

**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE  
DOCTORAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY SCIENCE**

**Author's resume of the Doctoral Dissertation written by**

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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMATION CAPABILITY IN THE CIVIL CRISIS  
MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS OF THE EU, WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO ITS  
KOSOVO INVOLVEMENT**

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## **OUTLINE OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM**

**1.1.** Security interpretation varies by the era. In crisis zones, challenges, risks and threats manifest mostly in crimes against humanity and war crimes; terrorism; organized crime; illegal migration; corruption or ineffective states. In the world of globalization, everything is interrelated as information society produces immense amounts of information. Along the historical fault lines, conflicts and wars have to be expected. What are the factors causing crisis and what kind of armed activity is typical?

**1.2.** International and regional organizations are bureaucratic, their decision-making mechanisms are complex, their mandates are limited, they have low budgets, and the sending countries are afraid of personal losses. Peacekeeping and crisis management have become multi-player activities. What international and regional organizations are represented in crisis zones? What is the role of organizations, what is the degree of cooperation?

**1.3.** International actors have different information gathering capabilities. In peace missions there is no unified approach regarding information gathering. In the course of co-operation, mistrust is a barrier. What information capabilities do international actors have? What is the level of cooperation, its intensity between local and international organizations? What is the willingness to share information between international organizations?

**1.4.** Yugoslavia is a fallen state. The status of independent Kosovo has remained disputed. Observer-advisory missions have limited mandates and limited information gathering capabilities, moreover, information management is still a new concept. OSINT is not a widespread activity. The quality of the analytical-evaluation work is below the desired level.

The number of experts involved in information gathering is insufficient. What are the relations of leaders to information management? Does strategic information reach the mission leaders? What is the capability to collect information? Are there any analytical and OSINT activities in the international police? Can an integrated information processing system be constructed?

## **2. HYPOTHESES**

**2.1.** Ever-present wars, mostly along the fault lines of civilizations, are rooted in ethnic and religious contradictions. Security must be understood in a complex way; as challenges, risks and threats rise together. Information society produces immeasurable amounts of information.

**2.2.** International organizations serve peace and cooperation, whereas the UN has lost its predominance, so peacekeeping has become a multi-player activity. Civilian crisis management comes from peacekeeping, but a UN resolution is always needed. The backbone of missions is mostly advisory-observer-type missions.

**2.3.** For information gathering, OSINT and HUMINT are the sources of the most important activities and missions. The ability of international organizations to gather information is nearly the same in the case of a limited mandate. A positive change in co-operation generally cannot be expected, local actors need political approval.

**2.4.** Peace missions can be carried out under UN mandate, parallel with strengthening information management. The operation of police observer and advisory missions is important, along with the ability to gather information. OSINT will gain more space, but the importance of analysis and evaluation is not yet sufficiently recognized.

## **3. THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE**

**3.1.** I review the change in the international security environment at global level. I identify security challenges, threats and risks. I analyse the impact of the lack of security on globalization; information society and conflict, missions' information-gathering capabilities.

**3.2.** I present the development and special features of peacekeeping and civilian crisis management. I would like to point out the importance of the essential presence of missions and operations. I present the UN and EU peacekeeping and civilian crisis management practices.

**3.3.** I review the development of information acquisition. I highlight the role of information in peacekeeping and crisis management. I analyse the organizations' information management practices. I present the particularities of cooperation.

**3.4.** I review the history of Yugoslavia and the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. I will reveal the scope of the missions. I point out the need for information management. I present the features of local criminal investigation. I outline the possibilities of police observation and counselling. I analyse the possibilities of using CIMIC and OSINT in police missions. I highlight the importance of analytical-evaluation work.

#### **4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

**4.1.** In international environment, I used the theoretical and practical skills acquired at military college training and the knowledge acquired during my military service that I could use during my five police missions.

**4.2.** In international crisis zones, I used the knowledge gained during my higher-level police studies and my criminal intelligence experience. This has contributed to my gaining an insight into local law enforcement agencies, to understanding the procedures used, to assess the proportion of forces, tools and methods, and the present customs.

**4.3.** I participated in five domestic multi-week pre-deployment training programmes, which helped to get acquainted with the conflict zones. I did a CEPOL crisis management training course and at least five training sessions in the missions, which, in addition to general preparation, provided knowledge that helped with understanding the specificities of the conflict.

**4.4.** Knowledge gained during my security and defence policy studies helped me identify and understand the interrelated real-world processes in the crisis area. In both domestic and international contexts, I have endeavoured to present the reports I have from an analytical and evaluation point of view.

