behaviour of individuals directed by a system of their preferences. The basic ones having a dominating nature are: maximisation of earned income, minimisation of efforts when achieving one’s object and optimisation of their way of life.
In any case, the European markets of labour, as in former times, will remain attractive for Ukrainian labour migrants, even if its leading positions will be redistributed in favour of labour markets in other countries or continents.

The state policy and legal regulation of internal and transnational labour migration flows in and from Ukraine are to solve the following urgent problems:

- to examine the question of the Ukraine joining to a number of International Conventions in the sphere of labour migration and migrant workers;
- to systematically conduct the work in collection and analysis of information on migration processes, with its further using for solution of regional problems, connected with labour migration;
- to broaden international cooperation of Ukrainian law enforcement services with appropriate foreign structures with a purpose of improvement of effectiveness of struggle against organised criminality, directed against Ukrainian labour migrants;
- to elaborate normative-legal documents for the organisation of a simplified system of money transfer from Ukrainian citizens working abroad and some others;
- to prepare the proposals for a partial redistribution of income taxes paid by Ukrainians at the place of work in favour of budget at the place of their residence at another locality.

As the State Statistical Service of Ukraine informs, about 1.303 million workers went abroad as labour migrants in 2015–2017. Most of them were aged 40–49 years. Every third of them were educated at a special professional training school. According to official statistics, their number corresponds to the size of departing labour migrants. It follows that the Ukrainian professional training institutions are working for export of labour resources in other countries. Officially 0.8 million of Ukrainians are engaged today in different spheres of the Polish economy. Still, according to unofficial information, the real number of labour migrants from Ukraine exceed 2.0 million. As compared with a number of inhabitants in Kyiv, the contingent of labour migrants from our country in Poland constitutes two-thirds of the capital's population or exceeds the size of inhabitants in Kharkiv by half a million. Thus, the scale of a labour migration abroad from Ukraine confirms its essential contribution to the strengthening of the national economy of a neighbouring country. Besides, every Ukrainian labour migrant working in Poland has a legal status, pays the taxes and membership fees of the ZUS and for all that do not wait for pension, do not receive the pecuniary aid from social programme 500+.

In 2017, the influential Polish edition Gazeta Prawna published the List of 50 persons having the largest influence on Polish economics in 2017. The second place was given to the community of labour migrants from the Ukraine, as the collective competitor participated in the proceeding of nomination. As a matter of fact, the Ukrainians have outstripped even the Polish President Andrzej Duda who took the third place.

11. Concluding remarks

Recently, a steadily growing tendency towards very negative appraisal of the quality of own life has arisen in Ukraine. In spite of being one of the states signing the Budapest
Memorandum and undertaking obligations to guard peace, security and the territorial inviolability of Ukraine, the Russian Federation has annexed the Crimea and occupied Donbas without a declaration of war. The Ukraine is at war, qualified as anti-terroristic operation, more than four years. Donbas and the Crimean Peninsula turned into real hot spots. Ukrainians suffer heavy casualties (more than 5,750 casualties including soldiers and civilians, as well as 242 children; 1,584,000 involuntary displaced persons; 3,144 prisoners of war, 144 of them are still not released). Considerable social tension and absence of physical, psychological, legal and financial safety of the people are vital problems in Ukraine today. The image of modern society is associated in public opinion, first of all, with ruin, disorder and deadlock. Migration policy has not yet become a priority for Ukrainian authorities regardless of the fact that according to media reports, the existence of migration problems is among social concerns. There are some doubts related to the problem whether the State Migration Service will turn into the institution capable of providing effective migration management as it was created on the basis of police departments and only a part of competences in this field was transferred to it, without administering functions in the domain of labour migration flows.

References


The Security Policy Relevance of East-Central European Demographic and Migration Trends

1. Introduction

This chapter will focus on the security policy relevance of the common demographic traits and issues of the nine countries featured in the present volume. Its primary area of interest is whether the demographic and migration trends of these countries have any impact – and if yes, what impact – on the security of the respective societies. Could these be construed as topical security policy challenges, meaning whether their population and political elite regard these trends as such? And if the answer is yes: Do these countries have any plans, strategies and experience in solving them?

2. General characteristics

In terms of population, the nine examined countries cover a wide range, with the 42-million Ukraine at one end and the barely 2-million Slovenia at the other. The majority of them fall into the larger category of European states with populations between 2 and 10 million, with Romania as an exception with a population of 19 million. Looking at the most important factors driving the major demographic trends, these countries share many characteristics looking back the past 28 years. With regards to fertility, such common traits are the decreasing ratio of women in childbearing age, the dropping number of abortions and the women’s increasing age at childbirth. In terms of relationships, such are the decreasing number of marriages, the rising number of divorces and children born out of wedlock. Moreover, another common trait was the increase in life expectancy of the population. Additionally, all of these countries have an ageing population (a rising percentage of the over-65 age group) and lower ratio of children. As a result, the average age of the population has increased in all countries (WB 2018). However, it must be mentioned – as the individual studies of this volume have shown – that the size and numerical values of these common phenomena vary largely from one country to the other.

There are many widespread misconceptions regarding demographic issues in East-Central Europe. From the regional press coverage and political discourse of demographic issues, the average citizen can easily draw the conclusion that after the 1989–1990 regime changes, all countries of the region have been affected by population decline. In support of this assumption, the United Nations’ statistics are often quoted saying that with
the exception of Austria, this region is among the two most affected ones in the world regarding population decline (WPP 2017; Romei 2016). Given that the average citizen cannot really distinguish between a slowdown in population growth and actual decrease in population, the false belief that Europe is already in the stage of population decline in regional public opinion is quite strong. However, it is true that natural population growth has been slowing down since the 1950s, Europe’s total population still rose by over 19 million even during the 1990–2015 period.

The statistical data from the examined countries also show a much more nuanced picture than public opinion. In the 1990–2017 period the population of five out of nine countries did indeed fall – most pronouncedly in Romania (−16.7%), followed by Ukraine (−14.4%), Croatia (−11.35%), and at a more moderate rate in Serbia (−6.9%), but the size of the population actually grew in four countries. The growth rate was more modest in the Czech Republic (2.2%) and Slovakia (3%), but quite outstanding in Austria (14.5%), where population growth was almost the double of the European Union average (7.3%) (WB 2018). This means that despite the similarity in the most important influencing factors in the major demographic trends, the end-results in population change are different. This also seems to indicate that the differentiating reasons could be found at the level of social and political responses.

3. Demography and security studies

Demographic trends stand out from social phenomena in several respects, but here and now we will only be looking at two factors which in our opinion have a defining influence on the potential securitisation\(^1\) of demographic problems. One factor is that population dynamics is based on the decisions of individual families and because of that these are largely influenced by cultural tradition and the immediate social environment. As such, it is among the social phenomena that are least susceptible to political intervention. Demographic attitude is strongly linked with value sets and beliefs: influencing and altering them are complex, lengthy and very expensive processes (L. Rédei 2006, 7, 80). On the other hand, this is an area that by its very nature can only be influenced in the long term. This means that shaping it requires foresight, strategic approach and a strategic toolset from the actors wanting to influence them. However, approaching demographic trends as a security policy issue is remarkably problematic for politics not solely because of the above-mentioned reasons. The other issue to consider is the method of securitisation. Childbearing could