I presented some of my conclusions at lectures and conferences. I have studied literature, studies, publications and analyses related to my research topic. I have published my mission experiences and the partial results of my research. My analysis and evaluation activities in my country also contributed to the preparation of my dissertation.

## **5. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYSIS WORK**

### **5.1. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THROUGH THE GLOBAL SPACE**

I reviewed different security concepts. I highlighted the security challenges, threats and risks of our time. I examined the environment of missions in such a way that through globalization I created its greatest room for manoeuvring. I introduced information society, which has an impact on the culture of information acquisition. I described the ethnic and religious civilization fault lines that usually defined the recurring nature of crises. I explained the possibilities of conflict outcomes. In my conclusion, I pointed out the forces and impacts affecting the missions.

### **5.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

I presented the main characters of the crisis zones. I reviewed the historical background of the organizations, highlighted their peacekeepers and their crisis management capabilities. In my inquiries, I focused on the United Nations and the European Union, but I also considered the presentation of the OSCE and NATO capabilities as indispensable. I mentioned the African Union only from a historical point of view, and then outlined peacekeeping and crisis management. I have pointed out that without international organizations there is an unimaginable effective peacekeeping and civilian crisis management.

### **5.3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMATION IN PEACEKEEPING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

I reviewed the history and characteristics of information gathering. Subsequently I touched upon the UN, the EU, OSCE, and NATO information gathering capabilities. I demonstrated that the essential capacity of the international actors involved in peacekeeping and civilian crisis management is cooperation. I pointed out that the nature of information is infinite, but I

also shown that the information-gathering ability of international actors in the clusters of crisis areas is generally limited. I argued that there is no successful crisis-zone activity without information gathering and cooperation.

#### **5.4. OPPORTUNITIES OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN EULEX KOSOVO MISSION**

I presented the brief history of Yugoslavia, and I detailed the conflict in Kosovo. I presented EULEX's legal freedom of movement. I highlighted the need for information management. I pointed out the features of observation, counselling and intelligence activities. I outlined the practical aspects of information gathering, with particular regard to drug and organized crime. I highlighted the effectiveness of CIMIC and examined its possible use in police missions. I emphasized the importance of OSINT and presented the analytical-evaluation work.

### **6. SUMMARISED CONCLUSIONS**

**6.1.** In the first chapter, I presented the general international environment and pointed out that without understanding security, the nature of the conflict cannot be understood, whose reasons are recognized by decision-makers through information gathering. I examined the security background of the Cold War when there were a small number of missions, so practically we could not talk about gathering information. Subsequently, globalization that has been all about it has changed the world. There is a strong interconnection where everything is connected to each other and affects each other. Another feature of globalization is information society, which puts pressure on the activities of information-gathering bodies. I stated that the mission's decision-makers, with the capabilities of information society, need to be supported. I showed that the root causes of crises are most closely to be examined along the fault lines of religion, identity and culture, as parallel to these fault lines wars break out. These crises are mostly characterized by ethnic cleansing, anti-humanitarian and war crimes, and terrorist actions. Supporting decision-makers with information, during the lifetime of missions is paramount. Yugoslavia is also a typical example of such a fault line where the struggle of the three entities led to a civil war resulting in ethnic cleansing. The ethno-religious conflict in Kosovo also showed its worst image. I showed that non-independent Kosovo had always been striving to self-reliance, but the way to that led through

demonstrations, revolt, guerrilla warfare, repression and terrorist actions. I pointed out that crimes against ethnicity were committed against humanity. Collection of information should be undertaken to support the subsequent investigation of criminal offenses. In relation to war I pointed out that it is the eternal characteristic of humanity. I agreed that we live in the era of asymmetric warfare. I found that crisis zones always create complex security challenges, threats and risks. I identified that mostly ineffective states, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, terrorism, migration, international crime, corruption and crimes against humanity are present in crisis areas. In order to identify the hazards, it is essential to provide decision makers with analysed intelligence. I came to the conclusion that the information needs of observer-consultant police missions have increased considerably.

## **COMPARING THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS WITH THE FINDINGS**

I concluded that war is constantly present, mostly for ethnic, religious or ideological causes. I showed that the challenges, risks and threats appear together. I pointed out that information society put pressure on decision-makers.