\(^1\) Based on the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde the present study refers to securitisation as the process resulting from the dialogue of society and political leadership that results in a particular issue becoming a security problem and is thereby excluded from the flow of normal policy. The first step of securitisation is the articulation of a (real or often just supposed) existential threat to the object of reference (e.g. state, people, nation), referred by a credible actor (e.g. political leader) towards the population. We can talk about successful securitisation in case when subsequently society will grant the credible actor powers to invoke extraordinary measures and circumvent regular political rules (e.g. re-allocation of resources, devising legal and institutional responses, usage of foreign policy methods, etc.). In this respect, securitisation is also an exercise of power mechanisms, given that the credible actor may be able to circumvent regular political rules by manipulating the subjective security perception of society even without the actual presence of an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998).
serve as a good example to discuss the issue. Raising a child anywhere in the world results in material disadvantage and a loss of living standards. Under ordinary political conditions, states tend to offset these by measures intended to increase the willingness to have children. It is, however, nowhere near certain that the securitisation of childbearing – i.e. presenting a lower number of births as an existential threat and treating it with extraordinary measures – will in fact create a social atmosphere actually conducive to solving the problem itself. Politics will want to solve population dynamics through the securitisation of demographic problems, an issue which is – as we have already mentioned – by its nature within the realm of the family.

Demographic trends and their consequences became the focus of international security studies – a discipline born after World War II – at the end of the 1960s and simultaneously also the forefront of global public opinion. We will illustrate this with three pivotal events. In 1968, Paul L. Ehrlich’s demographic bestseller, *The Population Bomb*, which discussed overpopulation, was published. The *United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)* began its activities in 1969 in order to help developing countries tackle the problems of demographic policy, family planning, population statistics and the population-related aspects of economic and social development. Finally, in 1974 the so-called Kissinger Report was born, which was the first document calling the attention of top-level politics to the repercussions of the least developed countries accelerating population growth on U.S. national security. Less than half a decade later China, the world’s most populous country officially adopted its *one-child* policy for fear that population growth would outpace economic development (*Agonács [s. a.]*). Ever since, the majority of demography-related security policy studies has been dealing with security and the security policy aspects of overpopulation (e.g. deterioration of resources – freshwater sources, farmland, natural vegetation; environmental pollution; growing energy needs and the resulting energy shortages; climate change; conflicts stemming from the resource hunger resulted by population growth, etc.). We must add that this approach is entirely justified because the explosive population growth might be in its final stages in Asia but has only begun in Africa.

Another key element of demographic trends – that of an ageing population, i.e. the phenomenon when in any given time interval, the ratio of old and young people grows in favour of the elderly – has emerged from the arena of expert debates into the agenda of international politics. The United Nations held its first global conference on ageing (World Assembly on Ageing) in Vienna in 1982, where they adopted a 62-point list of recommendations to devise old-age policies and social agendas (*VIPAA 1983*). Although these recommendations mainly touched upon areas such as research of the issue, data gathering and analysis, education and training, moreover some specific sectors such as health and nutrition, protection of the elderly, housing and environmental protection, family protection, social welfare, income security and employment, we can still consider this date to be crucial when ageing became an official topic of security studies. This mainly refers to conclusions of the Copenhagen School formulated a decade and a half later when most of the countries in the world realised that population ageing requires joint extraordinary measures from the international community (*Buzan* et al. 1998, 23–24). The Copenhagen School further reinforced the relationship between population ageing – and in a wider sense demographic issues – and security studies by inventing a sectoral approach to security, extending the notion of security beyond its military dimension to the spheres
of environment, economy, society and politics (Buzan et al. 1998, 49–162). Since then hundreds of studies have dealt with the economic, social and political impacts of ageing, from its effects on the labour market, economic growth and social welfare system through the sustainability of armed forces to the changing political attitudes of an ageing population (Bengtsson 2010; Apt 2014; Vanhuysse–Goerres 2012).

Nevertheless, we can only speak of actual population loss since the mid-1990s. The issue – as a potential future scenario – became the subject of serious debate among demographers, after the second half of the 1970s when the fertility rate indicator in America and Europe dropped below the sustainable population growth minimum of 2.1. The basic approach of the debate at the time was best summed up in *The Fear of Population Decline* by Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter published in 1985. The authors argued that besides family support to encourage child bearing, the potential population decline of countries with low fertility rates could also be compensated by migration coming from countries and territories with high fertility rates (Teitelbaum–Winter 1985, 153–154). This approach was essentially adopted by the United Nations on behalf of the international community (UNPD 2000; Lesthaeghe 2000), and it remained dominant in the Western European debate about population decline until the mid-2000s. Although there have been diverging opinions, they mostly remained in minority and only with regard to a limited number of countries (Vishnevsky 2000). In response to the experts recommending migration to offset the effects of population decline, European critics had another response. They thought that migration towards Western Europe was primarily driven by the needs of the labour market instead of demographic and nation-building aspects and that migration without an increase in fertility rates in itself would be insufficient to sustainably counteract population loss (Chesnais 2000, 14; Tapinos 2000, 12). In the wake of 9/11 and 2005 London terrorist attacks, as well as the 2015 European migrant and refugee crisis, the political debates about the challenges of European multiculturalism have become ubiquitous (Joppke–Morawska 2003; Fomina 2006; Sarrazin 2011; Rath 2011; Joppke 2014; Malik 2015). These debates have brought the European migration policy into question (deeming it excessively liberal) and at the same time amplified the voices of experts warning about the challenges of population decline. This is primarily because attempts to raise the European fertility rates failed in the 1990s and had only very modest success thereafter, meaning that from this point migration became the main source of European population increase (Salt–Almeida 2006; Münz 2007; Bijak et al. 2007). Paradoxically, it is in large measure due to this migration-driven population rise that Europe has avoided the securitisation of population decline so far. One must also note, however, that despite the debates on migration policies not a single demographer has questioned so far whether the most effective way of handling population decrease is a demographic policy based on family support encouraging childbearing, a social system geared towards population ageing and a welcoming migration policy.

4. Migration and security studies

Migration – as old as humanity itself – has grown into a relatively massive, natural and growing global phenomenon in the last third of the 20th century and has also become the subject of security studies. The literature of security studies dealt with migration
as a security challenge from two angles mostly: firstly, from the perspective of national security, pointing out that losing control over migration could negatively impact national sovereignty within the realm of human security as an issue of individuals’ safety (Wohlfeld 2014, 61). This second issue emerged in parallel to the rising number of forced migrants and refugees among all migrants since the mid-1970s.

It is, however, important to note that there are still serious debates within the security literature as to how and in what scenarios is it justified to discuss international migration as a security issue. This dilemma is strongly linked to the fact that migration is a phenomenon that is an opportunity and a challenge, one that has both advantages and disadvantages. For mostly poorer countries, it is an obvious advantage having to take care of less people, thereby reducing the strain on available resources while migrants will also transfer part of their earnings back home. Some of the disadvantages of migration for the countries of origin are the loss of the young, skilled, well-equipped and schooled population and the dismantling of families. Moreover, the fact that as a result of migration, the society’s population pyramid becomes distorted and mortality rates among the remaining old will rise. Migration also has many advantages for the receiving or destination countries: labour can become cheaper, it may relieve workforce shortage, and low-prestige, poorly paid and unpopular jobs will be filled and the same stands — to a smaller extent — to highly qualified jobs (such as doctors). It can also reduce population loss and ageing. Some of the disadvantages are language problems, the emergence of ethnic, religious and cultural tensions and an increased pressure on healthcare and housing systems. Additionally, part of the country’s citizens may lose their jobs as a result of the workforce inflow, and the arrival of migrants could encourage the emigration of the local well-equipped and well-educated workforce. Thus the image is neither black nor white, as some of the participants of the international discourse on migration would like to picture it.

Modern history shows us that migration mostly becomes a security issue only when states and the international community are unable to handle its consequences. That can be the case partly because they fail to take into account its long-term social effects, partly because migrants can arrive in such large numbers that the local administration is unable to receive and settle within the usual policy framework. These were the main reasons for the birth of migration crises after World War II and the one we have witnessed during the 2015 refugee and migration crisis.