**6.2.** In the second chapter, I presented the international actors that direct the missions and are present side-by-side. I agreed with the formation of a dense network of organizations and institutions. At the same time, shared capacity, bureaucracy, sudden changes, different decision-making mechanisms, rivalry, and lack of cooperation hinder their effectiveness. I pointed out that decision-makers need cooperation and information sharing. I highlighted that the largest and most decisive international organization is the United Nations, a “school-maker” for peace missions. At the same time, organizational backwardness has conserved, responses to the challenges, risks, and threats are lacking and contradict to the views on information acquisition. The organization has to endorse strengthening OSINT. The federation needs organizational reforms, its most important task is to increase its efficiency and ability to gather information. NATO has completed its basic task of peacekeeping and crisis management following the termination of the bipolar system. It can be stated that NATO is currently the world's largest military-political organization with significant intelligence capabilities and crisis management experience. Its operations have been globalized from operational point of view. The alliance is used with preference in combination with UN and EU operations. It can be stated that the EU is an internationally

recognized community struggling with bureaucratic dysfunctions that reduce its effectiveness. The EU's operational range has been extended to an almost unlimited extent. In 2003 the Union launched its crisis management activities but could rely almost exclusively on NATO military capabilities. I have established that OSCE's strengths are early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and election observation. It can be stated that the AU plays a prominent role in Africa.

It can be stated that UN peacekeeping activities are identical with the world organization's image. I was involved in peacekeeping until now and I found that police activities are best conducted without a weapon, under the mandate of an observer-consultant. This type of action is widely accepted, but it needs to strengthen its ability to collect information. I showed that the observer-type activity had fallen into the background, so I pointed to its limited return. Civil crisis management is an unarmed observer mission, primarily aimed at sending observation and status reports. This activity is based on effective information gathering and cooperation. Crisis management is an indispensable task for NATO and EU-led operations, with UN mandate. I showed that this type of mission is a modified equivalent of peacekeeping, and the Union is actively involved in such types of operations. I have come to the conclusion that without effective information gathering, no effective mission can be imagined. In all cases, efforts should be made to ensure that international police officers are allowed to move freely, engage in OSINT activities, establish full cooperation conditions, and have 24/7 SITCEN-supported analysis capabilities.

### **COMPARING THE SECOND HIPOTHESIS WITH THE FINDINGS**

I pointed out that the UN had lost its predominance, so peacekeeping had become a multi-player activity. I proved that it was the result of civil crisis management and peacekeeping. I showed that advisory-observer-type missions are the backbone of missions.

**6.3.** In the third chapter, I presented the history of information acquisition. I outlined the institutions that can help effectively support police observer-consultancy missions. I agree that information gathering is continuous, covers all areas of life, and there is almost no limit to its use. The presence of the activity will be even more perceptible. It is optimal if the collection of information takes place in human, technical and organizational space. OSINT capability must be created for decision-makers. I accepted that the United Nations could not

continue collecting information even in the Cold War, so the organization could not have known the depth of the current situation. At the same time, I agreed that open source information was subsequently authorized. The system has been extended with 24/7 availability centres, but I do not agree with the fact that it is not mandatory to set up these vital elements. I consider the role of the international policeman, OSINT, and the analysis-evaluation capability as the primary one.

It can be stated that the EU started its crisis management operations only after 2001. I showed that the initial EU civil crisis management is based on UN peacekeeping features. It can be shown that the EU depends on the capabilities of the Member States and NATO, and in addition to relying on committees' reports, satellite images and OSINT information. Analysts work in the EU INTCEN 24 hours a day. The introduction of the MAC seemed a good initiative that provided analysis, evaluations, internal information flow, contact and information sharing. It was a mistake to build up with SITCEN for the sake of self-reliance. I pointed out that it is necessary to increase the efficiency of the information support of operations.

NATO does not have an independent intelligence and intelligence system, yet it is the strongest in terms of capabilities. The Alliance is characterized by a well-established networking system in the crisis zone, which links the nations, the MHQ and the missions. SITCEN focuses primarily on the events of crisis areas. Where NATO is present, it is necessary to strengthen police support for information support. I introduced the system of cooperation, which is one of the main features of international police. The claim has taken unprecedented dimensions since 9/11, nowadays with regard to ISIS and illegal migration. Therefore, providing decision-makers with information needs additional support.

### **COMPARING THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS WITH THE FINDINGS**

I confirmed that the acquisition of information is still a decisive activity, primarily in OSINT, HUMINT and analytical-evaluation work. I pointed out that the ability of international organizations to gather information is limited, in the case of an observer-counselling mandate, it is almost the same. I showed that the effectiveness of cooperation is hindered by mistrust and information security.