Understandably, expert literature dealing with migration does not generally regard international migration as a phenomenon relevant from a security policy perspective, but only the irregular forms of it (Wohlfeld 2014, 64–65). States and societies can freely choose who they want to accept or are willing to live together with and only have international obligations to grant temporary refuge to a specific circle of migrants, well-defined by international law. Regular migrants — as we have already indicated — are considered a security concern primarily when their social integration is unsuccessful. Practical evidence shows that it happens most often to migrants with a radically different cultural background especially if they form sufficiently large separate/separated social groups within the receiving society (Schönwälder 2007). At the same time, the success of social integration depends on how any given society — as a (national) identity community — looks upon its sovereignty (from a territorial or ethnic-cultural perspective), how it defines the relationship between the community and its constituent individuals, and where it
draws the boundaries of its own political and cultural community – in other words who is considered a foreigner (Csepeli–Örkény 2017, 105). The 2015 European refugee and migration crisis has clearly demonstrated that in this respect there are significant differences between the societies of the European Union.

As it is the case with the handling of most global security challenges, the approach to migration is also characterised by a peculiar dualism. On the one hand, tackling the challenge seems to be easier in theory due to the fact that the majority of the world’s states has already realised that handling the issue requires extraordinary measures on behalf of the international community. With regards to migration, this is well indicated by the fact that the European Union regards international migration as a political priority from 2005, while the 193 member states of the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (SDG 2030) in September 2015. This framework agreement includes 17 points, nine of which are also related to international migration, and identifies the basic problems the solution of which would void migration of its security challenge status (Appave–Sinha 2017). This is a significant step forward in tackling international migration, as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), adopted by the same group of countries in 2000, did not identify migration as a problem to be solved. On the other hand, the international community and the United Nations consist of individual states, whose long-term political commitment to extraordinary measures tackling global challenges is in practice defined by their national interests most of the time and the measure to which a given challenge affects them in the present, and the short and long term.

A number of other factors also make the handling of international migration difficult. On the one hand, migration – similarly to childbearing – is fundamentally an action based on the decisions and rationales of micro-communities (i.e. families or even individuals) and can only be considered an international social phenomenon because it transcends national borders on the account of its sheer size. This means that it is nowhere near certain that a global or national approach in itself is necessarily sufficient to understand its roots and to handle it (Csepeli–Örkény 2017, 116–117). On the other hand, any given society’s attitude towards migration – as we have already mentioned – is strongly affected by how its members think about their sovereignty, the political and cultural boundaries of their own community, what they think the actual condition of their state society and what their fundamental attitude towards foreigners is. In other words, the social image of migration is strongly influenced by subjective elements linked to national identity. As a result, migration – especially international migration – is relatively easy and simple to securitise (Adamson 2006; Curley–Wong 2008; Themistocleous 2013). In addition, international migration primarily affects those security dimensions – political, economic, social – which one can most often see that the success of securitisation is not necessarily proportional to how much the object of securitisation is an actual threat to the community. This is well illustrated by Eurobarometer polls according to which after 2015 even countries (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic) which remained practically unaffected by the effects of the 2015 crisis, still considered migration as a number one threat to their own country’s security (Standard Eurobarometer 85-90 2016, 2017, 2018). The emergence of such public opinions was probably facilitated by the fact that international migration can be linked to several other phenomena affecting national security (e.g. terrorism, unemployment, conflicts stemming from religious and cultural differences), regardless of whether there is
a quantifiable statistical relationship between these phenomena (Journal on Baltic Security 2015, 7–124; Androvičová 2016; Tkaczyk 2017; Beck 2017). Finally, another problem is that international migration – due to its size and the nature of its origins – can only be handled through sustained and long-term cooperation among states, given that most of them lack the effective means and necessary resources to tackle it on their own. Partly as a result of the above mentioned factors, most states concentrate on handling the direct consequences of migration (with border defence, setting up refugee camps) even when they are fully aware that without talking about the roots of the problem, the results will be neither lasting nor effective. Joint action, however, can only be effective if the measures are taken with identical political goals, which is again very much a function of the social perceptions of migration. It is also crucial to note that it is the decision of a given society to draw the line from which it considers the phenomenon a security challenge. Since the 2015 crises, these differences have become obvious within the European Union and have been the main reason why the member states could not even agree on the handling of such fundamental migration tasks as joint border defence, common criteria for accepting migrants and the distribution of refugees arriving on EU territory.

5. The limits of securitising demographic and migration issues

There is a fairly strong consensus among demographers that an effective demographic policy must rest on three main pillars: a family policy to encourage childbearing, increasing life expectancy (through reducing mortality among the young and middle-aged and through elderly policies) and a migration policy (besides immigration this also includes policies regarding emigration and return migration). Neglecting any one of these areas will lead in the long and sometimes even in the short term to population decline and ageing. Both statements are clearly visible on the examples of the nine countries discussed in the present volume. On the one hand, we have seen that in Austria population growth was mainly a result of immigration and higher fertility rates. In the Czech Republic, the rise was almost exclusively a result of immigration and only to a small extent was it affected by the fact that childbearing among the numerically large Husak-children did not fall as steeply as among the Hungarian Ratkó-grandchildren. On the other hand, the severe population loss in Romania was both the result of massive emigration and the drastic fall in fertility while in Ukraine lower fertility was the main reason.

We may think that even the average citizen should easily realise the security policy relevance of population decline and social ageing. This realisation – i.e. accepting that population decrease and social ageing represent an existential threat on society – is the precondition to the securitisation of demographic policy so that extraordinary measures could be implemented. The examples of the nine countries examined in this volume clearly indicate that presenting demography or its elements as a security issue is in practice not as straightforward as it may seem at first glance. Not even in countries the societies of which in the examined time span were faced with real and relatively large population losses (Romania, Ukraine, Croatia). One of the main reasons for this is that the components of demographic policy can only be securitised to varying degrees. With regard to this, it is important to note that the defining criterion for securitisation is to prove that a given
(real or perceived) existential threat has demonstrable or at least plausible roots and it cannot be handled through alternative means. This process is the so-called securitisation speech act, a mean by which the ruling powers attempt to convince society that the given phenomenon is a problem that poses an existential threat which can only be tackled with extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998). Nowadays, this speech act is delivered mainly through mass media and political public discourse. In the age of global digital information flow this makes securitisation easier even if the phenomenon intended to be introduced as a security issue does not impact the given society. Terrorism is an excellent example which is considered a serious security policy threat even by those European societies where the phenomenon is not or hardly present (Tálas 2016). In these cases, successful securitisation is the result of the fact that our sense of security is mostly subjective, based on perceptions and can easily be dissociated from objective threat experiences. Paradoxically, this remains true even when the threat is unknown in that society’s everyday life. This is why we can often see – in the case of terrorism as well – poll results showing that the populations of countries with actual terrorist threats perceive this threat lower than the societies where no terrorist acts are being perpetrated (Standard Eurobarometer 85-90 2016, 2017, 2018).

As we have already indicated, members of a society often have a very subjective image of the security of their larger environment, given that it is mainly shaped by media and political public speech. Also, they only have actual experience regarding the security situation of their immediate environment. But this latter is also what makes the securitisation of any problem or phenomenon more difficult. These security-related factors are based on the decisions and beliefs of individuals or families (such as childbearing, immigration and emigration). This is the sphere where it is most difficult to actually prove the veracity of an existential threat because this is where our actual experiences and perceptions affect our security perception the most. This is also where it is the most difficult – and politically most hazardous – to point out the reasons for the extraordinary because these may well be ourselves or those living in our immediate environment and where pointing out the culprits could lead to conflicts that not only interdict the original goal of securitisation but could ultimately lead to the fall of the political power attempting securitisation. This is the area where it is the most difficult to demonstrate that extraordinary measures have no alternative within normal politics. It is especially hard for a political power to attempt securitisation while it may well be held responsible for bringing about the situation itself. Thus it is not accidental that governments shy away from solving demographic problems by measures (such as pension reforms or making family subsidies more rational) when there is in principle a social consensus regarding their necessity and where the benefit of extraordinary measures can be proven by existing international examples.