**6.4.** In the fourth chapter, I pointed out that the observer-advisor mission can only be performed with UN and / or EU mandates. I highlighted that the task can be hampered by the lack of local support, the security situation and the limited international quota. I agreed with the introduction of information management, which provides a more transparent information environment for the decision-maker, and by organizing information gathering it is stated that the data needed for the decision-making of the executives will be qualitatively better. Information acquisition should be extended throughout the conflict. Organized crime became globalized after the end of the Cold War and has reached conflict zones, for example, in Yugoslavia, where the civil war supported, inter alia, the development and consolidation of organized crime. In order to understand the actions, the causes of the conflict and the mission environment must be known. The effects pose a threat to Europe, therefore, missions' decision-makers need more effective information support. Conflict zones are cumulatively threatened by the challenges and threats that have regional and global impacts.

The United Nations deploys mostly monitoring, observer, and advisory missions. In missions with reduced licenses, unarmed participants perform their duties in dangerous conflict zones. I pointed out that co-operation increases the effectiveness of the actors' activities. I discovered that the information obtained from observation is used in the counselling process and then transformed into a cyclic process. It is important to do advising carefully, to know the area thoroughly, to respect the dignity of the local body, and to follow graduation. I identified the requirements for the work of an international police officer, such as knowledge of local characteristics, empathy, negotiation skills, monotony, tolerance and danger. I also revealed factors that reduce them, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, ethnic, religious and other conflicts, organized crime, corruption, terrorism, guerrillas. I stated that in the past, larger number of limited mandate missions were dominant with emphasis on observation, nowadays the smaller, counselling missions have the main role. While to the former a large number of personnel are allocated, to the latter a smaller number of members is provided.

I showed that it is necessary to change the proportion of observers and consultants. It is desirable to install observers everywhere. Mixed application will help promote information-gathering activities more efficiently. I pointed out that the spirit of CIMIC and the information thus obtained provide a model for observation and advisory police missions. The knowledge thus added can further strengthen the work of police policymakers. It can be seen

that OSINT, which has become a stand-alone discovery mode, is added to the collection of information gatherings in more and more places. It can be stated that throughout the course of the operations, open source information collection should be compulsory. Since OSINT cannot replace the other modes of intelligence, it is advisable to place it in a merger centre, if not, in a SITCENT. OSINT is an indispensable part of the police missions and can only be added by adding analytical-evaluation work. I agree that analytical-evaluation activities can be carried out within organizational frameworks. I pointed out that there is no such organization, need and expertise in a mission, yet the decision-maker expects added-value information.

### **COMPARING THE FOURTH HYPOTHESIS WITH THE FINDINGS**

I verified that it is desirable to carry out a peace mission only under UN mandate, where it is necessary to strengthen information management as a way of thinking. I have conveyed that the operation of observer-consultative police missions is of the utmost importance, but the ability to gather information is not clear. I have pointed out that OSINT is likely to receive more space, while the relevance of analysis and evaluation has not been sufficiently recognized yet.

### **7. NEW SCIENTIFIC RESULTS**

1) I was the firstly to elaborate on the specificities of the Police Advisory Monitoring Mission in Kosovo, with regard to decision-makers' information support. I pointed out that on-site information support is essential for the effectiveness of the police without executive mandate, or, in the absence of this, their mission moves at the margin of questionability.

2) I proved that observer-type police activities should be restored in proportion to the police advisory mission. I pointed out that the advisory function cannot provide as much information as an observer-type activity covering the whole area over the time of the operation.

3) I verified that the Pareto Rule can be applied to police advisory and observation missions in the event that all available sources of information are identified and cooperating. I proved that without extensive open information gathering no effective decision-making support can be imagined.

4) On the basis of on-the-spot experience, I supported the need for the creation of a deputy commissar / chief of staff responsible for gathering information. I pointed out that the increasing number of tasks related to information management, the new professional position, and the ongoing analysis and evaluation work provide more effective activity for decision-makers and decision-makers.

5) I disclosed that under OSINT activities missions conduct media monitoring, most of which cannot be replaced by the production of added value after the analysis-evaluation work. I proposed that a standalone OSINT team, supported by experts, should be set up in all police missions without an executive mandate.

## **8. PRACTICAL USE OF THE DISSERTATION, RECOMMENDATIONS**

**8.1** Inclusion in the topics of the central body for law enforcement peace and civil crisis management in Hungary. The purpose of this is to ensure that those who complete the basic course, and who expect involvement in foreign service receive targeted training for decision makers' information support.

**8.2.** Inclusion in the training session of the central body for military peace missions and crisis management in Hungary. This is to make the soldiers expecting to be deployed to get acquainted with information-gathering opportunities for police observer-consultative missions.