With regard to international examples supporting securitisation, it is worth mentioning that demographic problems have led to population decrease in the majority of Eastern and East-Central European countries (13 instances out of 20). Even in five within the seven countries who managed to avoid this consequence, there have been periods of population decrease. The effects of this common problem were not strong enough to lead the regions’ politicians at least to form some kind of international consensus to facilitate the securitisation of unfavourable trends and phenomena in the past 30 years. It was because these societies have had to face the issue of population decrease at different points in time (Hungary as early as the 1980s, Poland only after 1999) and in several regional countries,
population change has been fluctuating in the past 28 years (e.g. Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia). In addition, these individual societies also have varying traditions, value sets and behavioural patterns that define population dynamics, as we have already mentioned with regard to the different childbearing attitudes of the Ratkó-grandchildren and the Husak-children, the two most populous generations of the past three decades.

Regional differences are even more obvious with regard to the judgement of migration. While in Hungary and the Czech Republic migration and taking in refugees have clearly appeared in the political discourse since 2015 as a hard and immediate security policy problem almost reaching existential threat levels (Tálas 2018; Frank 2018), immigration has already been the subject of social debates before the onset of the migration crisis and remains a separate issue from the political debate regarding the intake of refugees (Riederer et al. 2018). In contrast, in Romania, Croatia and Serbia emigration is admittedly one of the most important demographic challenge and the 2015 crisis did nothing to change this (Todor 2018; Lőrinczné 2018; Örđögh 2018). And one has not even mentioned the diverging judgments of these phenomena at the level of families and individuals, where demographic trends are actually made/decided on. Convincing people that emigration is detrimental to demographics might be more difficult in the case of the former unemployed who have gained employment after others have left the country or in the case of those who benefit from earnings wired home from abroad but it might be easier in the case of businesses faced with a workforce shortage. Usually it is easier to convince those who fear the loss of cultural and religious cohesion of their society that immigration is a bad thing and more difficult to convince those who employ cheaper labour from abroad.

We can say in general that in practice those demographic and migratory phenomena are easiest to securitise which as a security problem has for some time already been the subject of wide (international) consensus (e.g. overpopulation, ageing), or those which the political powers can blame on external factors (e.g. immigration). It is most difficult to securitise issues that are traditionally based on individual or family decisions and belong to the private sphere (e.g. childbearing, abortion, emigration and immigration) or those that on account of their novelty, rarity or alternative solutions have not been identified by (international) consensus as security issues (e.g. population decline). It is thus not by accident that although demographic issues have been present in the national security strategies of all examined countries (i.e. have been identified as security issues), with the exception of Croatia, sectoral strategies or action plans involving practical measures have only been devised for handling the elderly (Scoppetta–Machačová–Moser 2013, 47) and the immigration side of the migration issue.

6. Demographic and migration issues − The specificities of extraordinary measures

In our region the handling of unfavourable demographic trends and processes as classical security policy issues is very limited with regard to the use of demographic policy tools and methods. First and foremost, in a general and fundamental sense, the extraordinary measures in these areas – due to the previously mentioned particularities of demographic and migration decisions and to the fact that general European values are different from
extraordinary measures in any other field – cannot be overtly punitive and repressive (such was the total ban of abortions or a childless tax in several regional countries in the early 1950s). Besides moral constraints, those in power must also accept this due to the projected efficiency of demographic policy measures. Although there are some who continue to advocate a tightening of abortion regulations for demographic reasons, the examples of Romania and Ukraine should quickly dispel any illusions. In these two countries, the number of abortions was significantly reduced between 1990 and 2015 from 992,000 to 700,000 in Romania and from over one million to 101,000 in Ukraine, while the number of live births respectively dropped from 314,000 to 200,000 and from 657,000 to 441,000 (Johnston 2018). This means that radically reducing the number of abortions through sexual education has not increased the childbearing disposition of Romanian and Ukrainian women at all. With this example we only wish to show that demographic issues are also unique in that the extraordinary measures to tackle them must almost always be incentive ones. As an example of incentive measures one can mention the institution of compulsory maternity leave that nowadays has become part of the regular political sphere in the European Union.