**8.3.** Integration in education at the departments of Military National Security, Civil National Security, and Counter Terrorism, and at the Faculty of Law Enforcement of the National University of Public Service. This is intended to provide students with a general picture of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the UN and EU police observer-consultative missions.

**8.4.** Targeted teaching of the dissertation material at courses for police / law enforcement leadership, peacekeeping and civilian crisis management, observation and advisory missions; liaison officer; information; operational officer; evaluation; observer; duty officer; mentor; advisory and border guards.

**8.5.** The dissertation is to be sent to the Hungarian Defence Forces Training and Doctrinal Centre, the Armed Forces Surveillance Group Headquarters, and the Scientific Research Centre, as well as to IO, MNSO, and CTC. This is to provide the organizations with a general picture of the information management of observer-counsellor police peace missions.

**8.6.** Police co-operation with neighbouring countries with a view to establishing a unified regional information management practice in missions. This will help to understand, prevent and combat regional security risks, threats, and challenges.

**8.7.** Initiation of further research or joining the existing projects. Presentation of the dissertation at conferences and further publications.

**PUBLICATIONS**

Uri László: Kábítószer-bűnözés elleni felderítés sajátosságai Koszovóban. Szakmai Szemle. Budapest, 2010 2. szám. 170-175. oldal. ISSN 1785-1181

Uri László: The Significance of Information in the Police Component of Kosovo Crisis Management Operation EULEX. Szakmai Szemle, Special Issue Tradecraft Review Special Issue. Budapest, 2010. évi 1. szám. 94-100. oldal. ISSN 1785-1181

Uri László: Műveleti szintű tanácsadás és megfigyelés sajátosságai, rendőri missziókban. Belügyi Szemle. Budapest, 2010. 12. 58. évfolyam. 92-102. oldal. ISSN 1789-4689

Uri László: Bűnügyi helyzet sajátosságai, az ENSZ grúziai rendőri missziójában. Szakmai Szemle. Budapest, 2010. 3. szám. 115-126. oldal. ISSN 1785-1181

Uri László: Some Crime-related Issues of Incomplete Mini-Schengen Zone on Balkans. Szakmai Szemle, Special Issue Tradecraft Review Special Issue. Budapest, 2010. évi 2. szám. 54-62. oldal. ISSN 1785-1181

Uri László: Koszovó egységes szervezett bűnözési helyzetképe kialakításának nehézségei. Hadtudomány. Budapest, XXI. évfolyam 3. szám, 2011. október. 91-102. oldal. ISSN 1215-4121

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Uri László: A rendőri tanácsadói misszió és a nyílt forrású információgyűjtés. Hadtudomány on-line. Budapest, 2012 elektronikus szám. 10 oldal.

Uri László: Az információbiztonság értelmezése az EULEX Koszovói rendőri tanácsadói műveletében. Szakmai Szemle. Budapest, 2012. 2. szám. 155-166. oldal. ISSN 1785-1181

Uri László: Van-e polgári-rendőri együttműködés, vagyis CIPOC? (Civilian-Police Co-operation). Hadtudományi Szemle On-line. Budapest, 2013. 6. évfolyam 1. szám. On-line kiadás. 203-210. oldal

Uri László: Béketeremtő magyar rendőrök. Belügyi Szemle, 61. évfolyam, 2013. 10. szám október. 110-126. oldal. ISSN 1789-4689

## **CURRICULUM VITAE**

### **HIGHER EDUCATION**

- 2006-2009. Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University  
Security and Defence Policy Expert.
- 1991-1995. Law Enforcement College.  
Criminal expert specialisation. Law-enforcement manager.
- 1985-1988. Zalka Máté Military Technical College.  
Logistic officer and general management training.

### **DOMESTIC SERVICE**

- 2017- Budapest Police Headquarters. Crime section.
- 2016-2017. Counter-terrorism Information and Criminal Analysis Centre.
- 2015-2016. Coordination Centre against Organised Crime.
- 2014. Budapest Police Headquarters. Crime section.
- 2014. Coordination Centre against Organised Crime.
- 1990-2014. Budapest Police Headquarters. Crime section.
- 1988-1990. Kecskemét Fighter Regiment.

### **MISSIONS ABROAD**

- 2008-2010. Kosovo. EU police advisor.
- 2003-2005. Georgia. UN police advisor.
- 1999-2000. Bosnia and Herzegovina. UN police monitor.
- 1996-1997. Bosnia and Herzegovina. UN police monitor.
- 1992-1993. Cambodia. UN police monitor.