In the past decades all of the regional countries – with the exception of Austria – have been conducting a demographic policy heavily centred around a family policy promoting childbearing and within that primarily giving financial support to raising children in families. Much less attention and resources have been devoted to developing the infrastructure of child rearing (e.g. increasing crèche and nursery capacities), developing the human capital involved in child rearing (e.g. the training and resupply of nannies, nurses and paediatricians) and on reinforcing the nurturing care nature of the human capital (e.g. to ensure that any child will have an easily available nanny, nurse and paediatrician during his/her life). Partly because of the above-mentioned factors and partly because the governments could only show modest success in further involving women and especially women with small children into the labour market (e.g. by expanding the availability of part-time work, teleworking or flexible working hours), family support systems remained heavily dependent on conjuncture in their financing and entirely inflexible in their behaviour. This means that on the one hand the systems were significantly exposed to the fluctuations of a given country’s economic performance while on the other they did not really give women the choice whether they want to remain at home with their children. Moreover, the family policy elements (e.g. part-time work, teleworking and legally ensuring the choice of flexible working hours at least in the state sector) have been developed the least through which the governments could enforce positive extraordinary measures and by communicating this also send a signal to society that they do regard demographic issues as serious security policy problems. Also, because the previous (i.e. the Communist) regimes also offered direct financial aid to families, societies continued to regard these as part of the normal – as opposed to extraordinary – workings of family policies. This means that these forms of support have not been differentiated from support meant to ensure social security and thus failed to demonstrate the importance of demographic issues.

The majority of the examined countries also remained without tools and methods for migration policy as applied to demographic policy. In terms of immigration these lack simply due to the fact that with the notable exception of Austria and to a smaller extent the Czech Republic after 2008, the others have not been destinations for immigration. All the other countries were either transit routes for international migration (Hungary, Serbia,
Croatia, Slovenia) or have not been affected at all by international migration (Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine). Following the 2015 migrant and refugee crisis, the demographic relevance of migration has been further marginalised. This resulted from the fact shortly after the beginning of the crisis, the governments of several countries have swiftly and efficiently securitised the migration problem (e.g. Hungary and the Czech Republic) but did this in a way that further deteriorated the chances of migration to be regarded as an acceptable and effective demographic policy tool by their respective societies. Conversely, every government in the region is apprehensive about securitising the other side of migration policy, namely emigration and re-migration. This is because doing so would inevitably lead to discourses about causality – unavoidable for devising efficient extraordinary measures – which would also mean that their societies would inevitably also assess governmental performance.

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This volume aims to summarise the demographic and migration processes of nine Central and Eastern European countries (including Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine) from the collapse of the bipolar world order until 2018. The studies analyse the issues of demography and migration together, because of the convincing argument that the complex demographic problems of the region can only be mitigated in the future through a comprehensive demographic policy that encourages childbirth, supports health preservation and builds on an effective migration policy as well. In general, Central and Eastern European countries belong to a region, where demographic prospects are less and less favourable, while there are several demographic macro processes that have influenced these countries in similar ways (but not to the same extent) during the past 28 years. The chapters in this volume also aim to answer the question of how the introduced demographic processes affect the security, as well as the security perceptions of these societies; whether the people and political elites interpreted them as security issues; and whether these countries had prepared proper plans and strategies to resolve or at least to mitigate their demographic challenges.

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